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Summary 
SUMMARY 
This study attempts to improve our understanding of the nature of mergers and 
their timing. It is motivated by the inability of empirical evidence at the micro- 
level to provide strong statistical results for the motivation of mergers in different 
periods. At the macro-level, the apparently stronger results of some studies have 
been insufficient to form the basis for a widely accepted theory of merger timing. 
Although the predictions are closer to the observed procyclical and episodic 
behaviour of the process, the findings of the macro-literature have been limited, 
in most cases, to confirmation of what is evident by casual observation. 
This study purports to create a framework that encompasses both the macro- and 
micro-environment of a company which may enhance understanding of the 
dynamic behaviour of merger activity in the UK. At the macro-level, we use 
frequency domain techniques to empirically examine the existence of merger 
waves and their relation to economic fundamentals. The empirical approach 
taken allows the identification of merger waves with different duration, 
regularity, and power, and reports their relation to macro- and financial factors 
along these waves. Having identified the explanatory power of macro- and 
financial factors, as well as the timing pattern of aggregate mergers, we search 
for complementary driving forces of the process at the micro-level. 
At the micro-level, a theoretic-decision model is constructed to explain merger 
timing which incorporates the most prevalent theoretical and empirical 
explanations, suggested by industrial organization and finance literature, into a 
dynamic framework. The model exploits the dynamics of the merger process by 
assuming that motives change over time because of changes in firm-specific 
characteristics and in merger activity per se. The model stresses the endogenous 
character of mergers by explicitly incorporating past, current, and future mergers. 
The theoretical model is estimated, using merger data from the UK from 1990 to 
2004. The empirical approach taken is survival analysis. Such an approach 
explicitly allows for dependency over time, in that it estimates the conditional 
probability of merger; that is, the probability of merger by time t, given that is 
has not occurred by time t-1. It is ideally suited to empirically examine the 
merger timing, since it allows us to investigate whether, given that a firm has 
xii 
Summary 
survived up to a certain point in time, changes in firm-specific characteristics or 
changes in merger activity per se will lead to a change in the timing of a merger. 
Findings of the macro-level provide evidence that fairly regular long waves as 
well as a less regular, less powerful waves of mergers exist. Even though no two 
merger waves are identical, they usually have some important features in 
common. Their coherence with macro- and financial factors varies in strength 
over waves of different duration and regularity. The findings at the micro-level 
provide strong evidence of the endogenous character of mergers. A combination 
of a range of micro-forces is the driving force within a wave which keeps the 
bandwagon rolling at full speed. As a consequence, macro-factors may pave the 
way for the development of initial merger activity, while micro-forces fuel 
merger diffusion and build the dynamics within a wave. 
X111 
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In 1890, Alfred Marshall claimed that economics of mergers and competition 
is a "subject on which it would be rash to speak confidently. We of this 
generation, being hurried along in a world of change, cannot measure 
accurately the forces at work and it is probable that the best guesses we can 
make will move the smiles of future generations. "' Although we can now 
approach this subject with greater confidence, Marshall's remark may still be 
appropriate for some aspects of the merger phenomenon more than one hundred 
years after it was made. In fact, Brealey and Myers (2002, p. 923) consider the 
wave' behaviour of mergers as being among the ten most important unsolved 
problems in financial economics. 
During the last century, significant upsurges in the numbers of takeovers3 
have been recorded in the UK in the 1920s and the 1950s, in the early 1960s, late 
1960s to early 1970s, late 1980s and late 1990s (see, for example, Hannah, 1983; 
Hughes, 1993). With respect to their relative importance, Hughes and Singh 
1 Alfred Marshall, Some Aspects of Competition, reprinted in R. L. Smyth (ed. ) Essays in the 
Economics of Socialism and Capitalism, 1964, p. 101; reproduced from Hannah (1974) 
2 The terms `wave' and `cycle' are used interchangeably throughout this study. 
3 The terms "takeover", "acquisition", "merger" are used interchangeably throughout this study. 
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(1987) report that in the period 1948-1958, UK mergers accounted for more than 
two-thirds of corporate deaths, and in the period 1959 to 1972, for four-fifths. In 
the decade 1972-1982, one in three of the largest 730 quoted companies were 
acquired, whilst in the mid-1980s, 137 of the largest 1000 non-financial 
companies were taken over in just four years (1982 to 1986). The magnitude of 
merger activity in 1990s is unprecedented in terms of takeover value of merger 
deals (see chapter 2). These figures show that merger activity is an important 
feature of the UK economy. 
A significant body of theoretical and empirical research has attempted to 
explain the driving forces of merger activity. At the micro level, the industrial 
organization literature stresses the efficiency-increasing power of it by the 
exploitations of synergies, or growth opportunities and the market power 
hypothesis which perceives the struggle for market share and price-setting power 
as the dominant motive for mergers. This stream of literature can be further 
divided into three main sub-groups, which, although they assume similar motives 
for mergers, provide a different analysis of merger activity. The first sub-group 
refers to the early industrial organization literature that claims that firms have an 
incentive to merge if the profits of the participating firms increase relative to 
their combined profits before the merger (see, for example, Salant et al, 1983; 
Perry and Porter, 1985; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). However, empirical 
evidence on the performance of mergers provides mixed results. Bild et al (2002) 
by employing the residual income approach find that mergers result in a 
significant improvement in profitability but acquirer's pre-merger value is 
destroyed by 30 percent. Profitability-based studies seem to question the profit- 
enhancing character of takeovers by finding a negative effect on the profitability 
2 
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of the acquirer (see, for example, Cosh et al., 1980; Cowling et al., 1980; 
Mueller, 1980; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Hughes, 1987; Chatterjee and 
Meeks, 1996; Ghosh, 2001; Gugler et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, event studies suggest that mergers benefit the target firms' 
shareholders, while the acquiring firms, at best, do not lose. The combined gains 
are mainly positive (see, for example, Franks and Harris, 1989; Franks and 
Mayers, 1996; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Higson and Elliot, 1998; Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000; Cosh and Guest, 2001; Graham et al., 2002; Raj and Forsyth, 
2003; Danbolt, 2004; ). However, more recent long run event studies have shown 
consistently negative returns to acquirers, questioning the gains of the merger 
activity (see, for example, Limmack, 1991,1997; Agrawal et al., 1992; Gregory, 
1997; Cosh and Guest, 2001; Conn et al., 2003). 
That gap between theoretical models and empirical evidence has led to a 
merger puzzle of why unprofitable mergers occur, and how the value of firms 
increases when profits are reduced. Recent theoretical models have attempted to 
explain that puzzle4. Thus, the second sub-group refers to the so-called "pre- 
emptive mergers". The pre-emptive theory of mergers is based on synergies, 
market power and competition for targets and suggests that is rational for a firm 
to pre-empt its rival's merger, in an attempt to avoid the larger loss of profits it 
would have suffered had its rival been successful (see, for example, Colangelo; 
4 Alternative theories consider these mergers inefficient and explain them by questioning the 
managers' rationality, the managers' commitment to value-maximization or the efficiency of 
financial markets. See the hubris theory by Roll (1986), agency theories by Amihud and Lev 
(1981), Jensen (1986), irrational financial markets theories by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
RhodesKropf and Viswanathan (2004) and merger arbitrage by Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford 
(2004). In contrast, other literature explains these facts by stressing that mergers actually raise 
productivity and cash flow (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001 and Harris et al., 2005). 
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Horn and Persson, 2001b; Brito, 2003; Fauli-Olier, 2000). Finally, the third sub- 
group refers to growing theoretical work on sequential mergers (see, for 
example, Karmen and Zang, 1990,1991,1993; Nilssen and Sorgard, 1998; Horn 
and Persson, 2001 a; Matsushima, 2001). 
On the other hand, finance literature claims that the "market for corporate 
control"5 facilitates the dismissal of low quality management or management that 
pursues goals other than shareholders' value maximization. Fundamental to this 
perspective has been the attempt to identify factors that discriminate between 
acquirers and their targets in terms of their respective economic and financial 
characteristics. Empirical evidence has shown that the main discriminator is size, 
while targets do not seem to be generally inefficient firms (see, for example, 
Cosh et al., 1980; Levine and Aaranovitch, 1980; Palepu, 1986; Powell and 
Thomas, 1994; Powell, 1997). Furthermore, Singh (1971,1975) gives early 
evidence of an overlap of characteristics between acquirers and their targets 
during "merger booms". More recent evidence suggests that discriminating 
factors vary in strength and nature on whether the period under study is a merger 
boom or a normal merger activity period (see, for example, Cosh et al., 1990; 
Antoniou et al., 1998). 
A common characteristic of all studies at the micro-level has been the lack of 
strong statistical results in discriminating between competing theories. Even 
though a growing body of literature on pre-emptive and sequential mergers has 
emerged, there is no supporting empirical evidence. Furthermore, an important 
weakness of the micro-framework for analyzing mergers is its inability to explain 
5 The term originates with Manne (1965), and refers to the market for ownership of corporations 
via acquisitions. 
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or incorporate the recorded upsurge in merger activity during some periods. 6 
Apparently, theories based on the micro-level cannot explain, by themselves, 
why there are some periods with intense merger activity. 
Another line of research deals with the cyclical behaviour of aggregate 
mergers. Research on the timing and determinants of aggregate mergers can be 
separated into three groups. The first area is related to attempts to understand the 
nature of aggregate merger activity. Evidence from this group suggests the 
general presence of merger waves, stochastic trends and, more recently, non- 
linear dynamics (see, for example, Shoughart and Tollison, 1984; Golbe and 
White, 1988,1993; Town, 1992; Chowdhury, 1993; Linn and Zhu, 1997; 
Resende, 1996,1999, Barkoulas et al, 2001). The second group seeks to explain 
the process by reference to macroeconomic and financial aggregates that display 
a similar (cyclical) pattern. Evidence suggests that merger activity is mostly 
positively related to aggregate share price levels (see, for example, Weston, 
1953; Nelson, 1959; Melicher et al, 1983, Guerard, 1985; Clark et al. 1988; 
Benzing, 1991,1993; Clarke and Ioannidis, 1996). 7 With respect to other 
aggregate or economy-wide measures, evidence is more disperse (see, for 
example, Nelson, 1959; Melicher et al, 1983, Poloncheck and Sushka, 1987; 
Holly and Longbottom, 1988; Golbe and White, 1988; King, 1989; Crook, 1995, 
1996). Generally, the findings show some relevance of economic aggregates to 
merger activity, but different periods, data sets and econometric treatment often 
6A notable exception is the work on sequential merger. However, there is not yet any supporting 
empirical evidence. 
7 Recently theoretical models have also been developed on the relation between merger activity 
and stock prices; see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004), and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005). 
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present conflicting results. Overall, existing research finds a weak and uncertain 
relationship between merger activity and macroeconomic variables, while the 
most pronounced relationship seems to be with financial variables. Finally, the 
third group suggests that the timing of merger activity is related to "economic 
disturbance" induced by surprises when it becomes cheaper to "buy than to 
make" (Gort, 1969). This theory of merger activity embraces a wide range of 
possible drivers, such as globalization, trade liberalization, changes in tax, 
accounting, government regulation, and antitrust policy (see, for example, 
Ravenscraft, 1987; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Schoenberg and Reeves, 1999; 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). 
Weston et al. (1990) describe the need for a complete theory of mergers: " [a] 
complete theory of mergers should have implications on the timing of merger 
activity. As the matter stands, there does not exist an accepted theory which 
simultaneously explains motivations behind mergers, characteristics of acquiring 
and acquired firms, and the determinants of the levels of aggregate merger 
activity". 8 However, attempts to develop such a theory of mergers have proved to 
be very difficult. Most of the studies focus only on some aspects of the merger 
phenomenon. In this thesis, it is suggested that the lack of a complete theory of 
mergers may be due to two related factors. The first is the lack of understanding 
of the dynamic behaviour of the process, and the second, the non-existence of a 
unified framework for analyzing merger activity that incorporates both micro- 
and macro-forces. 
This study attempts to improve our understanding of the nature of merger and 
their timing. It is motivated by the inability of empirical evidence at the micro- 
8 Weston et al. (1990), p. 276. 
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level to provide statistical results on motivation of mergers in different periods. 
In addition, existing studies on aggregate mergers by using techniques from the 
time domain cannot characterize the quasi-cyclical dynamics of merger series- 
different durations, explanatory power, and regularity. This would imply that 
results from the macro-merger research are subject to the spurious correlation 
problem (Yule, 1926). Thus, there is a need to understand the nature of the 
process before attempting to explain it. Having understood merger dynamics and 
its relation to the macro-environment, we focus on the micro-level of analysis. 
We claim that micro-perspectives, industrial organization and finance, may have 
some effect on merger intensity, and suggest a multicause model for merger 
timing. Specifically, the two central objectives of this study are: a) to examine 
whether there are merger waves and, if yes, their duration, regularity and relation 
to economic fundamentals; and b) to identify and analyze the dynamics within a 
merger wave. 
The study proposes that by extending some of the research on mergers and the 
combining micro- and macro-level of analysis, much of the disparate research on 
the topic can be woven together into a single framework that illuminates the 
dynamics of merger waves. The findings herein and the analytical framework of 
this study are expected to provide a tool for academics, professionals and the 
authorities in their attempts to identify the elusive determinants of merger waves. 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into three parts. The second part 
consists of Chapters 2 and 3 and provides a macroeconomic analysis of mergers. 
The third part consists of Chapters 4,5, and 6 and analyses mergers at the 
microeconomic level. Finally, the fourth part, Chapter 7, summarizes the results 
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of both the macro- and micro-analysis. Specifically, the remainder of the thesis is 
organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides an economy-wide perspective of merger activity. It 
reviews studies on aggregate mergers and their relation to economic 
fundamentals. It also presents studies of the statistical properties of merger 
series. The UK experience is then described. It offers an overview of UK merger 
activity over the last 100 years. In this historical overview, five merger waves are 
identified through casual observation of available data and relevant existing 
literature. Finally, the role of UK authorities on mergers and their influence on 
shareholders, industry structure, and conduct of firms is described in order to 
provide a complete picture of the merger phenomenon in the UK. 
Chapter 3 employs spectral techniques to empirically examine mergers in the 
UK. Specifically, it first provides a univariate analysis of mergers, where the 
existence and duration of merger cycles at the aggregate and sector levels are 
investigated. Having identified cycles of different duration and regularity, 
multivariate spectral techniques are employed to investigate synchronization of 
cycles; synchronization over merger cycles in different sectors, and 
synchronization of the aggregate merger cycle with a business or capital market 
cycle. 
Chapter 4 reviews studies on mergers at the firm level. It discusses the most 
prevalent theoretical explanation for, and empirical evidence on, mergers, as 
depicted in industrial organization and finance literature. This literature is 
categorized into four main groups, which we argue can be extended in an attempt 
to provide an explanation of the nature and timing of mergers. 
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Chapter 5 constructs a decision-theoretic model of merger timing by 
combining the most prevalent theoretical and empirical explanations as discussed 
in Chapter 4. This model exploits the dynamics of mergers by incorporating 
different motives simultaneously within a dynamic framework. It provides 
satisfactory explanations of the nature and timing of mergers 
Chapter 6 estimates the model constructed in Chapter 5 in order to assess 
empirically which factors play an important role in the timing of mergers in the 
UK. The empirical approach taken is that of survival analysis. Such an approach 
explicitly allows for dependency over time, for the survival analysis 
methodology estimates the conditional probability of merger. It is ideally suited 
for estimating our model, since it allows us to investigate whether a company 
that has survived up to a certain point in time changes in terms of the factors 
influencing merger (as described in Chapters 4& 5), would change the timing of 
merger. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the results of this study. It discusses conclusions of 
both the macro- and micro-levels of analysis which open new avenues of 
research that may lead towards a complete theory of M&A. 
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PART 2: MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 2: MERGER WAVES - 
THE ECONOMY WIDE PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three objectives. First, it reviews academic studies of the 
aggregate level of merger activity and its relation to economic fundamentals. It 
describes whether merger phenomenon can be explained using macroeconomic 
and financial variables, and discusses the time series data on mergers in order to 
reveal their non-random character. 
Second, it offers an overview of UK merger activity over the last 100 years. In 
this historical overview, five merger waves are identified through casual 
observation of available data and relevant existing literature. 
Third, it describes the role of the UK authorities in takeovers and their level of 
intervention. It discusses the costs to shareholders arising from referrals of 
proposed mergers to the Competition Commission, as well as the consequences 
of the enforcement of UK competition law on industry structure and the conduct 
of firms. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews literature on 
aggregate merger activity. Section 2.3 describes the extent and character of UK 
merger activity. Section 2.4 describes the role of UK authorities in mergers and 
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their influence on shareholders, industry structure, and the conduct of firms. 
Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes. 
Part 2: Macroeconomic Analysis Chapter 2/ Merger Waves- 
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2.2. Analysis of Aggregate Mergers 
Empirical evidence on aggregate M&A activity is divided into two branches. ' 
The first aims at understanding the time series patterns in aggregate merger 
activity, and investigates whether these series exhibit a wave pattern or stochastic 
trend, while the second seeks explanation of merger wave patterns in terms of 
economy-wide macroeconomic and financial variables that display a similar 
cyclical pattern. In what follows, we present these two branches of research. 
2.2.1 Statistical Properties of Merger Series 
An early proponent of the view that mergers occur in waves was Nelson 
(1959,1966). He indicated that mergers could be described by bursts of high 
activity, followed by long periods of low activity. Research has made significant 
progress in defining waves and econometrically estimating the wave-like 
behaviour of mergers since Nelson's work first appeared. Shughart and Tollison 
(1984), using data on US merger activity from 1895-1979, do not reject the null 
hypotheses that the merger time series examined are generated either by a 
random walk or by a first order autoregressive process, with first order 
autocorrelation close to but not equal to one. They argue that such processes are 
Evidence that mergers occur in waves has also led to the development of theoretical models 
generating wave like behaviour in equilibrium (see, for example, Fauli-Oller, 2000; Toxvaerd, 
2004). 
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not consistent with the wave hypothesis. 2 Golbe and White (1987) respond to 
Shughart and Tollison's claim by applying a nonparametric `runs' test to 
examine if the US merger time series are random. They conclude that there is 
dependence between consecutive terms in that series, and argue that this means 
merger waves are a real phenomenon. Ravenscraft (1987) identified four 
prominent merger waves in the US economy. To this end, he regressed measures 
of merger activity on four dummy variables, each representing one of the four 
major merger waves and concluded that merger activity in wave years is 
significantly higher than non-wave years. Furthermore, Golbe and White (1993) 
offer a direct test of a wave hypothesis describing the time series of US merger 
activity. Using regression analysis, they estimate a set of sine curves for the 
period 1919 - 1979. The authors find that the coefficient estimate for the 
amplitude of the sine wave, which is critical for the wave hypothesis, is 
statistically significant and thus, conclude that the fitted model adequately 
describes merger activity. A different approach in testing the merger wave 
hypothesis is the two-state Markov regime switching model. Town (1992) 
estimates such a model using different time series for US and UK mergers, and 
compares it against an ARIMA model. He argues that linear models fail to 
capture all of the structure of the data. Further, he concludes that the underlying 
pattern in merger data can be characterized by switches between high and low 
levels of activity, confirming the wave-like behaviour of the series. In addition, 
Linn and Zhu (1997), using US merger series for the period 1895-1994, conclude 
that a two-state regime process, in which there exist two distinct AR(l ) 
2 However, they do not provide any justification for their belief that a first-order autoregressive 
time series cannot display "wave" behaviour. 
13 
Part 2: Macroeconomic Analysis Chapter 2/ Merger Waves= 
The Economy Wide Perspective 
processes, explains merger activity well. Finally, Resende (1999) investigates the 
behaviour of mergers in the UK at the sectoral level for the period 1971-1989. 
He estimates a Markov switching model with no autoregressive dynamics and 
constant transition probabilities, and finds that the data are consistent with such a 
specification. These results indicate that mergers would occur in waves. He also 
finds evidence of co-movements in sectoral merger wave patterns by using factor 
analysis. In an another study, Resende (1996) investigates time series properties 
of mergers in the UK for the period 1971-1989, and finds that the degree of 
persistence to shocks is uniformly low across sectors; merger tends to react to 
shocks that are predominately aggregate. Barkoulas et al. (2001) propose a 
fractionally integrated process to model the wave-like behaviour of US merger 
series. The authors provide an alternative characterization of US merger activity 
as a strongly autocorrelated process, and suggest that the observed non-periodic 
cycle in the series can be attributed to the presence of long-memory dynamics. 
In summary, the existing literature examines statistical properties of merger 
series by using standard time domain techniques; both linear and nonlinear 
models suggest that mergers occur in waves (with the exception of the study of 
Shughart and Tollison, and Barkoulas et al. for the US). The UK has received 
considerably less attention in these studies. 
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2.2.2 Aggregate and Macro-determinant of Mergers 
2.2.2.1 Expectation and Capital Market Conditions Theories 
The two basic theories of aggregate merger activity are the expectations 
theory and the capital market conditions theory. The expectations theory suggests 
that expectations of future economic growth and current growth such as business 
failures, growth in industrial production and other proxies of the business cycle 
and stock prices influence merger activity. Optimistic expectations about the 
future and strong current growth would increase mergers. The capital market 
theory hypothesizes that increased interest rates and a tighter capital market may 
decrease mergers. Steiner (1975) claims that both theories may have some effect 
on merger intensity, indicating that a multi-cause model of merger activity is 
preferable. 
The first empirical study3 on macroeconomic determinants of merger activity 
was performed by Nelson (1959), who found a positive correlation between 
quarterly changes in US mergers and changes in stock prices for the periods 
1895-1920 and 1919-1954. 
Melicher et al. (1983) employ a multiple time series approach to compare 
aggregate merger activity in the US economy against components reflecting 
business conditions (industrial activity, and business failures), and capital market 
conditions (stock prices, and bond yields) for the period 1947-1977. They 
conclude that there is a weak relationship between merger activity and business 
3 Early studies using US data include Weston (1961), Eis (1969), Maule (1968), and Markham 
(1955). 
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conditions, with changes in merger activity being a leading indicator for 
industrial production and business failures. However, substantial support is found 
for viewing changes in aggregate merger activity as a capital market conditions 
phenomenon. Specifically, their results indicate that changes in mergers are 
related to current and prior changes in stock prices and bond yields. 
Geroski (1984) uses Granger causality tests to investigate the relationship 
between stock market prices and mergers. He uses four different samples: 
monthly or quarterly for the US or the UK which differ in length and time period 
covered. Results from all four samples suggests that such correlations are 
spurious, reflecting other more fundamental forces which jointly determine 
movements in both series. 
Polonchek and Sushka (1987) analyzed the quarterly number of mining and 
manufacturing mergers in the US economy with assets over $10 million during 
the period 1956-1978. Their regressions indicate that mergers are positively 
related to "Tobin's q" and fuel prices, and negatively related to the commercial 
paper rate, and real expenditures on housing investment. 
Clark et al. (1988) combined regression with time series analysis on annual 
US merger data from 1919 to 1979 in order to investigate the relation between 
mergers and macro-variables. They considered the autoregressive nature of the 
merger series along with other macroeconomic variables in their regressions and 
concluded that the change in stock prices was positively related to the changes in 
mergers. However, the relationship between industrial production and mergers 
was ambiguous. 
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A similar study is that conducted by Benzing (1991), who used regression 
analysis to determine the significance of factors in aggregate merger activity in 
the US before and after 1950. He also included past merger activity as an 
independent variable, along with other macroeconomic variables in the 
regression model. He found that stock prices were positively related to merger 
activity both before and after 1950. However, interest rates were positively 
related to merger activity prior to 1950, and negatively related to merger activity 
after 1950. The unemployment rate was negatively related to mergers before 
1950, but significantly related to mergers after 1950. He suggested that the above 
results mean that tightened regulation after 1950 may have caused businesses to 
take a longer view of mergers and to reduce the business cycle effect. In a later 
study, Benzing (1993), using the same methodology and US merger data for the 
period 1963-1986, concluded that a high level of current economic activity (as 
measured by the unemployment rate) stimulates mergers, while interest rates 
appear to have no effect. The results on a stock market variable, which was used 
to proxy market expectations of future economic growth, was inconclusive. 
Guerard (1989) examined the casual association of US mergers with stock 
prices and industrial production for the period 1895-1979 (two different merger 
series were used). His results suggest that stock prices series or industrial 
production do not aid in explaining mergers 
Crook (1996) used the `net present value' approach to merger decisions to 
select variables expected to explain changes in the aggregate number of mergers 
in US manufacturing and mining firms during the period 1930-1979. Using 
cointegration techniques, he concluded that there is a long run or equilibrium 
relationship between the annual number of mergers and the level of 
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manufacturing production and the level of the nominal bond yield, the 
equilibrium values being positively related to both variables. Over the period, the 
predicted equilibrium values of the number of mergers was rising and throughout 
much of the period, the actual number of mergers was greater than the 
corresponding equilibrium value. Annual changes in the number of mergers can 
be explained by changes in the nominal bond yield in the current year and in the 
two previous years, by changes in Tobin's Q in the current year and in years 
lagged 1,2, and 4 years, and by the difference between the actual and 
equilibrium value in the previous year. 
Clarke and loannidis (1996), using a Granger causality approach and UK 
merger data during the period 1971-1993, investigated the relationship between 
stock market prices and mergers. In contrast to previous studies, stock prices are 
measured in real terms and mergers are measured either by number or real value. 
Their results suggest that stock market prices `Granger' cause mergers. 
In summary, most academic studies have indicated that stock prices are 
positively related to merger activity. In contrast, there is less unanimity 
concerning the effects of interest rates and production on mergers. The UK has 
received little consideration in these studies. 
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2.2.2.2 Market Timing Models 
Recently, theoretical models have been developed to capture the relationship 
between merger activity and stock prices suggested by the empirical evidence 
described above. 4 These models are based on a concept dating back 5 to Hickman 
(1953), which suggests that in hot6 markets, investors may be overly optimistic. 
Since managers are able to time their actions, they profit from investors' 
optimism. A small and growing body of literature applying the timing concept to 
merger activity has emerged. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a theory based on an irrational stock 
market and self-interested target managers who can cash out quickly. They 
suggest that financial markets are irrational which means that they tend to 
overvalue stocks in the short-run, and the degree of overvaluation varies 
significantly across industries, sectors or group of firms. If a bidder is 
overvalued, it takes the opportunity to buy the real assets of a less overvalued 
target firm using their own overvalued equity. Assuming that target managers 
maximize their own short-term benefits, their model can explain why the target is 
willing to accept an all-equity bid even, if it is to the detriment of target 
shareholders. In other words, Shleifer and Vishny suggest that short-run market 
perceptions may lead at least in part, to a merger. In fact, if the market believes 
4 Business history indicates that periods of high market to book ratios coincide with periods of 
intense M&A activity, especially for stock-financed deals (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). 
5 That concept was more developed by the literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). For example, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) suggest that 
periods of relatively high issue volume should correspond to periods of reduced information 
costs. They find evidence of over-optimism in hot markets. 
6 Hot markets are defined as periods of high equity issue volume (Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996). 
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that the merger can drive positive synergy without being over-optimistic, bidding 
shareholders can realize some gain from its higher valuation. These gains will be 
diluted in the long-run, when the long-run prices return to the efficient level. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose a rational theory of mergers 
based on correlated misinformation. This theoretical model yields parallel 
empirical predictions on the link between misevaluation and mergers with an 
economically very different model from Shleifer and Vishny. They suggest that 
errors in valuing potential takeover synergies are correlated with overall 
uncertainty in the market. Targets accept all-equity bids because they tend to 
overvalue potential takeover synergies as a consequence of overpricing in a 
soaring equity market. The number of misvalued bids is expected to increase 
with booming financial markets, when uncertainty about the true value of firms 
is especially pronounced, and better-informed bidders can exploit their 
informational advantage at the expense of less-informed targets. 
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) develop a theoretical model of takeovers based 
on stock market valuations of merging firms. The model incorporates 
competition and imperfect information, and determines the terms and timing of 
takeovers by solving exercise games between bidding and target shareholders. 
The model predicts that the probability of negative abnormal returns to the 
merging firm increases with the dispersion of beliefs regarding the synergy 
created by the takeover. In addition, abnormal returns to shareholders increase 
with the volatility of stock returns, and decrease with the correlation between the 
returns of merging firms. 
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2.2.2.3 Industry Shocks 
Gort (1969) suggests that the "economic disturbance" induced by surprises 
triggers a wave of mergers when it becomes cheaper to "buy than to make". Gort 
holds that industry shocks alter the mean and variance of investors' assessments 
of intrinsic value for firms. Such shocks are derived from unexpected changes in 
demand, changes in technology, movements in capital markets, and general 
changes in entry barriers within industries. 
The theory of industry shocks is appealing because it is capable of 
rationalizing not only the merger waves caused by large-scale shocks, but also 
the clustering of merger activity within industries or regions (for example, 
merger activity caused by more focused shocks). This theory embraces a wide 
range of possible drivers, including globalization, trade liberalization, changes in 
tax, accounting, government regulation, and antitrust policy (see, for example, 
Ravenscraft, 1987). 
Several empirical studies support the notion that industry shocks drive M&A 
activity. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that industry shocks contributed to 
the extensive takeover and restructuring activity of the 1980s in the US. They 
show that takeover activity clusters in industries that experienced fundamental 
economic shocks such as deregulation, technological innovation, demographic 
shifts, and input price shocks. 
Schoenberg and Reeves (1999) examine the factors determining merger 
activity by using UK mergers over the period 1991-1995. Their findings suggest 
that exposure to deregulation is the most important single discriminator between 
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industries with high and low acquisition activity. They also find supporting 
evidence for industry concentration and industry growth rate as determinants of 
the takeover rate within an industry. 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) claim that large technological change and 
merger activity are associated. They studied the waves of the 1890-1930 and 
1971-2001 periods in the US, concluding that the former was significantly 
associated with the diffusion of electricity and the internal combustion engine, 
and latter with the diffusion of information technology. 
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2.3. The Extent and Character of UK Merger Activity 
The point of departure for a study of merger activity is one that examines the 
aggregate activity over the long-term: the past 100 years. There are two ways to 
consider deals activity: in terms of the number of transactions, and in terms of 
total expenditure.? Focus on the number of transactions gives equal weight to all 
deals - this is an implicit measure of the "breadth" of merger activity in the UK. 
Conversely, focus on the value of all transactions helps distinguish those 
episodes dominated by large deals - this might be regarded as a measure of the 
"depth" or materiality of sizeable deals. 
Ideally, a time series on mergers and acquisitions should be comprehensive 
and consistent, and should contain data that covers a long period of time. 
Unfortunately, none of the available series meet these criteria, and compromises 
must be made; any study of merger waves involves a trade-off between internal 
consistency of the data series and the length of the series. Empirical studies for 
the US have merged series produced by different institutions8 in order to produce 
a single long series, but this kind of procedure is problematic. There have been a 
few attempts in the UK to construct a mergers series. 
Hannah (1974) compiled a merger series for the period 1880-1918, which 
included mergers between companies in the manufacturing industry. The major 
' Alternative measures of merger activity could be the sum of the assets sales or employment of 
companies disappearing through merger. Although it is possible to construct series on each of 
these bases for parts of the economy, especially for industrial and commercial companies, or 
manufacturing and distribution, there is no long-run comparable series on any of them for the 
whole economy. 
8 Research on aggregate mergers and acquisitions in the US has made use of four merger series 
(for a description, see Golbe and White, 1988). 
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sources from which mergers were identified were business histories, histories of 
individual industries, reports of the Monopolies Commission, and the Stock 
Exchange Year Book. Despite covering quite an early period, there are some 
omissions in that series. Hannah claims a merger with a value of £1 million or 
more is likely to have been picked up by at least one, and probably several, of the 
sources used, and mergers of smaller companies may have been omitted in 
significant numbers. Utton (1971) compiled a complete record of mergers 
between quoted companies for the period 1954-1965, where the acquirer 
belonged to manufacturing industry. Gribbin (1974) reported successful merger 
proposals considered by the Board of Trade's internal and inter-Departmental 
Mergers Panel in the broad definition of industrial, commercial and financial 
sectors for the period 1966- 1972. Gribbin explains that this series only covers 
takeovers where the gross assets acquired exceeded £5 million, or where the 
acquisition could create or intensify a monopoly, as it is based on referrals by the 
Mergers Panel to the Monopolies Commission, in accordance with the 1965 
Monopolies and Merger Act. Hannah (1983) presents two series by the Board of 
Trade based on an analysis of company accounts (1954-1959 and 1960-1968). 
Unfortunately, the timing of takeovers in these series is based on the accounting 
year. 
Mergers and Acquisitions magazine provides information about UK domestic 
and foreign mergers and acquisitions. It records the numbers and value of 
mergers and acquisitions where at least 5% of controlling interests has changed 
hands for the entire UK economy since 1972. 
The longest time series for the UK mergers and acquisitions is provided by the 
Office of National Statistics (ONS), which covers the period from 1969 to 2005. 
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Contained in the Business Monitor MQ7 prior to 1986, it reports the number and 
value of domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions for all industrial and 
commercial companies. Moreover, it has no lower limit on the nominal pound 
size of the transactions reported. From 1995, financial institutions are also 
included. It pertains to all UK companies, both quoted and unquoted. 
Finally, Thomson ONE Banker and DataStream databases list all completed 
and pending transactions and provide, among others, the names of buyers, 
sellers, value and types of transaction and sector on all UK domestic and cross- 
border mergers since the 1980s. There is no explicit size inclusion criterion, and 
it covers all sectors in the UK economy. Although these series include the UK 
merger experience since the 1980s, they do not extend back far enough to 
provide an adequate historical perspective. 
In this study, the merger series provided by the ONS and Thomson ONE 
Banker is used for empirical analysis at the aggregate and sector levels, 
respectively 9 (see Chapter 3). 
2.3.1 The Early Wave of the 1910s-1920s 
Reliable evidence about mergers in the UK is only available from the late 
1960s. Nevertheless, the lack of data and empirical studies about UK takeovers 
A number of previous studies on mergers have used ONS data (see, for example, Hughes, 1993; 
Clarke and loannidis, 1996; Resende, 1996,1999). 
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prior to 1960s does' not necessarily mean that merger activity was not present in 
that period. 
Hannah (1974) suggests that the first UK merger wave started approximately 
in 1880 and ended in 1918, parallel with the first US1° wave, although the UK 
wave was smaller than that of the US. UK merger activity in that period was 
fuelled by radical changes in technology and the industrialization process. A high 
proportion of the mergers were in two sectors - textiles and brewing - whilst 
many industrial sectors remained untouched. The horizontal form of merger was 
overwhelmingly dominant in this period, accounting for 87 per cent of large 
mergers. 
2.3.2 The Waves of the 1960s and 1970s 
The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s and the subsequent Second 
World War prevented the emergence of a new takeover wave for several 
decades. The second takeover took off in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Brooks 
and Smith, 1963; Moon, 1968). Table 2.1 provides data on the annual 
expenditure upon, numbers of, domestic UK and cross-border acquisitions, 
financing of domestic acquisitions, and sales of subsidiaries between groups 
during the period 1969-2005. 
1° For a discussion of US merger waves, see Scherer (1980), Golbe and White (1988) and Bruner 
(2004) ch. 4, while for European merger activity see Franks and Mayer (1993), Geroski and 
Vlassopoulos (1993). 
26 
Part 2: Macroeconomic Analysis Chapter 2/ Merger Waves_ 
The Economy Wide Perspective 
Fairbum (1989) suggests that the industrial policy adopted in the UK during 
the 1960s was responsible for the high frequency of horizontal mergers in the 
1960s. In 1964, the British government introduced a new policy promoting the 
creation of `national champions' which would be able to compete on world 
markets. The Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC) was founded to assist 
mergers of firms in the same line of business. The IRC could exempt merging 
firms from the antitrust scrutiny. In the following decade, 1970, the policy to 
promote national champions was abandoned and the focus was on conglomerate 
integration. Thus, during the 1960s, around 90 percent by value and 80 percent 
by number of the mergers that were examined by the competition policy 
authorities were horizontal, while in the 1970s, horizontal mergers were around 
70 percent by number and 65 percent by value (Gribbin, 1974; Graham, 1979). In 
the 1970s, extensive activity occurred in engineering, vehicles, food, drink, 
textiles, paper printing and publishing, and distribution (Cowling et al., 1980, 
Cosh, Hughes, and Singh, 1980). 
In the 1970s, the average value of mergers by the financial sector was more 
than double that of mergers by industrial and commercial companies 
(Aaronovitch and Sawyer, 1975). Lye and Silberston (1980) claim that in the 
1960s and 1970s, only a small number of mergers were of high value, i. e. 
principally those in which independent companies were taken over. There were 
only a few subsidiaries sales of large dimensions. During this period the level of 
cross-border acquisitions was very low. 
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2.3.3 The Wave of the 1980s 
The forth takeover wave in the UK started in 1981, when the stock market had 
recovered from the preceding economic recession, and ended in 1989. It was 
characterized by an unprecedented number of divestitures, hostile takeovers, and 
management buyouts / buyins (Thomson ONE Banker). 
As Table I shows, in the period 1982-1985, average acquisition expenditure 
rose significantly. By 1986, expenditure in real terms increased sharply, while 
there was no corresponding increase in numbers acquired. The first phase of the 
1980s merger wave was the product of relatively few massive mergers (Hughes, 
1993). After 1986, the numbers as well as the expenditure in real terms rose 
significantly. Of the independent companies acquired in 1986,10 per cent 
accounted for over 85 per cent of total expenditure (Business Monitor MQ7, 
1987 Q1). 
As depicted in Table 1, in the late 1980s, acquisition expenditure in the UK 
was primarily funded by the use of cash and equity. The use of debt fell 
significantly after the wave of 1970s. In addition, during this period, a number of 
very large sales of subsidiaries between groups occurred. Thus, in 1984, the six 
largest independent company acquisitions had an average value of around £100 
million, while the three largest sales of subsidiaries between groups averaged 
£90 million (Hughes, 1993). 
Over 45 per cent by value and 28 per cent by number of all acquisitions by 
UK companies took place abroad in the period 1986-9. Table I reveals a steady 
increase in the numbers of acquisitions abroad by UK companies and in total 
acquisition expenditure in the period 1986-90, with activity apparently peaking 
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in 1989. The US and Canada were the most important destinations for this 
activity, especially in value terms. The UK was a target for increasing cross- 
border mergers from both the EC and North America (Hughes, 1993). 
2.3.4 The Wave of the 1990s 
In the early 1990s, merger activity increased briskly in all segments of the UK 
economy and all firm size categories. The magnitude of the fifth wave was 
unprecedented in terms of the takeover value of merger deals. The sale of 
subsidiaries between groups as a proportion of all domestic acquisitions was 
similar to the previous takeover wave. As Table I shows, in the late 1990s, 
acquisition expenditure in the UK was primarily funded by the use of cash and 
equity, with the use of debt reaching its lowest level in relation to previous 
acquisition waves. Sectors exhibiting more intense merger activity are the 
financials, consumer products and services, industrials, media, high technology 
(Thomson ONE Banker). 
A striking feature of the fifth takeover wave is the significance of `strategic 
buyers' who seek to combine with targets who are related along business lines, 
and with whom synergy value might be created. Strategic combinations dampen 
somewhat the influence of financial buyers. Another important feature is its 
international nature. As shown in Table 1, in the late 1990s, cross-border mergers 
increased remarkably in value, reflecting the growing globalization of product, 
services, and capital markets. 
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The number of hostile bids in the UK fell significantly in the 1990s compared 
to the takeover wave of the 1980s, according to the Thomson Financial Securities 
Database. This decline in hostile takeover activity can be attributed to the bull 
markets, as target shareholders are more prone to accept a takeover bid when 
their shares are overpriced. In addition, hostile takeovers are no longer needed as 
a corporate governance device, given that there are a sufficient number of 
alternative governance mechanisms (for example, stock options) that encourage 
management to focus on shareholder value, and to voluntarily restructure when 
necessary (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). 
2.3.5 A New Wave? 
Since mid 2003, takeover activity (including a large number of cross-border 
deals) has again picked up in the UK. A number of very large sales of 
subsidiaries between groups has occurred. Acquisitions are still financed mainly 
through cash and equity, although the use of debt has started to increase. 
The increase of merger activity in the UK has been accompanied by a similar 
increase in US and Europe, continuing the international industry consolidation of 
the 1990s. Since the beginning of 2002 until the middle of 2005, cross-border 
acquisitions have accounted for more than 43% of the total value of all mergers 
by European bidders, and 13% of the total value of all mergers by US firms. The 
European acquirers seem to prefer friendly negotiations to aggressive bidding. 
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Since the beginning of 2002, the total number of hostile bids in Europe has 
amounted to 32,17 of which have been in the UK (Thomson ONE banker). 
Although it is too early to draw conclusions about whether a new merger 
wave is forming, some trends are already emerging; international mergers are 
playing an important role in merger activity of the early 2000s. 
2.3.6 Summary of UK Merger Activity 
In the broadest of terms, we may sum up this section as showing that the UK 
has experienced periods of intense merger activity, followed by low transaction 
periods. Data suggests that five distinctive merger waves may have been present 
in the UK economy during the last century. Merger activity exhibits different 
characteristics in each of them, suggesting the presence of different sets of 
underlying motives for each wave. 
A number of common factors can, nonetheless, be found. First, all waves 
occur in periods of economic recovery (following a market crash and economic 
depression caused by war, an energy crisis, etc). Second, the waves coincide with 
periods of booming stock markets. It is notable that all five waves ended with the 
collapse of stock markets. Third, takeover waves have been presented by 
industrial and technological shocks often in the form of technological and 
financial innovations, supply shocks (such as oil price shocks), deregulation, and 
increased foreign competition. Finally, takeovers often occur in periods when 
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regulatory changes (for example, those related to anti-trust or takeover defense 
mechanisms) take place. 
Such conclusions about common factors are however, based on casual 
observation. A more formal and explicit analysis is needed to ascertain whether 
such factors are statistically significant. Thus, in Chapter 3, we investigate the 
relation of aggregate UK merger activity 1 and such macroeconomic and 
financial factors by using frequency domain techniques. 
Although cross-border mergers play an important role in UK merger activity (see, for 
example, Conn et al. 2003), domestic mergers only will be considered in this study. An 
examination of UK cross-border merger is left for future research. 
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2.4. The Role of the UK Authorities in Merger Activity 
Takeovers are regulated through a number of institutions and mechanisms. In 
the UK takeovers are regarded as a central function of the stock market. 12 The 
Stock Exchange may influence takeovers by listing requirements for new 
companies and rules for existing companies which wish to raise new funds such 
as equity, and requirements for buyers to make full bids once shareholdings 
reach 30 per cent. On the other hand, any UK mergers which do not fall under 
the European Community Merger Regulation, 13 and which meet the jurisdictional 
tests in the Enterprise Act 2002, falls under the regulation of two UK authorities: 
the Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission. In the following 
section, a brief description of their respective roles is presented. 
12 The takeover process acts as a discipline on firms allowing control to be transferred from 
inefficient to efficient management and encouraging a convergence of interests between 
management and shareholders. For a discussion of the relation between capital markets and 
takeovers in the UK and European countries, see Franks and Mayer (1993). 
"Under the EC Merger Regulation, the European Commission has exclusive competence, subject 
to limited exceptions, to regulate certain large scale mergers, defined as `concentrations having a 
Community dimension'. In particular, the EU Commission will consider investigating any merger 
involving world-wide turnover greater than ¬5,000 in, or where EU turnover of at least two of the 
companies concerned exceeds ¬250 in. As a consequence, subject to limited exceptions, mergers 
which exceed the relevant turnover thresholds set out in the EC Merger Regulation are not 
subject to the OFT' s jurisdiction under the Act. 
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2.4.1 The UK Competition Policy 
The UK introduced its competition regime in 1948 with the establishment of 
the Monopolies Commission. 14 In 1965, its remit was widened to inquire into 
mergers as well as monopoly markets (Wilks, 1999). Under the Competition Act 
1998, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) became the 
Competition Commission (CC), and the powers of the Commission and the 
government responsible for administering competition law, the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), were amended. 
Prospective mergers are voluntarily notified to the OFT, which screens all 
merger proposals15 and carries out preliminary investigations of markets where 
competition problems are thought to be present. If further investigation is 
deemed to be necessary, it sends the case to the CC for a full investigation. 16 A 
merger (whether in the form of acquisition of assets, the purchase of shares, 
public bid, joint venture, management/leveraged buy-out or buy-in, or a similar 
transaction) will qualify for investigation where either one or both of the 
following criteria is satisfied: 
14 For a discussion of UK competition policy and its evolution, see Parr et al. (2005), Clarke et al. 
(1998), and Fairbum (1993). 
15 In sectors such as media, water and sewerage, electricity and gas, telecoms and 
communications, rail, aviation, and financial services, mergers are governed by different approval 
mechanisms or sector-specific rules either instead of, or in addition to, the general jurisdiction of 
the OFT under Enterprise Act. 
16 The OFT also has some powers of its own, and it can, and does, carry out its own 
investigations. 
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a) As a result of the merger, a share of at least 25 per cent of the supply of 
goods or services of any description in the UK, or in a substantial part of 
it is created or enhanced (the `share of supply' test); 
b) The value of the turnover in the UK of the company being taken over 
exceeds £70 millon (the `turnover' test). 
It is implicit in these criteria that at least one of the companies concerned must 
be active within the UK. Table 2.2 presents statistics on cases considered by the 
OFT. 
Table 2.2: 17 UK Mergers Considered by the Office of Fair Trading 
Year 
Qualifying 
mergers 
First Release data on 
mergers of UK 
companies* 
Qualifying mergers as 
% of First Release 
cases 
1998 269 887 30% 
1999 254 714 36% 
2000 192 765 25% 
2001 200 554 36% 
2002 194 502 39% 
2003 190 531 36% 
2004 117 642 18% 
Source: OFT annual reports for 2000,2001,2002,2003,2004 
* "First Release" is an Office for National Statistics publication giving data 
for the number of acquisitions of UK companies 
After a reference has been made, the CC considers a series of questions; first, 
whether a relevant merger situation has been, or will be, created; and secondly, if 
so, whether the creation of that merger situation has resulted, or may be expected 
to result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or market in 
" `First Release' includes the number of acquisitions of domestic UK companies and the number 
of UK companies acquired by foreign ones (inward acquisitions). 
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the UK for goods or services. There is no obligation for the firms involved in a 
merger to demonstrate that positive benefits arise from the merger, and although 
in practice, firms may often seek to do so, the Commission will clear a merger if 
it finds that it will not result in a substantial lessening of competition, even if no 
positive benefits may be expected to arise. ' 8 
Consistent with the practice in the US under the FTC, it is likely that only a 
small proportion of mergers qualifying for investigation will be referred to the 
Commission. Table 2.3 presents statistics on mergers examined by OFT and 
references to CC over time. 19 Confidential guidance cases refer to cases where 
companies obtain formal confidential advice in relation to a proposed but 
unannounced merger. Before a planned acquisition becomes public knowledge, 
the OFT is prepared to give guidance in confidence as to whether it is likely that 
the transaction, once announced, will be referred to the Commission. Pre-notified 
cases refer to publicly announced but uncompleted merger cases, where 
companies fill a statutory Merger Notice setting out details of the proposal and 
the market it will affect and ask clearance from the OFT. 
As set out in Table 2.3, the OFT reviewed 270 cases in 2003/2004, of which 
117 were qualifying mergers, along with a further 153 which did not qualify for 
investigation (this category includes mergers which were found not to qualify, 
merger proposals which were abandoned and informal advice cases). These 
figures are lower than in previous years. (In 1998 the OFT reviewed 425 cases. ) 
The reduction in cases may be due, in part, to a merger cycle, and in part, to the 
change in jurisdictional thresholds under the Act, which has reduced the 
18 For a discussion, see Parr et al. (2005) Ch. 1, and Lyons (2001). 
19 For a statistical history of MMC (now CC) reports, see Clarke et al. (1998) Ch. 1. 
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proportion of mergers qualifying for investigation (Parr et. al., 2005). That 
justification can also apply to data in Table 2.2. 
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Companies have the right to appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT) against the use of the powers given to the OFT by the Competition Act. In 
the old regime, decisions made by the CC were merely recommendations to the 
Secretary of State, but in the new regime put into place by the Enterprise Act 
2002, the CC's decisions - both in the identification of adverse effects arising 
from a substantial lessening of competition and in the remedies designed to deal 
with these effects - became determinative, that is to say, they became final 
subject only to legal appeal to the CAT. 
2.4.2 Interaction between the UK Competition Commission and the 
Economic Consequences of Mergers 
Academic studies have pointed to possible significant costs to the economy 
arising from state regulation20. These costs take the form of administrative costs 
of operating the regulatory system and the compliance costs to the company 
resulting from a competition inquiry, in the form of legal and other advisory 
expenses and management time. However, these costs can be expected to be de 
minimis in relation to a company's value; typically, such costs in the UK amount 
to between £500,000 to £2 m per merger (Arnold and Parker, 2006). 
A potentially much more important impact results from shareholders value 
from a revaluation of the share prices during an inquiry. Frank and Harris (1993) 
20 For a review, see Blundell and Robinson (2000) 
40 
Part 2: Macroeconomic Analysis Chapter 2/ Merger Waves: 
The Economy Wide Perspective 
use event study methodology and data from a sample of 159 UK mergers 
referred to the MMC between 1965 and 1990 to examine shareholder value 
changes to bidder and target companies from a merger. They show that those. 
proposed mergers eventually referred to the Commission are viewed at the bid 
date as value-creating for shareholders. However, the market's capitalization of 
those gains is likely to be attenuated by the perception of a relatively high 
probability of the mergers not taking place (compared with those mergers that are 
not referred). Value gains are eroded on the referral date by approximately 8 per 
cent to targets and I per cent to bidders. There is significant further erosion to 
targets when the bid is rejected, and a small positive gain to targets upon 
acceptance. Value changes to bidders are small in both the referral and report 
months, and are generally not significantly different from zero. 
Forbes (1994) investigates the value impact for bidding companies only of 
MMC references, using event study methodology and data from a sample of 53 
mergers in the period 1976 to 1990. He compares abnormal returns among the 
initial announcement of the merger, announcement of referral to MMC and the 
Commission's decision. The value effects are found to be broadly consistent with 
those in Franks and Harris; bidder returns are small and not statistically 
significant. 
More recently, Arnold and Parker (2006), using 50 merger cases referred to 
the MMC/CC during 1989-2002, look at the impact on shareholder value of UK 
competition regulation. The study confirms the finding from earlier studies of 
greater gains to shareholders in target than bidding companies, but does not find 
evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company 
shareholders when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the 
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regulatory regime is stable and well understood, the capital market behaves 
efficiently in response to new information. However, for a sub-group of mergers 
involving companies with a new regulatory regime, where the industry and the 
stock market has little or no experience with respect to mergers, the capital 
market operates less efficiently. 21 
A few studies have examined the consequences of the enforcement of UK 
competition law on industry structure and the conduct of firms. 22 In an early 
study, Shaw and Simpson (1986) establish a significant decrease in market shares 
by leading companies after a UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (now the 
CC) investigation over a time horizon of 14 years. The authors derive the 
conclusion that `intervention by the MMC in reducing barriers to entry did not 
fail'. Davies et al (1999), also determine the probability of an adverse finding 
against firms investigated by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission on 
the basis of data from 1973 to 1995 collected from MMC reports. They find that 
the larger the share of the market leader, the more likely the MMC is to judge a 
monopoly practice to be against the public interest. It is most (least) inclined to 
judge against exclusive dealing (other vertical restrains). They also suggest that 
the MMC was less inclined to reach adverse findings in the 1990s than it was in 
earlier years. 
21 The relevant studies for the EU are those of Brady and Feinberg (2000) and Duso et a] (2003). 
They look for evidence of regime effects and individual case effects (relating to cases grouped by 
EU member State and by industry sectors) of regulatory decisions on shareholder value. They 
find that the regime effects are weak. However, for individual cases, enforcement of the merger 
regulations could have a substantial effect on individual company share prices. They also suggest 
that findings by the European Commission of `serious doubts', or the announcement of a 
`suspension' decision adversely affect the share price. 
22 For similar studies concerning the EU competition policy, see Harding and Gibbs (2005). 
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2.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented research on mergers within an economy-wide 
perspective. It reviewed studies examining the statistical properties of merger 
series. Such studies suggest that there is dependence between consecutive terms 
in that series, and argue that this means merger waves are a real phenomenon. 
Furthermore, studies examining the macro-determinants of mergers indicate that 
stock prices are positively related to merger activity, whilst there is less 
unanimity concerning the effects of interest rates and production on mergers. 
The historical overview of UK mergers and acquisitions presented in this 
chapter demonstrates that mergers have played a major role in the structural 
transformation of the UK economy during the last 100 years. However, the 
patterns of UK merger activity have received little research attention, mainly 
because there are no available merger series that are consistent and contain data 
that cover a long period of time. Casual inspection of available data and existing 
studies suggest that five merger waves have occurred in the UK during the last 
century, each of which may be characterized by different features. Although 
some authors accept the wave hypothesis based on casual empiricism, it is 
necessary to test the idea formally, to provide evidence that appearances are not 
somehow deceiving. This is the objective of Chapter 3. 
In order to complete the picture of the UK merger environment, the chapter 
closed with description of the regulatory context and the main institutions 
involved in shaping merger outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3: UK MERGER WAVES"? 
3.1. Introduction 
Although we have talked of merger waves in the UK in the context of existing 
research, in this chapter we explore more formally whether this is appropriate. 
The phrase merger cycle itself may be questioned by some researchers who 
prefer the more agnostic term fluctuations. Of course, it is obvious that merger 
series do not punctually follow a sine or cosine wave. However, they do display 
what Hillinger (1992) calls a quasi-cycle, meaning that: "the length of the period 
and also the amplitude [is] to some extent variable, their variations taking place, 
however, within such limits that it is reasonable to speak of an average period 
and an average amplitude". 
Empirical literature on merger waves, as discussed in Chapter 2, has confined 
itself to characterizations of the stochastic process behind mergers either by 
focusing on linear and/or non-linear time series models, or by devising tests for 
the stationarity of merger series. However, linear models such as ARIMA models 
are poor approximation of the merger series, as a linear representation of the data 
is unable to capture all of the structure that exists in available merger series 
I am pleased to acknowledge insightful suggestions from the participants of seminars at the 
Warwick Business School as well as the 2006 EARIE meeting in Amsterdam, especially Denis 
Mueller and Eileen Fumagalli , on early versions of this chapter. 
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(Town, 1992). In particular, analysis based on ARIMA models may be 
misleading if such models are not consistent with the stochastic properties of the 
data, and may also be misleading if chosen primarily on grounds of parsimony 
(see, for example, Harvey and Jaeger, 1993). Although a non-linear, Markov 
switching - regime model is better for describing aggregate merger behavior, it 
cannot characterize the quasi-cyclical dynamics of merger series-periodicity, 
explanatory power, and regularity. Such a model also fails clearly to distinguish 
movements at different frequencies. Finally, studies examining the stationarity of 
merger series claim the rejection of "the randomness hypothesis" due to the 
rejection of a unit root hypothesis. However, they do not provide us with more 
information about merger cycles. 
In this chapter, we employ spectral analysis in order to investigate UK merger 
cycle regularities within a model free framework. Spectral analysis is an 
alternative approach which is better suited to describing and analyzing quasi- 
cyclical fluctuations at different frequencies. It is concerned with the exploration 
of cyclical patterns of data. The purpose of the analysis is to decompose a 
complex time series with a cyclical component into a few underlying sinusoidal 
(sine and cosine) functions of different wavelengths. The term `spectrum' 
provides an appropriate metaphor for the nature of this analysis. Performing 
spectrum analysis on merger time series is like putting the series through a prism 
in order to identify the wave lengths and importance of the underlying cyclical 
component. As a result, we uncover regular cycles of different lengths, which 
initially, might have appeared to be simply random noise. 
Having identified merger cycles with different durations, we apply methods of 
multivariate spectral analysis in order to determine whether there is 
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synchronization of UK aggregate merger cycles with a business or capital 
markets cycle, as well as synchronization over cycles in different sectors. 
Furthermore, frequency domain analysis of the merger cycles helps to 
overcome the important but controversial issue of detrending, a problem 
connected with the lack of consensus on of what constitutes cycle fluctuations. 
Cycle fluctuations are typically identified with deviations from the trend of the 
process. However, within the empirical literature, there is fundamental 
disagreement on the properties of the trend and on its relationship with the 
cyclical component of the series. 2 Since the issue of what is an appropriate 
statistical representation of the trend has not been resolved, and since the choice 
of the relationship between the cyclical and secular components is arbitrary, 
statistical based approaches to detrending raise questions about the robustness of 
stylizing facts. We adopt the view that if there is information suggesting that 
merger cycles are fluctuations within a range of periodicities, a natural definition 
arises in terms of these fluctuations. It is clear that in this case, the option is to 
isolate the desired fluctuations (and not detrending), using the wide range of 
filtering methods available. We will justify our use of the Hodrick Prescott 
(1997) and Baxter King (1999) filters. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces spectral analysis, 
both univariate and multivariate cases. Section 3.3, gives our justification for 
Z In the past, the representation and extraction of the secular (and thus, the cyclical component) of 
a series was handled in a very simple way. The trend was represented with a deterministic 
polynomial function of time, assumed to be independent of the cyclical component and extracted 
using simple regression methods. More recently, following Nelson and Plosser's (1982) findings, 
Beveridge and Nelson (1981), Watson (1986), and Hamilton (1989) have proposed alternative 
definitions of the trend, different assumptions about the relationship between the trend and the 
cycle, and novel methods for estimating the two components. 
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extracting the cyclical component of merger series instead of detrending. It also 
provides a description and our justification for the use of Hodrick, Prescot and 
Baxter, and King filters, and the consequences of filtering a time series. Section 
3.4 provides a univariate analysis of UK mergers. It first describes the data used, 
then presents the univariate results and finally discusses the findings. Section 3.5 
discusses the synchronization of cycles, and presents data used in multivariate 
analysis of UK mergers. It presents the results of such analysis and discusses the 
findings. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes the results from univariate and 
multivariate analysis. 
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3.2. An Introduction to Spectral Analysis3 
3.2.1 Univariate Spectral Analysis 
Spectral analysis is a modification of Fourier analysis, rendering it suitable for 
stochastic functions of time. Fourier analysis (see, for example, Priestley, 1981) 
is the technique of using an infinite number of orthogonal sine and cosine 
functions X, (co) (representing waves) with frequencies co E [-ir, ir] to 
approximate a stationary process X,. Frequency is defined as cycle per period. 
The influence of any given wave X, (co) on the overall movement X, depends 
on its amplitude (variance or deviation from the mean of the series), and is called 
power in spectral analysis. The power spectrum of X, is given by the Fourier 
transform of its autocovariance function y(ic), k=0, ±1, ±2,...: 
f(w)=-ýY(k)exp(-iwk) , t) E 
[-7r, ir] (1) 
21r 
_co 
where i is the imaginary square root of -1,7r is a mathematical constant 
approximately equal to 3.14, and the sine and cosine functions are represented by 
the complex exponential function given by Euler's formula: 
exp(-iok) = cos(-cok)+i sin(-wk) (2) 
Since f (a) is symmetric about co =0, it is customary to limit the analysis to 
the frequency interval 0< w<_ ; r. Consequently, the Fourier transformation maps 
a time series from the time domain into the frequency domain. By definition, 
frequency is the reciprocal of periodicity, where the latter measures the time 
'The classic text on spectral analysis is Bloomfield (1976). However, introductory discussion of 
spectral analysis can be found in Stoica and Moses (1997) and Chatfield (2004). A more 
technical analysis is given by Priestely (1981), Brillinger and Krishnaiah (1983) and Canuto et. 
al. (2006). An application of spectral analysis to social sciences is given in Warner (1998). 
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required for completion of a cycle. Thus, the spectrum of a series decomposes its 
total variation by the cycle-length of various periodic components. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the plot of a sample power spectrum. The interpretation 
is quite similar to a probability density function; the total area under the power 
spectrum equals the process variance, while f (w)d ao is the portion of the total 
variance of X, which is due to the component X, (w) with frequencies over the 
interval [co, w+dw]. In other words, if the process X, contains a coherent cycle at 
some frequency , co* , then the value of the power spectrum, 
f (w), should reach 
a local maximum at w. If the data contain several cycles with different 
frequencies, then f (co) should have local maxima at each, with the global 
maximum at the frequency having the largest amplitude. The spectrum in Figure 
3.1 has been normalized so that the area under the curve equals one. Hence, the 
area under the curve from w, to w2 is the share of total variance of X, which 
can be attributed to the composite of the waves in that range. Furthermore, its 
quasi-cyclical fluctuation depends on the relative power of its constituent 
components. When all waves in [ of , cvz ] have similar power, the composite will 
display relatively irregular fluctuations. In contrast, when power is concentrated 
over a very narrow band of frequencies, it will display more regular cycles. This 
corresponds to a well defined peak in the spectrum in the range [ w, , w2 
], as in 
Figure 3.1. Accordingly, the steepness of the spectrum peaks can give an 
indication of the degree of regularity in the corresponding fluctuations. Thus, 
spectral analysis permits a natural decomposition of a series into quasi-cyclical 
components defined over frequency bands corresponding to cycles of different 
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duration. It offers measures of the periodicity, regularity, and explanatory power 
of fluctuations in these components. 
Figure 3.1: Sample Power Spectrum 
max f(( 
3 
w 
Note: Horizontal axis measures frequencies (l») of cycles, while the vertical 
axis measures the power spectrum 
(f (a))) 
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3.2.2 Estimation of Power Spectrum 
Implementing Equation. 1 is problematic, as it requires autocovariances from 
-oo to +cc. The classic solution to this problem is to assume that out of sample 
covariances are zero. This assumption has the disadvantage that, when working 
with short economic time series, it produces an estimate of the spectrum, called 
the periodogram, which is inconsistent (see, for example, Chatfield, 2004). 
However, although the periodogram is itself an inconsistent estimator, smoothing 
the periodogram gives a consistent estimation procedure. It is clear that the 
periodogram is the discrete finite Fourier transform of the complete sample 
autocovariance function. However, the precision of the values of the estimated 
autocovariance , ck , 
decreases as k increases, because the coefficients are based 
on fewer and fewer terms. Thus, it would seem intuitively reasonable to give less 
weight to the values of ck as k increases. An estimator, which has this property, 
is 
M 
Akco+2Y- "kCkcoscok (3) 
?C k=! 
where { 2k } are a set of weights called the lag window, and M (<sample size) 
is called the truncation point. Many lag windows have been suggested in the 
literature (see, for example, Chatfield, 2004). We smoothed the periodograms 
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using three different lag windows; Bartlett's, Turkey's, and Parzen's windows. 4 
As all yielded similar results, we report the estimates using Bartlett's window. 
The truncation point M has to be chosen subjectively so as to balance 
`resolution' against `variance'. The smaller the value of M, the smaller will be 
the variance of f (co) but the larger will be the bias. If M is too small, important 
features of f (co) may be smoothed out, but if M is too large, the behavior of 
f (co) becomes more like of the periodogram with erratic variation. A useful 
rough guide is to choose M to be about 2NrN--, where N is the sample size (see 
Chatfield, 2004, p129). The normalized spectrum, h (co), is estimated by 
h (w)= f(m)/6X, (4) 
where or 2 is total unconditional variance of the series given by 
aS =Jf (w)d av . Eq. (4) gives the percentage of total variance that is due to 
frequency component w. By definition, f h(w)dw =1. 
4 Parzen window is given by Ak =2 (1 + cos 
Al 
7rk ), k=0,1, ..., 
M, the Parzen window by 
I 1-6(M )2+6(M )3, O5k<_M/2 
it k 2(1-k /M ,M/ 2_<k<_M 
and the Bartlett window by 2k =1- k/M for 
k=0,1, 
... 
M 
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3.2.3 Extension of Spectral Analysis to the Multivariate Case 
By means of bivariate spectral analysis, it is possible to describe pairs of time 
series in frequency domain by decomposing their covariance into frequency 
components. Cross spectral analysis can be considered as the frequency domain 
equivalent of correlation analysis. The definition of the (smoothed) cross 
spectrum, analogous to that of the (smoothed) spectrum, is obtained by 
substituting the cross covariance function for the autocovariance function (see, 
for example, Priestley, 1981). 
The cross spectrum between time series X, and Yr is expressed as 
Co 
. 
fry(üv) =Eyn, (k)exp(-iwk) (5) 2zc, 
With y), (k) = Cov(x,, y, -k 
) 
The cross spectrum contains all the information concerning the relations 
between the two series in the frequency domain and it is, in general, complex 
valued. It can therefore be decomposed into its imaginary and real parts: 
f(w) =co , 
(w)-zqu, (w) (6) 
Where co , 
(&) is the cospectrum between the two variables and represents 
the covariance between Xr and Y1 attributable to the fluctuations determined by 
o). It can also be interpreted as the covariance between the `in phase' 
components of the two processes, components whose phases are matched in 
time. qu,, (w) is the quadrature spectrum, representing the covariance between 
the `out of phase' components of the two processes. Fluctuations of significant 
importance in the series, as captured by large values of fr(w) and fy, (co), may 
not make an important contribution to the contemporaneous covariance between 
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the variables, simply because they are in different phases of the implied cycle. 
The quadrature spectrum searches for these unmatched fluctuations. 
In the next step, we introduce a measure which assesses the degree of linear 
relationship between cyclical components in the two series, frequency by 
frequency. This measure is the squared coherency and is defined as: 
C, «0) = {1. 
xyi0» 
1' 
Jx1 co)Jy(w) 
(7) 
Coherency ranges from 0 to 1. If coherency is high at a particular frequency, 
this means that the components of each series corresponding to that frequency 
are highly correlated. However, this measure is completely independent of the 
position in time of the two series. Coherency adjusts the series in time, so that the 
components' phases match. Thus, if the cycles obtained from two series had 
exactly the same shape, but one of the cycles series was lagging with respect to 
the other, coherency would be high for every frequency. What matters is the 
cyclical behavior. If it is similar, coherency is high. Using coherency and the 
concept that the area under the spectrum is equal to the variance of the series, the 
following equation can be derived: 
Jf(a))do) 
= jCy(w)fx(w)dw+ 
f fu(w)dw (8) 
T -; r 
The first term on the right in the equation is the product of squared coherency 
between X, and Y, and the spectrum of X, (explained variance); the second 
term is white noise. This equality holds for every frequency band [w,, w2 J. 
Thus, total variance of a series equals an explained variance (by some series Y, ) 
and a remaining unexplained portion. Comparing the area under the spectrum of 
the explained component to the area under X, autospectrum in a frequency band 
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[w,, w2 J yields a measure of the explanatory power of Xt, analogous to an R2 
in the time domain. 
However, coherency, as previously mentioned, is independent of the position 
in time of the series. It indicates only whether or not two series have the same 
pattern. 
Another concept that can help characterize much better the relations between 
the series is the phase effect, which is defined as 
Ph, 
, 
(co) = ArcTan(qu, 
(co) 
) (9) 
cozy (co ) 
It measures the phase difference between the frequency components of the 
two series: the number of leads (if Phý, y 
(co)>0) or lags (if Ph, (co) <0) of x on y. 
The analysis of quantities given by Equations 8 and 9, together with the (auto) 
spectrum of each series, will give an overall view of the frequency interaction of 
the two series. 
3.3. Requirements for Applying Spectral Techniques 
Spectral analysis requires a stationary process, which raises the difficult issue 
of detrending. Instead of using the usual approaches to test for stationarity and 
then detrending, we adopt a different view in the spirit of Burnside (1998). Thus, 
we first extract the cyclical component of the series (this is, by definition, 
stationary) by using appropriate filtering methods, and then apply spectral 
techniques to investigate the properties of that cyclical component 
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3.3.1 Extracting the Cyclical Component of the Series 
It is well known that time series can be decomposed into cyclical and trend 
components. 5 The cyclical component captures temporary fluctuations around 
the trend associated with cycles, while the trend component describes long-term 
growth. Thus, time series, X, , observed over period t=1,2,... T 
is decomposed 
additively into a trend, u, , and a cyclical component, e, , i. e. 
X, 
, u, + s1 (10) 
Since our aim is to look at stylized facts of merger cycles rather than time 
series in general, it is natural to treat the data in such a way that all variation 
outside merger cycle frequencies is filtered out. In other words, our focus is upon 
extracting the cyclical component of the series and then analyzing its properties 
using spectral analysis. 6 
Alternative definitions of the trend in an economic time series have been 
proposed in the literature, each of these definitions having different implications 
for the statistical properties of both the trend and the residual (commonly referred 
to as the cyclical component), and the correlation between them. That has led to 
the development of a variety of methods for estimating trend and cycle 
components of an economic series. 7 Since the appropriate method depends on the 
5 Since only trend and cycle are assumed to exist, the procedures followed in this study implicitly 
assume that the seasonal and cyclical components of the series are lumped together, and that 
irregular (high frequency) fluctuations play an inconsequential role. 
' The cyclical component of a time series is, by definition, a stationary process and thus, spectral 
analysis can be applied. 
7 There have been various attempts to construct trend and cycle estimators that work well in a 
variety of situations such as first order differencing, unobservable components model, Beveridge 
and Nelson's procedure, Hodrick and Prescott's filter, band pass filters, cointegration, 
multivariate frequency domain, common linear (e. g. Mills, 2003). 
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definition of the trend and the correlation of the trend and the cyclical 
component, it is difficult to distinguish among these. As Canova (1998) 
indicates, there is something misleading in the fact that different estimation 
methods lead to different facts about trend and cycle components. 8 However, 
when detrending and extracting the cycle component of a time series are 
recognized as being distinct exercises, there are many facts about the cycle 
component which should be accepted as being robust. In other words, it is 
important at this stage to distinguish between the arguments about the right way 
to detrend on the one hand, and those about the nature of a cyclical component of 
interest on the other. 9 Thus, we proceed by first defining a merger cycle and then 
describing methods to extract the cyclical component from the merger time 
series. Empirical evidence (Town, 1992; Linn and Zhu, 1997) on merger waves, 
as well as conventional wisdom that merger cycles are unlikely to be longer than 
business cycles define the merger cycle as fluctuations with a range of 
periodicities from 6 to 32 quarters. 10 Defining the merger cycle as fluctuations 
with a specified range of periodicities, it is natural to adopt a linear filter as a 
procedure to isolate the merger cycle component. We compile statistics using 
two different filters so as to gain information on the behavior of variables at 
8 The problem of spurious cycles due to inappropriate data transformations is well known in 
empirical business cycle analysis (King and Rebelo, 1993; Harvey and Jaeger (1993), Osborn, 
1995). 
9 For example, if one is using first difference methods to render stationary an economic time 
series, it is misleading to argue that by so doing, only the cyclical components of certain 
frequencies are being isolated. This is because first differencing places strong emphasis on high 
frequency components. (See the discussion by Burnside (1998) and the reply of Canova (1998). ) 
10 Burns and Mithell (1946) define business cycles as cyclical components from 6 to 32 quarters 
in duration. Similar cut-off points are used by Granger and Hatanaka (1964), Lucas (1980), and 
Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003). 
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different cycle frequencies in the spirit of Burnside (1998). We choose Hodrick 
and Prescott, and Baxter and King filters, which emphasize different cycle 
concepts and which appear to be the most reliable tools for measuring cycles 
(Canova, 1994). These two filters provide different windows through which the 
data can be examined. 
3.3.2 Filtering Techniques 
When a series is filtered, the relative importance of its components is changed 
so that only the component of interest is retained. Thus, the characteristics of a 
cycle can be identified by retaining only the desired frequencies and totally 
eliminating the remaining while inducing no phase shift, i. e. no alteration in the 
timing relationships between series at any frequency (ideal filters). In other 
words, the objective is to obtain a filter that eliminates the low frequencies 
(slowly evolving components of that series or trend) in the series and preserves 
the components that account for the short-run major fluctuations; fluctuations 
that have been defined as lasting from 6 to 32 quarters (1.5 to 8 years). 
The Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter retains high frequency components and 
attenuates fluctuations at low frequencies. This was originally developed as the 
solution to the problem of minimizing the variation in the cyclical component of 
an observed time series, e=X, - µ, , subject to a condition on the `smoothness' 
of the trend component, g. In this way, the two components are identified. The 
assumption that the trend is smooth is imposed by assuming that the sum of 
squares of the second differences of p, is small. The smoothness condition 
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penalizes acceleration in the trend, so that the minimization problem becomes 
that of minimizing 
I ý, >0 (11) 
Min[2+ý[(fýr+ý Prl-`Pr All-l)]z rr4, j; =, 1=1 r=z 
where A. is a Lagrangean multiplier that can be interpreted as a smoothness 
parameter i. e. one that penalizes the variability of trend. As A increases, the 
penalty imposed for large fluctuations in the trend component increases and the 
path for ji, becomes smoother, so that in the limit, as A -* oo, p, becomes a 
linear trend. Optimizing the smoothness parameter is an issue that has fuelled 
considerable research. '' Setting the smoothing parameter to A =1,600 produces a 
frequency response function that is very close to that of the ideal high-pass filter 
with lower pass 706 cycles per period, " if quarterly data is being used (Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997; Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). Thus, this choice produces a filter 
that is close to optimal for passing the cyclical component having periods of 32 
quarters or less. However, this optimality result is based on application of the 
filter to an infinitely long time series, or from a practical viewpoint, to the 
" Although most researchers have followed Hodrick and Prescott and used the value of 1,600 for 
the smoothing parameter when using quarterly data, there is less agreement in the literature when 
moving to other frequencies. Backus and Kehoe (1992) use a value of 100 for annual data, 
whereas Cooley and Ohanian (1991) suggest a value o 400 and Baxter and King (1999) a value of 
10. 
"The transfer function of HP filter is H(co) = 
42(1- cos(ro))2 
Thus, the cyclical 
1+ 42(1- cos(rw))Z 
component of the HP filter places zero weight on the zero frequency (H(w) = 0), and close to 
unit weight on high frequencies (H(o)) = 16A /(1+162)). Thus, for A =1,600, this filter 
looks remarkably like an approximate high pass filter with cut-off frequency CO = it / 16 cycles 
per period or cut-off periodicity of 32 quarters per cycle. 
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midpoints of series of typical length. The optimality conclusion does not apply 
at, or close to, series endpoints (Mise et al., 2005; Kaiser and Maravall, 1999). A 
solution to this problem, proposed by Kaiser and Maravall (1999), is application 
of the filter to series extended with proper optimal forecasts (obtained with the 
appropriate ARIMA model for the series). However, this solution would require 
to render the series -stationary. The most appropriate procedure, one which 
renders a series stationary without simultaneously distorting its cyclical structure, 
depends on the type of non-stationarity in the data. As already discussed, in 
practice, such a procedure is difficult to find. Weak reliance on the power of the 
unit root test seems hazardous in this context, so we adopt another approach, 
proposed by Baxter and King (1999). Since the optimality of HP is improved as 
we move towards the midpoints of the series (especially after the twelfth 
observation), it would seem natural to drop twelve observations from the 
beginning and end of the sample period. 
Baxter and King develop the theory of band pass filters and propose an 
alternative to the Hodrick -Prescott filter. Roughly speaking, the band-pass filter 
is a linear filter that takes a two-sided weighted moving average of the data, 
where cycles in a `band', given by a specified lower and upper bound, are 
`passed' through, or extracted, and the remaining cycles are `filtered' Out. 13 The 
Baxter-King (BK) filter has the following two-sided moving average 
representation: 
13 At quarterly frequencies, the desired band is 6 to 32 quarters per cycle, which means a 
frequency band of 'r / 16 <I w j< it /3. Thus, the transfer function of the ideal band pass filter 
takes the form: 
lif 
W 16 3 
0 otherwise 
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K 
aK (L) ^ akLk 
k=-K 
(12) 
Where the lag operator L is defined so that LkXI = X, _k 
for positive and 
negative values of k. In addition, symmetry (weights are such that ak = a_k for 
k=1,... K) is imposed so that the filter does not induce a phase shift. It 
approximates the ideal filters by choosing the filter weights so as to minimize: 
Q` 
2ý 
J)W"())-WK(w)l2 dco (13) 
Where W*(co) is the frequency response function of the ideal filter, WK(co) 
is the frequency response function of the filter described by (7) and K denotes the 
maximum lag length of the resulting two-sided moving average. 
HP and BK filters are good and justified attempts to approximate the ideal 
filters. However, each filter fails to retain perfectly the desired frequencies 
(compression and/or exacerbation effect), and frequencies that should suppress 
also pass the filter (leakage effect). 14 In Figure 3.2, the transfer function15 plots 
the squared gain (change in amplitude) of HP and BK filters for both trend 
stationary (TS) and difference stationary (DS) series. The ideal filter would 
eliminate permanent fluctuations (those at period co) and irregular fluctuations 
(those at periods less than 6 quarters-only in the case of BK filter) and leave all 
others untouched, implying a squared gain of one. In other words, the ideal filter 
extracts fluctuations within the desired band of periodicities (or until the upper 
band, in case of HP filter). If the squared gain is higher than one in a range of 
14 For a more technical analysis on distortionary effects of the Hodrick-Prescott filter, see Ehlgen 
(1998), Cogley and Nason (1995), Singleton (1988), and of the Baxter and King filter, see 
Murray (2003). 
15 The transfer function indicates the extent to which the filter alters the spectrum of the original 
time series. 
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frequencies within the desired band (from 6 to 32 quarters) or below the upper 
band in the case of HP filter (32 quarters), the fluctuations corresponding to those 
periodicities are expanded relative to the original series (exacerbation). Others 
are attenuated (compression), in which case, the squared gain is lower than one. 
Leakage effect exists when periodicities outside the band (or above the upper 
band in the case of HP filter) are not completely eliminated. Unfortunately, there 
is no ideal filter for all processes. The HP filter is quite close to ideal for a trend 
stationary series but has a tendency to induce spurious power when applied to the 
wrong type of data. The BK is an alternative that minimizes the risk of 
introducing spurious cyclical structure in the data when the type of non- 
stationarity in the data generating process is unknown (Baxter and King, 1999). 
The danger of spurious cycles can be minimized by careful comparison across 
filters, bearing in mind the transfer function in Figure 3.2. Thus, we compare 
results with the known potential distortions induced by the filter used, and 
compare across filters to judge robustness. Confidence is justified if the BK and 
HP filtered data both display cycle peak at or below a period of 28 quarters. 
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Figure 3.2: Transfer Function for the HP and BK Filters 
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3.4 Univariate Analysis of UK Mergers 
3.4.1 Data Description 
One difficulty in the time series analysis of mergers is the need for relatively 
long data series. Any study on merger waves involves a trade-off between 
internal consistency of the data series and the length of the series. Empirical 
studies for the US have merged series produced by different institutions in order 
to produce a single long series, but this kind of procedure is problematic. 
We consider the longest consistent series available for the UK mergers 
provided by the Office of National Statistics (see Chapter 2). Specifically, we 
consider the number of completed domestic mergers quarterly over the period 
from 1969 to 2005. Ideally, one would measure merger activity by the real value 
of merged firms. However, this measure is subject to huge errors, since the price 
paid for the acquired firm is often not disclosed. In these cases, the value of the 
acquisition would be estimated from publicly available information, which 
generally understates the true value of the transaction. This bias would represent 
a simple shift in the mean of the series. 
At the sectoral level of analysis, the data source is the Thompson ONE Banker 
database; the most extensive resource for merger transactions around the world. 
We consider the number of completed domestic mergers by sector (as defined by 
the Thompson ONE Banker) quarterly for the period from 1985 to 2005. The two 
different sources of the different levels of analysis provide a more complete 
picture of mergers than using just one source. Series have not been merged in 
order to construct longer series. Summary statistics for the merger data at the 
aggregate and sector level are given in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Mergers and Acquisitions in the UK- Summary Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Aggregate Mergers 168 82.49 56 464 
Sectors 
Telecommunications 14 4.38 0 19 
Consumer Staples 67 11.98 3 61 
Retail 73 16.44 3 71 
Real Estate 57 24.24 2 131 
Media & Entertainment 106 25.08 0 109 
Materials 74 16.17 0 74 
Industrials 144 27.25 2 121 
High Technology 74 26.09 0 139 
Consumer Product & Services 123 31.80 1 127 
Energy and Power 36 7.98 0 33 
Financials 89 18.95 6 100 
Healthcare 28 8.10 0 36 
Note: Data for aggregate mergers cover the period from 1969- 
2005 quarterly and are sourced by Office of National 
Statistics while those for different sectors cover the 
period from 1985-2005 quarterly and are sourced by 
Thomson ONE Banker 
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3.4.2 Univariate Results : Cyclical Component of UK Mergers 
Figure 3.3 displays the results of applying HP and BK filters to the aggregate 
number of mergers. There is a very close correspondence between the cycles 
isolated by the HP filter and those generated by the BK filter, although the HP 
filtered series is somewhat less smooth. The maximum and minimum of that 
series are the same for both HP and BK filters, with the former occurring in 1987 
Q3 and the latter in 1991Q1. Other peaks occur in 1973Q1,1978Q4,1989Q3, 
1994Q2, (also in 1988Q3, but only if using the HP filter), while troughs exist in 
1975Q1,1985Q1. The above results are an indication of quasi-cyclical behaviour 
of the aggregate mergers with different amplitudes and regularities. The cyclical 
component of sector mergers also exhibits the same pattern, regardless of the 
filter used. 
66 
Part 2: Macroeconomic Analysis Chapter 3/ UK Merger Waves? 
Figure 3.3: Cyclical Component of Aggregate Mergers Series using HP and BK 
Filters 
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Note: The horizontal axis measures period in quarters, while the vertical 
measures the deviations from the mean of the series (merger numbers). 
The common sample period for these graphs is 1969.1-2005.4, but since 
K=12 is used, (BK filter), three years of data (12 observations) is lost at 
each end of the plots. In addition, as the HP filter is close to optimal only 
at the midpoints of series, the same number of observations is dropped in 
order to avoid spurious cycles towards the end of the series (see Section 
3.3.2, pp: 59-60) 
These cyclical components are further studied using the spectrum estimation, 
in order to analyze duration, regularity, and explanatory power. Figure 3.4 
presents the estimated spectrum for the BK and HP filtered data of aggregate 
mergers (the correspondent spectrum of mergers by sector are presented in 
Appendix A). Since these are point estimates of the power spectrum function, 
they give no indication of their likely accuracy. Thus, we also calculate the 
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corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. 16 Based on the fact that each 
frequency component, w, corresponds to a particular periodicity (cycle length), 
the horizontal axis measures cycle lengths in quarters, in order to make 
conclusions more straightforward. Thus, the area in the plot is divided into three 
segments: the long run periodicity band (LR), which corresponds to cycles of 32 
quarters or longer, the merger cycles band (MC), which corresponds to cycles of 
6-32 quarters, and the short run (SR) periodicity band, which corresponds to 
cycles of 2-6 quarters. Note that as we move to the right along the axis, the 
cyclical period falls. This also implies that the first half interval covers cycles 
with periods from infinity down to 5 quarters, while the second half covers only 
periods from 5 down to 2 quarters (the smallest cycle observable with quarterly 
data). 
16A 100(1-a)% confidence interval for f (Co) is given by 
of ýa) 
to 
y2 (w) 
, where Xv, 
a/2 
%v, l-a/2 
M 
v= 2N /E A2 is the number of degrees of freedom of the lag window (see Chatfield, 2004 
K= M 
p: 139). 
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Figure 3.4: Univariate Estimated Spectrum of Aggregate Mergers using HP and BK 
Filtered Data. 
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Note: The dashed line gives the 95% confidence interval. The horizontal axis 
measures the cycle length in quarters, while the vertical measures the 
power of spectrum of mergers series (variance of merger series). 
MC=merger cycles periodicity band, LR=long run periodicity band, 
SR=short run periodicity band 
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3.4.3 Discussion of Univariate Results 
The estimated spectrum provides clear evidence of cyclical structure for 
aggregate mergers. In addition, for every sector, the estimated spectrum displays 
at least one identifiable peak (see Appendix A). Table 3.2 reports the periods at 
which maximum power is obtained with HP and BK filtered data. As peaks 
imply strong periodicity in the data, the presence of a peak in the spectrum is an 
indication of a predictable component in the corresponding series. In aggregate 
mergers, and also in all sectors, a peak is found within the merger cycle band, 
suggesting that merger cycle fluctuations have a predictable component. 
Table 3.2: Duration of Regular Cycles by Sector, and of Aggregate Mergers using HP 
and BK Filtered Data (period in quarters) 
Cycle duration 
HP BK 
filtered filtered 
data data 
Aggregate Mergers 24 24 
Sectors 
Telecomunications 16 16 
Consumer Stample 28 20 
Retail 20 20 
Real Estate 20 20 
Media & Entertainment 20 18 
Materials 20 20 
Industrials 20 20 
High Technology 16 16 
Consumer Products & Services 20 20 
Energy and Power 12 12 
Financials 20 20 (8) 
Healthcare 20 20 
Note: The apparent difference between the overall cycle length 
of 24 quarters and the average cycle length of 20 quarters 
will affect small differences in phases. 
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Since sectors exhibit a regular cycle of 20 quarters or less, it is 
the (slightly) lead/lag relation among them that may create a 
cycle of 24 quarters in aggregate level. 
Can we be sure these peaks are not a spurious product of the filter used? For 
aggregate mergers, as well as for sectors such as Consumer Products and Service, 
Healthcare, Industrials, Real Estate, High Technology and Materials, the answer 
is yes. For these sectors, and also for aggregate mergers, regardless of how the 
data are filtered, not only is a cycle peak identified in the merger cycle band, but 
each one is also below that in the transfer function for both HP and BK filters. 
For sectors such as Energy and Power, Media and Entertainment, Retail, and 
Telecommunication, again, it is the case that a spectrum peak in the merger 
cycles band is found in data filtered by both methods, though the variation of the 
series which occurs within the short run band when the HP filter is applied is 
higher than that for the BK filter (especially in Telecommunications). Since the 
two filters have different transfer functions, it is not surprising that when they are 
applied to the same time series, the resulting filtered series display different 
properties. Remember that both filters eliminate high periodicity (or trend), but 
while BK extracts the cyclical component within the band of 6 to 32 quarters 
smoothing low periodicity irregular variation, the HP filter imposes only an 
upper bound in the periodicity of the isolated fluctuations and does not remove 
the irregular variation in the series. Thus, the existence of high variation in the 
spectrum of these sectors is just the consequence of the dominant role played by 
the low periodicities in the spectrum. In other words, merger activity in these 
sectors may contain important low periodicity components that are passed by HP 
filter, but that are removed by the BK filter. Thus, confidence in the spectrum is 
justified. The remaining sectors, Consumer Staples and Financials, are more 
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questionable. Regarding the former, the peak in the HP filtered data is roughly 
consistent with spurious cycles induced by the filter. Thus, there is no confidence 
regarding cycles in that sector. For Financials, BK filtered data display two 
different peaks within the merger cycles band, while HP filtered data for the 
same sector exhibit only one peak within the same band. Thus, on the basis of 
BK filtered data, we can conclude that Financials exhibits two different merger 
cycles of 20 and 8 quarters duration, while on the basis of HP filtered data, that 
sector exhibits only one cycle of 20 quarters duration. Consequently, only the 
cycle of 20 quarters duration is consistent with both filters, and we can be 
confident that this cycle is a true feature of the data. 
For a more rigorous assessment of the spectrum mass distribution across the 
three bands, Table 3.3 reports the results of variance decomposition of the 
normalized spectrum (for both filters) of mergers at aggregate and sector level. 
By doing so, we can check whether most of the spectrum mass is concentrated in 
the merger cycle periodicity band. Although that is obvious in the case of BK 
filtered data, it is questionable in the case of HP filtered data. The first column of 
the table contains the proportion of the variance due to the long run periodicity 
component, while the next two columns report the proportion of the merger 
variance due to merger and short run cycles, respectively. As expected, variance 
decomposition when BK filtered data are used suggests that the merger cycle 
periodicity component explains most of the merger variance. Cyclical variation 
ranges from 67 percent to 83 percent. However, in HP filtered data, the estimated 
distribution of mergers variance across long run, merger cycle, and short run 
periodicities suggests that for 10 out of the 13 sectors (with the exception of 
Financials, Consumer Staple, and Telecommunications) in our sample, and also 
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for aggregate mergers, the merger cycle component is larger than the other two 
components. Aggregate mergers exhibit proportional cyclical variation of 54 
percent, indicating that the bulk of the spectrum mass is concentrated in the 
merger cycle periodicity band. Among sectors, Energy and Power exhibits the 
highest cyclical proportional variation of 73 percent, followed by high 
Technology, Real Estate, and Media and Entertainment. The merger series of 
Consumer Products and Services, Industrials, Materials, Healthcare, and Retail 
have merger cycle periodicity components of less than 50 percent, but higher 
than the other two cyclical components. Finally, Financials, Consumer Staples, 
and Telecommunications display a short run variation which is higher than that 
of the merger cycle band. Indeed, their short run periodicity band accounts for 
most of the variance in the series. This means that irregular cyclical fluctuation in 
these sectors is more important than longer cycles (cycles from 6 to 32 quarters). 
Overall, these results suggest that the bulk of the spectrum mass is concentrated 
in the merger cycle band for the majority of the sectors and aggregate mergers. 
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Table 3.3 Variance Decomposition of Merger Activity by the Periodicity Component 
Variance decomposition -HP filtered data 
LR MC SR 
Aggregate mergers 0.26 0.54 0.20 
Sectors 
Telecommunications 0.09 0.35 0.57 
Consumer Staples 0.12 0.33 0.55 
Retail 0.09 0.46 0.46 
Real Estate 0.18 0.52 0.30 
Media & Entertainment 0.12 0.50 0.37 
Materials 0.16 0.48 0.38 
Industrials 0.15 0.48 0.38 
High Technology 0.13 0.59 0.29 
Consumer Products & Services 0.19 0.48 0.33 
Energy and Power 0.08 0.73 0.19 
Financials 0.10 0.39 0.51 
Healthcare 0.13 0.46 0.42 
Variance decomposition -BK filtered data 
LR MC SR 
Aggregate mergers 0.30 0.68 0.01 
Sectors 
Telecommunications 0.18 0.69 0.13 
Consumer Staples 0.18 0.67 0.15 
Retail 0.11 0.83 0.06 
Real Estate 0.20 0.76 0.04 
Media & Entertainment 0.16 0.77 0.08 
Materials 0.20 0.77 0.03 
Industrials 0.18 0.77 0.05 
High Technology 0.13 0.78 0.08 
Consumer Products & Services 0.22 0.74 0.05 
Energy and Power 0.08 0.73 0.19 
Financials 0.21 0.75 0.04 
Healthcare 0.19 0.76 0.04 
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Note: MC=merger cycles periodicity band, LR=long run periodicity band, 
SR=short run periodicity band 
So far, we have identified cycles with peaks in the spectrum of aggregate and 
sector level merger series. In order to assess the significance of these peaks and 
consequently, the significance of cycles, we test formally for cyclical structure in 
the data following a procedure developed by Canova (1996) and modified by 
Reiter and Woitek (1999). The test statistic is given by 
SaRIN(0)ýIýPRII ' (9) 
where £? Mc defines the merger cycle periodicity range, while OR defines the 
short plus the long run periodicity ranges (R = SR u LR ). IN (w) is the sample 
periodogram and 11.11 represents the number of periodogram ordinates in the 
interval. Thus, the numerator measures the average power of the series inside the 
merger cycle periodicities, while the dominator measures the power outside the 
referred band. 
Table 3.4 presents the value of the test statistic (D) for the HP and BK filtered 
data. If D is significantly greater than one, there is cyclical structure at merger 
cycle periodicities in the data. '? Table 3.4 shows that when the data are filtered 
by BK filter, aggregate mergers and mergers in all sectors exhibit cyclical 
behavior. However, when the HP filter is used, the results are not so clear. Thus, 
for aggregate mergers and for sectors such as Energy and Power, Financials, 
Consumer Products and Services, Healthcare, Industrials, Materials, Media and 
Entertainment, Real Estate, Retail, and High Technology, the results strongly 
support the presence of merger cycles in the 6-32 quarters range (1.5-8 years). 
17 Canova (1996) shows that 11 128 11. D follows the X2 (2 1I Omc IP distribution 
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For the two remaining sectors (Consumer Staples and Telecommunications), the 
test statistic is not significant, although it is greater than one. Thus, the 
hypothesis of a merger cycle in these sectors can not be accepted. That 
conclusion is further supported by the spectrum (see Appendix A) and variance 
decomposition, Table 3.3 (HP filtered data), which shows that short run cyclical 
fluctuations tend to be more important than merger cycle fluctuations. Thus, for 
Consumer Staples and Telecommunications, we do not find a robust cyclical 
structure. The case of Financials, however, is the most controversial. Although 
the D test supports the notion of merger cycles in Financials, variation 
decomposition indicates that short run fluctuations explain more than the merger 
cycle fluctuations (HP filtered data). Furthermore, spectrum with HP and BK 
filtered data (see Appendix A) indicates a cycle of 20 quarters or two cycles of 
20 and 8 quarters, respectively. Consequently, we can be confident only about a 
merger cycle of 20 quarters (5 years) duration in Financials, although strong 
lower periodicity also exists. 
Overall, the above results suggest that aggregate mergers occur in cycles of 24 
quarters (6 years), although there are some less regular periodicities. That 
conclusion is consistent with the cyclical component of the merger series (Figure 
3.3) where the hidden periodicities are shown. At the disaggregate sector level, 
most UK industries exhibit cyclical merger activity of approximately 20 quarters 
(5 years). 
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Table 3.4: Canova Test (D) for UK Merger Cycles 
HP filtered data BK filtered data 
Aggregate mergers 2.69 6.78 
Sectors 
Telecommunications* 1.23 4.57 
Consumer Staples* 1.11 4.01 
Retail 1.93 6.35 
Real Estate 2.50 5.73 
Media & Entertainment 2.35 4.63 
Materials 1.62 6.98 
Industrials 2.10 7.44 
High Technology 3.13 7.09 
Consumer Products & Services 2.14 5.82 
Energy and Power 1.84 8.47 
Financials 1.47 4.18 
Healthcare 1.96 6.04 
Note: *Average spectrum in the merger cycle periodicity band is not 
significantly higher than at other periodicities bands at 5 per cent 
significance level 
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3.5 Is there a Synchronization of Cycles? 
Since we have identified the power and the duration of merger cycles in 
aggregate and at the sector level, an interesting question is whether there exists 
the synchronization of cycles; in particular, synchronization over cycles in 
different sectors, and synchronization of the aggregate merger cycles with a 
business or capital markets cycle. 18 As regards the former, relevant literature (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3) argues that merger waves result from shocks to an 
industrial sector's economic, technological or regulatory environment. If these 
shocks are common to sectors, they will lead to a synchronization of sector 
merger cycles. If there are different shocks, a lead / lag relation among sectors 
will be observed. 
On the other hand, with regard to the latter question, we take the view that 
merger is an investment decision and as such, management uses information to 
develop estimates of future cash flows, to discount those cash flows with the 
appropriate cost of capital, and to evaluate whether the net present value of the 
merger is positive. Such evaluation is sensitive to expectations of current and 
future economic and financial market conditions. (For empirical evidence, see 
relevant literature in Chapter 2, Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). 
As a result, an important determinant of mergers is the real business cycle 
because high levels of economic activity generate higher expected cash flows 
from a merger and a greater need for additional real capital. Thus, when an 
'8 A number of studies suggest the existence of business cycles, and the cyclical behaviour of 
interest rates and stock prices in the UK, (see, for example, Roma and Torous, 1997; Andreou et 
al, 2001). 
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economy is in expansion, it is expected to encourage merger activity. The real 
GDP growth will be used to proxy the business cycle and the current economic 
activity. Thus, real GDP growth and merger activity move together. 
Secondly, stock prices would have two effects on merger activity. Stock 
prices have an important influence through the mechanism of the cost of capital. 
High stock prices reduce the firm's estimate of its cost of capital, raising the net 
present value of the future economic benefits available from a merger. On the 
other hand, Fama (1981) shows that current stock prices are statistically 
significant predictors of the future rate of change in economic activity. As a 
result, higher stock prices indicate the market's assessment of favourable future 
economic conditions, which in turn, means higher future cash flows associated 
from a merger. In this case, more mergers should become positive net present 
value investments. In contrast to most existing studies, we use the real stock 
market prices, since high stock prices can simply imply that the nominal value of 
stocks is higher as a result of inflation (see, for example, Clarke and loannidis, 
1996; Polonchek and Sushka, 1987). Thus, stock prices are expected to move 
together with merger activity. 
Finally, many mergers are financed with borrowed capital, and would be 
influenced by the current real interest rate. Higher interest rates would indicate 
higher cost of capital and tighter monetary conditions, which would be expected 
to discourage merger activity. Consequently, movements of real current interest 
rates and merger activity are expected to be in the opposite direction. 
The above hypotheses are empirically investigated by applying concepts of 
cross spectral analysis. 
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3.5.1 Data Description 
In addition to data on merger activity used in univariate analysis, we use 
quarterly data on UK stock market prices, GDP growth, and interest rates from 
1969 to 2005. In accord with the literature, the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
100 Price Index (FTSE 100) is chosen as the measure of stock market prices, 
taken from DataStream.. The nominal short term interest rates are measured as 
the 3-month Treasury-bills taken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
database. In addition, real GDP is taken by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) database and its growth rate is calculated as the proportionate change in 
real GDP levels. The FTSE 100 and short term interest rates are deflated by the 
gross domestic product deflator (at market prices). In the rest of the study, when 
discussing the above variables, we refer to their value in real terms. 
3.5.2 Multivariate Results 
In this section, we present the main empirical results, based on estimation of 
coherency, phase effect, and quadrature spectrum and univariate spectra. 
Table 3.5 presents the significant relations across sectors with the 
correspondent phase value. It is obvious from the table that there is 
synchronization across most sectoral cycles. Only cycles in Financials and 
Healthcare do not have a significant relation with any other. Thus, we are able to 
conclude that sector specific shocks are responsible for merger cycles in these 
two sectors. 
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The cyclical component of aggregate mergers, interest rates, GDP growth, and 
the stock prices are presented in Figure 3.5.19 Figure 3.5 shows that aggregate 
merger cyclical fluctuations lead that of interest rates by approximately 2 years. 
This means that interest rates are procyclical indicators of merger activity. Thus, 
interest rates do not reach their peak until some time after merger activity has 
reached its trough, a point that is not reached until a recovery in merger activity 
is well underway. Although this relation is constant over time, the amplitude of 
these cyclical patterns differs according to the time period analyzed. Thus, during 
1969-1984, interest rates are more volatile than mergers, while after 1984, they 
both exhibit very similar amplitude. 
On the other hand, aggregate mergers and business cycles move together with 
similar amplitudes, although during the 1980s, the amplitude of the former is 
much higher than that of the latter. 
Mergers cycles are not similar in amplitude to stock market cycles, with the 
exception of some periods (1977-1981 and 1986-1990). During 1996-2001, the 
amplitude of the stock market cycle is higher than that of mergers. The relation 
of these cyclical components is further studied by spectral methods. 
19 As HP and BK filters give similar results, in this section, we present only results from HP 
filtered data. 
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Figure 3.5: Cyclical Component of UK Aggregate Mergers, Interest Rates, Stock 
Prices, and GDP Growth using HP Filter 
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Note: The common sample period for these graphs is 1969.1-2005.4, but 
since we use K=12 (BK filter), we lose three years of data (12 
observations) at each end of the plots. In addition, with the HP filter, 
we drop the same number of observations in order to have robust 
results (see Section 3.3.2). 
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Figure 3.6 shows the univariate spectrum of interest rate, GDP growth, stock 
prices, and mergers. We notice that the mass of the spectrum for all of the 
variables is concentrated in the periodicity band 10 to 32 quarters, with a peak at 
24 quarters. That means that all the variables exhibit a regular cycle of 24 
quarters, the only exception being GDP growth, which exhibits higher variation. 
More specifically, it presents three different peaks corresponding to three 
different cycles, the first with 24 quarters duration, the second with 6 quarters 
duration and the third cycle with about 4 quarters duration (the third one may be 
due to seasonality, as the series are not seasonal adjusted; seasonal variations are 
regarded as very small cycles). Thus, all the variables have in common a 24 
quarters (6 years) cycle. 
Figure 3.6: Univariate Spectrum of Interest Rates, Stock Prices, GDP Growth, and 
Aggregate Mergers 
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Note: The spectrums are normalized (divided by their maximum value) 
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In order to have a clearer view of the relation between these variables, we 
present some estimates from cross spectral analysis. Figure 3.7 shows the 
explained variance of merger activity in terms of interest rates, GDP growth, and 
stock prices. Explained variance is the ratio of the heavy grey area relative to the 
sum of the high and heavy grey area. Here, we find that in a merger cycle of 24 
quarters, 53% of the mergers variance is explained by the GDP growth, while 
interest rates and stock prices can explain 26% and 9%, respectively. However, 
in a smaller but not regular merger cycle of 10 quarters, the GDP growth can 
explain 6% of the mergers variance, while interest rates and stock prices can 
explain 2% and 28%, respectively. Thus, long, regular merger cycles can be 
explained by business cycles, while smaller, irregular ones can be better 
explained by stock price fluctuations. In both cases, however, there is a portion 
of aggregate mergers that is not explained at all by these macroeconomic and 
financial variables. That portion is bigger in the case of a smaller cycle. 
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Figure 3.7: Explained Variance of Aggregate Mergers in terms of Stock Prices, 
Interest Rates, and GDP Growth 
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Finally, Table 3.6 reports phase values between mergers and interest rates, 
business cycle, and stock prices only for the periodicity band 6 to 32 quarters. 
Table 3.6 shows that there is a phase difference of 0.1 radians between mergers 
and stock price cycles, indicating that the mergers cycle leads that of the stock 
prices. In lower periodicities (about 10 quarters), the mergers cycle moves 
together with that of the stock market. However, the 10 quarters cycle is not 
regular (cannot be predicted). 2° On the other hand, interest rates lags the mergers 
cycle of 24 quarters, while business cycles is a leading indicator of the same 
cycle. We could argue in favor of synchronization between mergers and 
business cycles and stock market cycles, as their phase difference is small (as 
shown in Table 3.6). We can find different lead and lag relation as we move to 
different periodicities. The different signs of phase indicate that there is no 
constant time lead/lag relation at each frequency. However, we are interested 
mostly in values at 24 quarters, as that is the regular merger cycle (as provided 
by the mergers spectrum). 
Overall, the above results suggest that although mergers and the stock market 
both exhibit a regular cycle of 24 quarters (6 years), these cyclical patterns are 
not very similar. A closer relation between these two exists for a cycle of 10 
quarters (2.5 years), with merger activity moving together with changes in stock 
prices. However, this cycle is not regular (cannot be predicted). On the other 
hand, there is greater similarity in the cyclical behaviour of mergers and interest 
rates at periodicity of 24 quarters. In that cycle, merger activity is a leading 
indicator of the interest rates cycle. The closest relation exists between mergers 
20 Periodicities in the area around 10 quarters contribute equally to the aggregate mergers 
univariate spectrum. 
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and business cycle in their sharing of a common cycle of 24 quarters, these two 
cycles synchronizing. 
Table 3.6: Phase Differences between Aggregate Mergers and Interest rates, Stock 
Prices, GDP Growth along Cycles with Different Periodicities. 
Period Interest rates FTSE 100 GDP growth 
29 1.9 0.1 -0.4 
24 2.0 0.1 -0.4 
21 2.1 0.1 -0.3 
18 2.2 0.1 -0.3 
16 2.3 0.1 -0.3 
14 2.4 0.0 -0.2 
13 2.4 0.0 -0.2 
12 2.5 0.0 -0.2 
11 2.5 0.0 -0.1 
10 2.5 0.0 -0.1 
9 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 
8 0.7 -0.2 -0.1 
7 2.8 -0.2 -0.1 
6 -1.4 0.2 -0.1 
Note: Period is measured in quarters, and phase values in radians 
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3.5.3 Discussion of Multivariate Results 
Multivariate spectral analysis suggests that there is synchronization over most 
of the UK sector mergers (notable exceptions being Financials and Healthcare, 
which are cycles that do not seem to cohere with those of any other sector). This 
result is consistent with that of Resende (1999). Thus, we can conclude that 
mergers in the UK spread through all sectors at the same time. 
There is evidence of synchronization between the UK merger cycle and the 
business cycle with a duration of six years, there being a strong coherency 
between these two cycles. On the other hand, mergers and interest rates cycles 
exhibit a less strong coherency; both exhibit a cycle of six years, while the 
mergers cycle leads that of interest rates. The above results suggest that until 
expansion in the UK economy, as firms become optimistic about future 
prospects, they engage in merger activity. As mergers are sometimes financed 
with borrowed capital, the demand for credit may well increase. Thus, mergers 
may be a factor, among others, influencing interest rate increases during 
expansion. These results are consistent with studies that suggest that interest rates 
are procyclical, lagging economic indicators (see, for example, Friedman, 1986; 
Blanchard and Watson, 1986). 
On the other hand, although mergers and stock prices both exhibit a regular 
cycle of six years, these cyclical patterns are not very similar. A closer relation 
between these two exists for a less regular cycle of 2.5 years, where the two 
cycles synchronize. From the above results, we can conclude that stock price 
fluctuations move together with small, less regular merger cycles, while over 
longer regular merger cycles, stock prices do not seem to cohere with merger 
activity. The above results may explain why empirical studies give mixed results 
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regarding the relation between merger activity and stock prices (see, for example, 
Geroski, 1984; Guerard, 1989; Benzing 1993; Clarke and Ioannidis, 1996). These 
studies apply time domain techniques that do not distinguish between cyclical 
fluctuations of different duration. Results of the present study show that the 
relation between merger activity and stock prices is different over cycles of 
different duration. 
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
Using well-known concepts from spectral analysis, we have described the 
properties of merger cycles in the UK. 
We concluded that Energy and Power have the smallest merger cycle of 12 
quarters (3 years), followed by High Technology, with a merger cycle of 16 
quarters (4 years). Most industries have merger cycles of 20 quarters (5 years). 
Only Consumer Staples and Telecommunications do not exhibit a regular merger 
cycle. In addition, there is synchronization of merger cycles for most of the 
sectors, while only Financials and Healthcare cycles do not cohere with any 
other. Furthermore, aggregate mergers exhibit a regular cycle of approximately 6 
years. Cycles with lower periodicities also exist but they cannot be regarded as 
regular. These results suggest that past merger activity may influence current 
merger activity. There may be a bandwagon effect to merger activity that 
influences most sectors in the UK economy. 
Furthermore, we examined the synchronization of aggregate mergers with 
interest rates, stock prices, and business cycle, all exhibiting a cycle of 6 years. 
There is clear evidence of a strong coherence between aggregate mergers and 
business cycles. These two cycles synchronize, although the amplitude of the 
former is much higher than that of the latter. A less strong coherence exists 
between aggregate mergers and capital markets cycles. Aggregate mergers and 
interest rates exhibit a similar cyclical pattern, with the former leading the latter 
by 2 years, while the aggregate mergers cycle has an even weaker coherence with 
the stock prices cycle of 6 years. On the other hand, a stronger relation between 
aggregate mergers and stock prices exists in smaller cycles of about 2.5 years. 
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However, within this cycle, the coherence of interest rate and business cycle is 
very small. 
These results suggest that aggregate mergers synchronize with the business 
cycle. As the economy expands, it would seem that business becomes more 
optimistic and confident about the future, and when excess capacity is exhausted, 
they may borrow to finance merger and acquisition activity, triggering the 
interest rate cycle. Based on the weak relation between aggregate mergers and 
long stock market cycles, the observed relation between high stock market 
valuations and merger cycles may have been misattributed to expectations about 
the future economic conditions (see, for example, Benzing 1991). On the other 
hand, the stronger relation of stock prices and merger activity over a small, less 
regular cycle of 2.5 years may be attributed to behavioural misevaluation factors 
(see, for example, Morellec and Zhdanov, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). Rapidly changing stock prices are indicative of pervasive 
disequilibria in equity markets, and in such situations, the changes are so great, 
that market valuations do not accurately reflect long term profit opportunities. 
Thus, when financial markets overvalue stocks in the short run, a bidder takes the 
opportunity to buy the real assets of a less overvalued target firm using their own 
overvalued equity. These opportunities will be diluted in the long run, when the 
stock prices return to the efficient level. 
However, results show that a large portion of an aggregate mergers cycle 
cannot be explained by the business cycle, interest rate or stock price 
fluctuations. Although evidence suggests that a merger cycle of 6 years 
synchronizes with the business cycle, only 53% of the merger fluctuations can be 
attributed to the business cycle. On the other hand, fluctuations in the interest 
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rates and stock prices can explain 26% and 9%, respectively. These effects of 
business cycle, interest rates, and stock prices on merger cycle may be 
overlapping. Since the largest portion of a merger cycle that can be explained by 
macro factors is 53%, there is a need to search for complementary driving forces 
of merger activity at the micro-level. Macro-environmental forces create 
receptive conditions for the development of merger activity. By examining firms' 
motives for mergers, we provide an indication of the micro-forces that feed into, 
and further reinforce, merger activity. 
The next chapters provide such an analysis at the micro-level. First, we review 
the most profound motives for mergers, as suggested by industrial organization 
and finance perspectives. A theoretic-decision model is then constructed to 
explain the timing of mergers based on different micro-forces. And finally, the 
model is empirically tested. 
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PART 3: MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 4: MERGER ACTIVITY - THE FIRM 
LEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
4.1. Introduction 
Research on the causes of merger activity at the firm level has received 
growing attention from both the industrial economics and financial perspectives 
over the last two decades. Extensive theoretical and empirical literature has 
explored both the motives and consequences of mergers. ' 
Industrial organization literature is based on both the efficiency-increasing 
power of mergers, be it by the exploitation of synergies, or growth opportunities, 
and on the market power hypothesis, which perceives the struggle for market 
shares and price-setting power as the dominant motive behind mergers. On the 
other hand, finance literature focuses on the corporate control hypothesis, which 
considers the control of firms as a valuable asset traded in a market for corporate 
control. That market facilitates the dismissal of managers who are not acting in 
1 Although there is a large body of literature on the welfare effects of mergers, a review of it lies 
beyond the objectives of this study (see, for example, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; Hay and 
Werden, 1993; Spector, 2003). There is also evidence of difficulties associated with mergers. 
Organization research points to the role of cultural clashes. The human resource management 
literature indicates that acquired firm employees may react unfavourably to mergers. For a survey 
and synthesis of these literatures, see Larson and Finkelstein (1999). 
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the shareholders' best interests. 2 The misvaluation of firms is another motive for 
merger stressed by finance literature. 
Both approaches have yielded some useful insights into merger activity. 
Rather than reviewing the entire extensive literature on the topic, we concentrate 
on the more important theoretical and empirical conclusions, in order to indicate 
that such an analysis at the micro-level can be utilized in developing explanations 
of merger waves. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the main models of 
merger drivers from an industrial organization perspective. Section 4.3 reviews 
studies explaining mergers from a finance perspective. Finally, Section 4.4 
concludes by proposing a marriage of the main conclusions of the industrial 
organization and finance perspectives in order to explain merger waves. 
2 There are also theories that point towards the managers' interest in mergers, be it that they 
incorrectly believe themselves to be better able to manage the target (hubris hypothesis), or that 
they act for personal advantage (empire-building hypothesis). However, we focus on merger 
theories that are based on the assumption of shareholders' wealth maximization. 
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4.2. Industrial Organization Perspective in Analyzing Mergers 
The industrial organization literature on mergers assumes that managers are 
rational and maximize the profit of shareholders. Under these assumptions, early 
theoretical studies analyzed static oligopoly models to examine the incentives to 
merge in the presence of either Cournot or Bertrand competition. A central 
postulate is that the pre-merger and the post-merger situations are represented as 
either Cournot or Bertrand equilibrium points involving different market 
structures, with the merged firm being treated as a single player in the post- 
merger game. It is asked whether firms participating in a merger benefit from 
merging their business instead of staying independent. The early industrial 
organization literature assumes that a group of firms has an incentive to merge if 
the profits of the participating firms increase relative to their combined profits in 
the status quo equilibrium. This is the `traditional criterion' for merger incentives 
in industrial organization literature. However, more recent literature indicates 
that gains from concentration often do not satisfy the traditional criterion. Thus, 
theoretical models allowing the merger decision to be made endogenously 
emerged in an attempt to provide a clearer picture of the merger process. 
Another view of the merger phenomenon is one that allows for the 
interdependence of merger decisions. Theoretical literature on sequential mergers 
has been developed in order to examine whether merger incentives are 
influenced by future mergers. 
Finally, a theory of pre-emptive mergers has been developing in order to 
provide explanations of why unprofitable mergers occur. 
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In the next subsections, we first present the main theoretical models of merger 
incentives in a static framework where a merger is seen in isolation, followed by 
models of sequential mergers, and then pre-emptive merger models. 
4.2.1 Theoretical Models of Mergers within a Static Framework 
Stigler (1950), in a highly influential model, stresses the problem of enforcing 
an agreement between competitors. Enforcement depends on being able to detect 
cheating, and he shows that detection is easier with fewer firms. 3 Stigler's model 
predicts that increased concentration from mergers can lead to collusion and the 
identification of factors facilitating collusion. 
On the other hand, Stigler (1950) argues that firms which do not participate in 
a merger (outsiders) may benefit more than participants (insiders). When a 
merger occurs, the merged firm has an incentive to reduce its production to a 
level below the combined output of its constituent firms, leading to an increase in 
industry price (if the cost reductions associated with the merger are not too 
large). Outsiders will then expand output and profit from the higher industry 
price. Thus, insiders do not capture all the profits resulting from their merger. 
Such externality of a merger may increase total industry profits, but may not be 
profitable for the merged firm. 
' Models of repeated games, however, indicate that tacit collusion is possible, even with very 
large numbers of firms, and predict that collusion is one of many possible equilibria (see e. g. 
Shapiro, 1989, pp: 364-6). 
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Salant et al (1983) raise again the possibility that some exogenous mergers 
may be unprofitable, by examining a Cournot oligopoly model where identical 
firms with constant marginal costs sell homogenous products to consumers with 
a linear demand curve. They consider Cournot equilibrium, in which a subset of 
the firms merges while the other firms remain independent. After the merger, the 
insiders have an incentive to contract production for any given output by 
outsiders, prompting outsiders to respond by expanding their own production. 
However, as the outputs of the outsiders increase, the profits of the insiders 
decrease. Hence, the possibility arises that the increase in production by outsiders 
following the merger will reduce insider profits by more than the increase in 
profits that would have occurred had outsider production remained constant. 
They show that a merger is unprofitable, even if it creates efficiency gains 
because these gains are not great enough to compensate for the profit reduction 
induced by the reaction of outsiders. They indicate that a merger is unprofitable 
unless the merging coalition consists of more than 80 per sent of all firms in the 
industry. 
However, by assuming that the merged firm does not differ from the others, 
Salant et al. understate the incentive to merge. Perry and Porter (1985) consider a 
model which addresses the industry asymmetries caused by the merger of subsets 
of firms. They suggest that a merged firm faces a different maximization 
problem because of its altered cost function and new strategic considerations. 
They assume that demand and marginal cost are linear functions of output, and 
focus on the incentive to merge that arises solely from firm size and behaviour in 
an imperfectly competitive environment. They model industry as consisting of 
oligopolists and a competitive fringe. By assuming that the competitive fringe 
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capacity is constrained, profitable opportunities remain for the oligopolists. Thus, 
as firms from the competitive fringe merge and form a new oligopolist, the fringe 
will contract but not vanish. The competitive fringe becomes a smaller fraction 
of the industry, so that on balance, the industry behaves less competitively. The 
new oligopolist (merged firm) supplies less than did its component firms of the 
fringe prior to merger, and as a result, prices increase (in this case, firms from the 
competitive fringe cannot react to a merger by increasing production due to 
capacity constraints). Without this price effect, there would be no incentive for 
fringe firms to merge. Therefore, the profits of the merged firm can exceed those 
of its constituent firms only if the merger results in a price rise sufficient to offset 
the lower output level. They show that when the number of merged firms is 
small, the competitive fringe is large, so that the residual demand facing the 
firms in the fringe considering merger is relatively flat. Thus, an output 
contraction has a small price effect and the profitability of merger is reduced. 
However, when the number of merged firms is large, the residual demand is 
relatively steep, so that additional merger can more readily increase the price. 
Rothschild (1990) employs a variant of Perry and Porter's oligopoly-fringe 
model to analyze the incentives for horizontal merger. They consider three 
different ways that merger may take place: between firms which remain in the 
fringe, between firms within the oligopoly, and across the boundary of fringe and 
oligopoly. They show that if merger takes place in the oligopoly, then the profits 
of outsiders in both oligopoly and fringe are increased. A merger in the fringe 
which produces no synergies leaves unaffected the profits of all outsiders, 
irrespective of their location in the industry. If a merger in the fringe is synergy- 
producing, then the profits of the outsiders in the fringe are reduced, while those 
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of the outsiders of the oligopoly are increased only if demand is sufficiently 
large. 
On the other hand, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) investigate the incentive 
to merge when firms produce differentiated products and engage in price 
competition. They assume constant and identical cost and a symmetric demand. 
They show that mergers are always beneficial to existing members and become 
more profitable as the size of the merger increases. The resulting industrial 
concentration confers positive externalities on other industry members. 
Some other studies examine whether profitability of a merger depends on the 
linearity of demand. Cheung (1992) shows that for demands satisfying the 
criterion that the marginal revenue of the industry decreases , the minimal market 
share for a merger to be profitable is 50% of industry output. Fauli-Oller (1997) 
explains why Cheung's threshold was lower than that of Salant et at. for a merger 
to be profitable. He shows that the profitability of mergers depends on the degree 
of concavity of demand; the greater the degree of concavity, the lower the 
profitability of a merger. Therefore, Cheung's threshold is lower than that of 
Salant et al. because he allows for strictly convex demands. 
Huck et al. (2001) suggest that profitability of a merger in markets with 
quantity competition depends on the market structure and on the merging firms' 
exogenous given `strategic power'. They consider a Stackelberg market with 
homogenous products and linear costs. Leaders independently and 
simultaneously decide on their individual supply and the remaining followers 
decide upon their quantity after learning about the total quantity supplied by the 
leaders. It is shown that two leaders rarely have an incentive to merge, nor do 
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two followers. However, if a leader merges with a follower, this increases the 
joint profit of the two firms by lowering total industry production. 
A more recent alternative point of view investigates the pattern of mergers 
that can be expected to occur, by endogenizing the merger decision. 4 
Horn and Persson (2001 a) proposes an approach to modeling endogenous 
merger formation by employing ideas on coalition formation from cooperative 
game theory in order to study the determinants of mergers. They show that the 
free-riding problem mentioned above (see, for example, the study of Salant et al. ) 
is not as pervasive in their approach under fairly general assumptions regarding 
technology and demand. They suggest that while the free-riding problem might 
be descriptive of markets with a larger number of firms, it seems less plausible 
that, in a concentrated industry, a limited number of firms who can communicate 
and sign binding agreements would forego the gains from merger as a result of 
indefinitely trying to become even more profitable outsiders. If the parties can 
communicate and sign binding contracts, the outcome should also be efficient. 
Rodrigues (2001) uses a two-stage game to model endogenous mergers. In the 
first stage of the game, firms decide whether or not to merge, and in the second, 
they compete on the product market. They show that three factors interact to 
determine whether or not firms will merge: the initial number of firms in the 
industry, the expected competitive intensity, and the possibility of economizing 
on fixed costs through merger. The model shows that the equilibrium market 
4 Gowrisankaran (1999) develops a model that endogenizes the merger process, but in a dynamic 
framework. In this model, mergers, investment, entry, and exit are endogenous variables 
rationally chosen by firms to maximize expected future profits. This model indicates that in 
addition to increased concentration in the industry, mergers serve as a relatively quick way for the 
industry to adjust when needed, compared to entry, exit, and investment. 
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concentration, and firms' propensity to merge, is decreasing in the first of these 
factors and increasing in the other two. 
Inderst and Wey (2004) present a model in which both the gains of insiders 
and those of outsiders are important to predict the likelihood of a merger. They 
model the takeover of a designated target as an auction in which the target 
chooses an optimal reserve price. At the heart of their analysis is a free-rider 
problem among potential acquirers. They show that even if there are substantial 
gains to insiders, the target's optimal reserve price always create a free-rider 
problem. An acquirer is worse off than any of the remaining independent firms. 
In summary, although the above studies use different set-ups, they all stress 
the importance of the number of merged firms already in the industry in 
explaining merger activity. 
4.2.2 A theory of Pre-emptive Mergers 
A growing body of literature on pre-emptive mergers has been developed. In a 
theoretical piece, Colangelo (1995) studies whether, and under which 
circumstances, pre-emptive merging occurs in vertically related industries. He 
shows that when either vertical or horizontal merger, but not both, are possible, 
vertical mergers often pre-empt horizontal mergers. The overall gains from a 
vertical merger are often greater than that from a horizontal one. Upstream 
(downstream) firms are therefore often prepared to bid more for a downstream 
(upstream) target than other downstream (upstream) firms. The pre-emptive role 
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of vertical merger is linked to the fact that horizontal mergers are largely 
detrimental for the vertically related non-merged firms. While pre-emptive 
merging can take place, even with a large number of firms, the larger the number 
of firms, the larger the number of the merging parties necessary for a merger to 
be so detrimental for the non-merged firms to call for a pre-emptive reaction. 
A pre-emptive merger mechanism has also been demonstrated by Horn and 
Persson (2001b), using a cooperative game theory model. They study an 
international oligopoly and the so-called tariff-jumping argument, according to 
which international mergers are more likely than domestic mergers, since the 
former saves on trade costs. They show, however, that domestic firms may agree 
to a profitable merger to pre-empt international mergers that would stiffen the 
competition in the home market. 
Using a spatial competition model, Brito (2003) proposes that firms may have 
clear incentives to be insiders in a merger, even when efficiency gains do not 
exist and market power is the only reason the merger is profitable. When the 
number of mergers is limited, firms may decide to merge with the purpose of 
pre-empting other mergers. This behaviour is based on the fact that some 
outsiders may gain less than the participating firms when products are not 
symmetrically differentiated. The existence of pre-emptive mergers depends 
crucially on the asymmetric profile of post-merger pay-offs and on the number of 
mergers being limited by the antitrust authorities. Therefore, such mergers are 
more likely to arise in concentrated markets where firms sell non-symmetrically 
differentiated products. 
In a related study, Fauli-Olier (2000) discusses the strategic value of an early 
merger by modelling a five-staged sequential game of merger formation. The 
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main assumptions are cost asymmetries and Cournot competition of independent 
firms. Before Cournot competition occurs, efficient firms are allowed to bid 
sequentially for inefficient firms, so that market structure can be altered. Profits 
depend on the number of inefficient firms having been previously bought, but not 
on who carried out the takeover. Demand also influences the realization of 
profits. Inefficient firms will accept any offer assuring them, at least, their 
opportunity cost, that is, the profits they would obtain if they stayed in the 
market. The opportunity cost of one firm accepting an offer when no one else 
does depends on whether by deviating, it will be bought in later or remain 
independent. In the former case, the opportunity cost is the profits determined by 
zero mergers, while in the latter, the opportunity cost is the profits determined by 
the number of mergers already taken place. In other words, inefficient firms are 
no longer symmetric, because they obtain different pay-offs when they refuse 
offers. A firm that moves fast and buys an inefficient firm first obtains more 
profits because it pays less for its target. By buying first, a firm can exploit the 
competition between inefficient firms. Finally, he indicates that mergers are 
prompted by two different factors. Firstly, a low realization of demand increases 
the profitability of takeovers; and secondly, takeovers raise the profitability of 
future takeovers. 
On the other hand, Akdogu (2003a) considers a reduced form model with 
exogenous targets and extends it to study a situation where multiple targets are 
available sequentially. If multiple targets are available, the pre-emption motives 
are attenuated by the possibility of imitation. In an empirical paper, Akdogu 
(2003b) finds empirical evidence for pre-emption in the telecom industry in the 
Us. 
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The above studies illustrate that strategic motives, and pre-emption in 
particular, are important merger incentives. There are studies that emphasize the 
fact that strategic motives may be so strong as to induce firms to agree to 
unprofitable mergers. 
Thus, Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) develop an endogenous merger model 
based on coalitional bargaining, where the merger is expected and only the 
identity of the winner is unknown. The intuition of their model is that firms will 
compete not to be left out from the merger. It explains how mergers can reduce 
profits and raise share prices by using pre-emption theory. Demand and cost 
shocks are the main reasons for these mergers. In their model, target receives 
their reservation values and the buyer takes the whole surplus, which is at odds 
with the empirical evidence. 5 
In addition, Molnar (2005) proposes and tests a pre-emption theory for 
mergers. He indicates that it can be optimal to overpay for a target firm and 
decrease the acquiring firm shareholders' value if the loss is less than in the 
alternative case when the merger is undertaken by one of the product market 
rivals. His model is based on synergies, market power as the main motive for 
mergers, and competitive bidding for targets. The empirical results do not reject 
the pre-emption theory as an explanation of mergers. 
Pre-emption theory is also applied to a different stage of the merger process, 
namely, takeover bidding. 6 Fishman (1988) explains why bidders offer targets 
such a high premiums, by examining `pre-emptive' bidding strategies. He 
'For a review of empirical studies on M&A performance, see Goergen and Renneboog (2004). 
6 Angwin (2004) also stresses the importance of speed in acquisition integration. 
105 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 4/ Merger Activity - 
The Firm Level Perspective 
develops a model of strategic bidding among competitors in an environment of 
asymmetric and costly information. In the scenario of two-bidders for the same 
target model, after observing the first bidder's initial offer, a second bidder 
updates his prior beliefs about the first bidder's valuation. Then, on the basis of 
these beliefs, the second bidder decides whether to acquire information and bid 
for the target. This gives the first bidder the ability, through his initial offer, to 
affect this decision. This is the strategic interaction between bidders. In the 
model, the higher the valuation of the first bidder, the lower is the second 
bidder's expected profit from entering the competition. In equilibrium, the first 
bidder may make a high-premium, `pre-emptive' bid that signals a high valuation 
and deters a second bidder from competing. Otherwise, he makes a low-premium 
bid that signals low valuation, in which case, a second bidder competes. Thus, it 
is not the bid itself that pre-empts the second bidder, but rather the information 
conveyed by the bid. 
In summary, pre-emptive theory of mergers is based on synergies, market 
power and competition for targets. It suggests that merger is a rational response 
of value-maximizing managers to some market shocks. These shocks could 
include deregulation, technological innovation, negative demand or negative cost 
shocks occurring in the acquiring firms' product market. ' These shocks have the 
effect of creating synergies or cost savings, rendering some mergers profitable. 
When several potential acquiring firms achieve these large cost savings, they 
' Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find evidence consistent with major economic changes shaping 
the merger and restructuring markets. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that mergers 
reallocate capital to more productive purposes and to more productive managers. 
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compete for the opportunity to merge if the available targets are limited. ' The 
winning firm that acquires the target could become a lower cost producer and 
will be able to increase its product market share if the costs savings are large 
enough. If the merged firm increases its market share, rivals are worse off. 
Intuitively, if a firm expects that one of its rivals will gain large cost savings or 
efficiencies by taking over some other firm, then it can be rational for the first 
firm to pre-empt this merger with a takeover attempt of its own. By pre-empting 
the rival firm's merger, the first firm avoids the larger loss of profits it would 
have suffered had its rival been successful. However, its post-merger profit could 
still decrease relative to its pre-merger profit. This pre-emption can be optimal, 
even if it requires the first firm to overpay relative to the increase in the joint 
profits of the combined firms. In this case, the merger itself may reduce the 
acquirer's value because of the high price paid for the target. 
4.2.3 Theoretical Models of Sequential Mergers 
The theoretical literature is mostly focused on a single merger seen in 
isolation. There is, however, a small body of literature on sequential mergers. 
Pioneering work on sequential mergers has been done by Nilssen and Sorgard 
(1998). They analyze the interdependence of merger decisions over time. They 
discuss the strategic motive for merger in terms of the taxonomy of business 
An important issue in the pre-emptive theory of mergers is the notion that targets are limited. 
Socorro (2004) highlights the importance of firms fitting well for stable mergers to arise. 
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strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). In particular, they 
investigate whether firms will be more likely or less likely to carry through their 
own merger when they take into account any possible future merger of the rivals. 
They denote the effect that such considerations have on the profitability of firms' 
own mergers as the strategic motive for merger, which is determined by two 
factors. The first is whether own merger will encourage or discourage a rival's 
merger. If rivals' gains from merging alone are less than gains from merging 
after own merger has occurred, then own merger will encourage rivals' merger. 
The second factor is whether a rival merger will increase or decrease own profit. 
They find that the prospects of a subsequent merger decision have an ambiguous 
effect on the profitability of the first merger. 
Matsushima (2001) considers sequential mergers using Nilsen and Sorgard's 
method. However, they demonstrate a different mechanism of sequential 
mergers; they do not allow cost savings effects from a merger. They adopt a 
spatial model and demonstrate that cost savings are derived from transferring 
output from the distant firm (inefficient firm) to the near firm (efficient firm). 
They show that if transportation cost per length is large relative to market size, a 
sequence merger occurs. The intuition is that the production (transportation) 
technology of each firm is the same. At each location, however, these firms are 
asymmetric with regard to their transportation costs; the larger the transportation 
cost per length, the larger the asymmetry at each location. The cost savings 
obtained from transferring output from the distant firm (inefficient firm) to the 
near firm (efficient firm) become greater at each location, triggering a sequence 
of mergers to occur. On the other hand, if the transportation cost per length is 
small relative to market size, a merger sequence does not occur, even though 
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firms would be better off with the sequential merger. Given that the first merger 
is completed, the non-merged firms free ride on the first merger and do not 
merge because the cost saving is not great. The first pair anticipates it and they 
do not merge. 
Motta and Vasconcelos (2003) models a sequential merger formation game 
with endogenous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for 
approval to the antitrust authority. They consider a model in which firms operate 
in a market with linear demand, and what distinguishes firms is the amount of 
capital they own. The total supply of capital is assumed to be fixed to the 
industry. They assume that each firm operates with constant marginal costs of 
production, but that the level of its marginal costs is a decreasing function of its 
share in the industry capital. That assumption embraces the fact that a merger 
brings the individual capital of merging firms into a single larger resulting firm 
and, therefore, it gives rise to endogenous efficiency gains by decreasing 
marginal costs. It also assumes that there exist plant-specific fixed costs. That 
means that by creating a larger firm, a merger has the effect of increasing fixed 
costs proportionally. According to their model, a merger increases a firm's 
capacity, which in turn, leads to scale economies. They show that, using Cournot 
competition, when such efficiency gains are very small, there will be no merger. 
When they are of intermediate importance, firms outside the merger lose 
competitiveness but continue to operate profitably, resulting in a more efficient 
market outcome. If a merger provides important cost savings, then it will be 
followed by a merger of the rivals. In other words, if there are efficiency gains to 
be reaped from a merger, outsiders will respond by merging as well. This 
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`defensive' merger will allow the outsiders to match the efficiency gains of the 
first merger partners. 
Kamien and Zang (1990) explore the possibility of endogenous 
monopolization of an oligopoly through one firm's acquisition of the others, by 
using a homogenous good Cournot oligopoly model. The main assumptions are 
that firms' unit production costs are constant and identical, and that entry into the 
industry by new firms is infeasible. The first of these assumptions implies that 
merger is solely for the purpose of reducing competition, while the second 
assumption determines the limits of monopolization through acquisition without 
the impediment of entry by new firms. Two possible mechanisms of 
monopolization are analyzed as three-staged non-cooperative games. In both, 
each original owner possessing a single firm, independently and simultaneously 
makes bids for each of the other firms. Furthermore, they have an asking price 
for their firm. A firm is sold in its entirety to the highest bidder whose bid 
exceeds the firm's asking price. After this stage an owner may possess more than 
one fine. In `the centralized version of [the] monopolization' mechanism, as 
Kamien and Zang call it, an owner of several firms operates only one of them to 
avoid internal competition, as that merger yields no economies of scale. In the 
so-called `decentralized version of monopolization', an owner of several firms 
may choose to operate more than one in competition with the others. The 
operated firms engage in Coumot competition. Both models indicate that an 
owner of a firm, when considering the possibility of selling out, takes into 
account the fact that the merged entity that can be formed without its 
participation will increase the merged entity's profits by reducing competition. 
This increases the cost of buying out firms. As a result, an equilibrium analysis 
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of the above two mechanism discloses that monopolization through acquisition is 
possible only when there are just a few firms in the industry. 
Later, Kamien and Zang (1991) analyze monopolization by acquisition under 
the assumption that firms' total cost functions are strictly convex. This 
assumption provides an additional incentive for merger, by providing a merged 
firm with a cost advantage over an unmerged one. That is, a merged firm will 
have a lower cost of producing any given quantity than one that is unmerged. 
Despite the double incentive for merger, reduction of cost and number of 
competitors, their analysis discloses that monopolization is more feasible than in 
the linear total cost case. It still is limited to industries with a relatively small 
number of firms. 
In another paper, Kamien and Zang (1993) examine whether the number of 
firms in an industry can be whittled down through successive rounds of mergers 
to a number at which complete monopolization is possible. They suggest that 
while sequential acquisition makes it easier to monopolize an industry, there may 
still be some limits to monopolization. They consider a sequential non- 
cooperative game in which the Kamien and Zang (1990) centralized game is 
played over and over, each time with possibly fewer firms due to purchase in 
previous rounds. They analyze two possible scenarios. In the first, they consider 
a single buyer seeking to acquire all the other firms from the outset, and find that 
monopolization, if demand is linear, can be accomplished only when there are 
three or fewer firms to begin with. In the second scenario, they allow for the 
possibility of the industry being whittled down by permitting every owner in the 
industry to be a potential buyer. In this case, they find that sequential 
monopolization becomes easier, as compared to the case of a single buyer. 
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However, this model indicates that if the number of initial firms is sufficiently 
large, then a monopoly cannot be attained as equilibrium within a given number 
of iterations. Also, monopoly cannot be attained if the number of firms that can 
be purchased in any single round is uniformly bounded. 
In summary, the above studies stress the interdependence of M&A decision 
over time. A merger may trigger another merger, as firms are likely to imitate 
rival actions in order to reap similar benefits. 
4.2.4 Interim Summary 
The main conclusions of the industrial organization literature on M&A 
incentives can be categorized into three groups. The first refers to static models 
on M&A where mergers are seen in isolation. Using different oligopoly models, 
it is investigated whether firms participating in a merger benefit from merging 
their business instead of staying independent. A factor that determines, among 
others, whether or not firms will merge is the number of merged firms already in 
the industry. In industries with a large number of firms, it seems more likely that 
firms will remain independent. In such industries, the benefits to outsiders are 
greater than those to insiders and as a consequence, firms free-ride to merger. 
Since the benefit to the marginal merger increases as the number of previous 
mergers increases, the propensity of firms to merge increases with the number of 
merged firms. We label such conclusion as the stock effect of M&A. After a 
certain concentration has been reached, a merger may take place and as it does 
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so, further mergers may occur. That means that such an effect may reinforce 
merger activity and amplify a wave. We argue that stock effect may be utilized to 
partially explain merger waves (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1). 
The second group of merger explanations refers to the pre-emptive motive of 
merger activity. If a firm anticipates a merger of one of its rivals, it can be 
rational for the first firm to pre-empt this merger with a takeover attempt of its 
own. By pre-empting the rival firm's merger, the first firm avoids the larger loss 
of profits it would have suffered had its rival been successful. However, its post- 
merger profit could still decrease relative to its pre-merger profit. We name such 
pre-emption as the order effect of merger. When several firms adopt such 
behaviour that attempts to pre-empt a rival's merger, a sequence of mergers may 
be triggered, with firms attempting to be in the early stages of that order. We 
argue that order effect may be utilized to partially explain merger waves (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2). 
The third group of merger explanations stresses the interdependence of merger 
decision over time. If a merger provides important gains, then it will be followed 
by a merger of rivals; that is, when a merger provides gains to insiders, outsiders 
will respond by merging as well. This `defensive' merger may allow outsiders to 
match the gains, if any, of the first merger partners. On the other hand, if these 
gains are small, a sequence of mergers may not occur, even though firms would 
be better off with the sequential merger. Given that the first merger is completed, 
the outsiders free-ride on the first merger and do not merge because the gains are 
not great; the first pair anticipates it and do not merge. We label such behaviour, 
where a merger triggers another merger, as the herd effect of merger. That effect 
stresses the fact that once the bandwagon gets rolling, firms choose to merge 
113 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 4/ Merger Activity - 
The Firm Level Perspective 
because other firms are merging. Mergers stop occurring when industry has been 
concentrated and mergers are not profitable anymore because targets have 
become too expensive or are not allowed by antitrust authorities. We argue that 
the herd effect can be utilized to partially explain merger waves. (see, Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2.3). 
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4.3. Finance Perspective in Analyzing Mergers 
The finance literature on mergers and acquisitions stresses that an active 
market for corporate control exists, and merger and acquisitions are probably the 
result of the successful workings of this special market. The market for corporate 
control concept is based on the neoclassical tradition and treats mergers as a 
market process of allocating spare resources to their most effective use via the 
best management. Manne (1965) indicates that the control of firms may 
constitute a valuable asset that exists independent of any interest in either 
economies of scale or monopoly power. Control of firms is traded in this market, 
as managers who believe they can run firms better than incumbent management 
seek some way of realizing the gains potentially available either through taking 
over the inefficient firm or through merging with it. 9 In the absence of any 
internal methods of control, or where such methods are not successfully 
implemented, the market for corporate control facilitates the dismissal of low 
quality management. 
Thus, if managers are pursuing goals other than value maximization, or if they 
are simply poor quality managers, then we would anticipate that a firm's 
financial performance, as measured by profitability, would be lower than that in 
value-maximizing firms. If the market for corporate control is operating to 
discipline non-value-maximizing managers, then lower profitability should be 
associated with a higher probability of takeover. However, lower profitability 
9 In theory, optimal contracts can be designed to ensure that managers act in shareholders' 
interests and, in this case, no takeovers will be observed in equilibrium. However, practical 
problems of implementing such contracts can arise because information imperfections are often 
more severe than these can allow for and contracts become non-optimal when some change to 
firm performance occurs (Morck et al., 1988) 
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could lead to an increased probability of takeover not only for disciplinary 
reasons, but because lower profitability could financially constrain a firm; both 
internal funds are lower and access to external funds may be more difficult. 
Firms with many profitable investment opportunities but no available funds 
could be expected to become the targets of firms without financial constraints. 
Jensen (1986,1988) provides a specific type of non-value-maximizing activity 
on the part of managers, namely, the inappropriate use of a firm's free cash 
flow. 10 According to Jensen's free cash flow theory, value maximizing managers 
should distribute the free cash to shareholders in the form of higher dividends (or 
alternatively, they could use it in order to repurchase their own shares). The free 
cash flow theory of mergers can be interpreted as suggesting two additional 
channels through which the market for corporate control might exert its 
influence. Higher dividends paid out by firms with no investment opportunities 
will signal that managers are not squandering shareholders' assets and thus 
should be related to a lower probability of takeover in such firms. l ' At the same 
time, any increase in investment by firms with no profitable investment 
opportunities will necessarily be value-reducing, and the market should 
discipline such over-investment behaviour by a takeover. Thus, Jensen's theory 
of takeover indicates a role for both investment and dividend policy in 
influencing the probability of takeover, at least among firms which have no 
profitable investment opportunities. 
10 Free cash flow is the cash available to a firm in excess of that required to finance the firm's 
profitable investment opportunities. 
The idea that managers use dividends as a signal to convey information about their intentions 
or about the future performance of the firm is one which has been much investigated in the 
literature (see, for example, Miller and Rock, 1985). 
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Empirical literature attempts to reveal the characteristics of acquired firms 
using market, financial and accounting data. 
Early empirical studies for the UK by Singh (1971,1975) for the periods 
1954-1966 and 1967-1970, Kuehn (1975) and Cosh et al. (1984) for the period 
1961-1967 and late 1960s, respectively, do indeed suggest that acquired firms are 
more likely to be less profitable. Empirical studies using US data include that of 
Hayes and Taussig (1967) for the period 1954-1966 and Hindley (1970) for the 
period 1957-1969 using US data. In general, these studies tend to support the 
market for corporate control hypothesis, although that support is relatively weak. 
Empirical studies by Palepu (1986) and Schwartz (1982), using US data and 
covering mergers in the 1980s, produce results that are also consistent with the 
market for corporate control hypothesis. Thus, the general conclusion of studies 
covering the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s is that acquired firms tend to be less 
profitable and generally sluggish. 
A study by Hasbrouck (1985), covering the early 1980s in the US, attempts to 
assess differences in the financial characteristics of target and non-target firms. 
The results indicate that unregulated non-financial target firms are characterized 
by low valuation ratios and to a lesser extent, high current financial liquidity. 
On the other hand, findings from Hannan and Rhoades (1987), also covering 
the US in the 1980s, do not indicate that poorly managed firms are more likely to 
be acquired than those that are well managed. Specifically, the results suggest 
that firms with large market shares and operations in urban areas are relatively 
more likely to be acquired, but not firms with low profits or low growth. Meador, 
et al. (1996) examine the accounting, financial and market characteristics of 
target firms for the period 1981-1985 of the US economy. The results are also in 
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direct contrast to the theory that firms with inefficient management are likely 
targets for merger. The significance of sales growth suggests that firms seeking 
to expand their market share choose to merge with firms whose sales are 
increasing. In addition, smaller firms are more likely candidates than larger 
firms. 
Asquith et al. (1983) have also observed that acquired firms tend to be smaller 
than acquirers, suggesting a negative relationship between takeover likelihood 
and size. Firm size role may arise as an induced effect stemming from transaction 
costs and barriers to takeover. Transaction costs include the costs associated with 
the absorption of the target into the acquirer's organizational framework as well 
as the costs associated with finding a prolonged battle that a target may wage to 
defend itself. Successful takeover is contingent on acquisition of a proportion of 
the outstanding equity at a price reflecting market value plus a premium. With 
credit rationing, potential bidders may face limitations on the absolute size of 
their outlay and hence, limitations on the size of the firm they may reasonably 
expect to acquire (Rege, 1984; Machlin et al, 1993). 
Financial leverage is another characteristic that makes a firm an attractive 
target; unused debt capacity may be considered attractive. Managers inclined to 
minimize the risk of bankruptcy have incentive to underlever the firm. If, 
however, low leverage is viewed as a sign of managerial incompetence, this will 
lead to a firm-specific relationship between this variable and takeover likelihood. 
As an alternative justification, it may be noted that firms with low leverage offer 
the combined firm the opportunity of raising funds by borrowing externally 
(Hasbrouck, 1985). 
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The role of financial liquidity in takeover behaviour is less straightforward. 
Firms may hold financial assets in excess of normal transaction requirements for 
a number of reasons. For example, the tax consequences of distributing cash to 
the shareholders may be unfavourable (Rege, 1984). If firms are short of finance, 
then more liquid firms may be attractive targets. 
In a more recent study, Dickerson et al. (2002), using UK data for the period 
1970-1991, find evidence that some takeovers can be interpreted as having 
disciplinary motivations; low profitability was found to be associated with a 
higher probability of takeover, although this effect was weaker in the latter half 
of the study period. Furthermore, firms without investment opportunities (as 
indicated by Tobin's q ratio) did not experience a significantly increased 
takeover probability if they increased investment or reduced dividends. 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) suggest that undervalued firms are considered as 
cheap buys and are more likely to become targets. 12 They use market to book 
value ratio as a valuation measure of a firm. In particular, they break down the 
market to book value ratio into three components: firm specific pricing deviation 
from short-run industry pricing, short-run deviations from firms' long-run 
pricing, and long-run pricing to book value. The first two components track 
misvaluation at the firm and sector levels, and the third tracks long-run growth 
opportunities. They find that acquirers with high firm-specific overvaluation use 
stock to buy targets with relatively lower firm specific overvaluation at times 
when both firms benefit from an over-heated sector or market. Cash targets are 
12 The misvaluation argument has also been used to explain the relation between stock market 
and aggregate merger activity (for a discussion, see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). In addition, Gugler 
et at. (2005) provide supporting evidence of the q theory of mergers and misevaluation 
hypotheses as possible explanation of merger waves at the firm level. 
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undervalued relative to stock targets, while cash acquirers are less overvalued 
than stock acquirers. After controlling for firm-specific and sector or market- 
specific misvaluations, they find that firms with low long-run growth 
opportunities actually merge with those with high long-run growth opportunities. 
In summary, the above literature examines financial, accounting and market 
characteristics of firms in order to distinguish between acquired and non- 
acquired firms. Factors such as profitability, investment opportunities, dividends, 
growth prospects, size, liquidity, leverage and undervaluation seem to play an 
important role in determining a target firm. We label these firm-specific 
characteristics as the rank effect of merger. We argue that as firms develop, these 
characteristics change and may create `attractive' targets. As a result, the gains 
from a merger may also change, which generates different preferred dates for 
merging. Thus, rank effect can be utilized in order to provide a partial 
explanation of merger waves (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4). 
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4.4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has reviewed the most prevalent theoretical explanations for, and 
empirical evidence on, mergers as depicted in the industrial organization and 
finance literature. Literature on mergers tends to focus on the effects of 
acquisitions on profitability as the main incentive for acquisitions. A merger is 
more likely to result in an increase in profitability for the merged firm when the 
number of outsiders is small. Thus, the propensity of firms to merge increases as 
the number of merged firms increases (a labelled stock effect of merger). The 
pre-emption theory of acquisitions states that firms that acquire another firm 
early, gain more than late movers (a labelled order effect of merger). In addition, 
a merger may trigger another merger as firms attempt to imitate the action of 
their rivals and match the efficiency gains of the first merger partners (a labelled 
herd effect of merger). Finally, firm-specific characteristics play an important 
role in an acquisition decision (rank effect of merger). 
An analysis of the existing literature suggests that attempts to explain merger 
activity (with the exemption of literature on sequential mergers) refer to merger 
seen in isolation; that is without taking into consideration the interdependence of 
mergers over time. We propose that this research on mergers can be combined to 
provide an explanation of the dynamics within merger waves. 
We propose a model, as explained in Chapter 5, which is tied closely to the 
explanations suggested by the existing literature in an attempt to shed some light 
on merger waves. Specifically, we construct a decision-theoretic model that 
simultaneously incorporates stock, order, herd, and rank effects of mergers. The 
prime objective of doing so is to obtain a model that may be used to assess 
empirically which, if any, of these effects plays an important role in explaining 
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merger activity. We then consider whether the model would generate merger 
waves. 
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CHAPTER 5: A THEORETICAL MODEL OF 
MERGER TIMING 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we construct a decision-theoretic model of merger timing. The 
merger decision is analyzed from the target's perspective, which provides an 
alternative approach in analyzing the merger process. 
This model differs from previous analyses in that it incorporates different 
merger motives simultaneously within a dynamic framework and endogenizes 
the merger process. Merger literature has shied away from a dynamic 
endogenous merger process' because of the complexity of modelling an 
endogenous process. The reason for the complexity is that in a merger 
environment where any firm can merge with any other, it is hard to sort out 
which mergers will occur from among the many conflicting possibilities. Instead 
of endogenizing the merger process, most studies have picked particular mergers 
and checked whether they are profitable relative to no mergers occurring. 
However, the criterion of `profitable relative to no merger' is not a valid guide to 
whether a merger will occur. For instance, a merger between two firms A and B 
that is profitable relative to no merger might not occur because A will wait for B 
and a third firm, C, to merge, knowing that it will be much better off than with no 
merger, due to the decreased competition. In general, because the future always 
'A notable exception is Gowrisankaran (1999). 
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holds the possibility of mergers, which, in turn, affects the reservation prices 
from not merging, a merger that is profitable in relation to no merger will not 
necessarily occur. Furthermore, it is not certain that a merger that is not 
profitable relative to no merger will not occur. If a firm expects that one of its 
rivals will gain large cost savings or efficiencies from taking over some other 
firm, then it can be rational for the first firm to pre-empt this merger with a 
takeover attempt of its own. By pre-empting the rival firm's merger, the first firm 
avoids the larger loss of profits it would have suffered had its rival been 
successful. 
Our model exploits such dynamics of merger process by assuming that 
potential targets should have different preferred takeover dates, or, in other 
words, at any given date, only some of the potential targets will wish to actually 
be acquired by another firm. Literature, as discussed in Chapter 4, suggests four 
effects of merger: stock, order, herd, and rank effects. We argue that these effects 
may also influence the timing of merger activity (for a similar analysis on 
technological diffusion, see Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993). By encompassing 
these four effects, the model provides explanations of the nature of merger 
activity and the dynamics of a wave at the micro-level of analysis. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 constructs a deterministic 
model of merger timing while Section 5.3 describes the stock, order, herd, and 
rank effects. Section 5.4 presents a stochastic model of merger timing. Section 
5.5 outlines the empirical approach taken to estimate the theoretical model. 
Section 5.6 discusses the incorporation of herd effect into the empirical model. 
Finally, Section 5.6 summarizes. 
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5.2. A Deterministic Model of Merger Timing 
Consider a firm, i, that is a potential merger target with stand alone market 
capitalization, V, (t). It is subject to a continuous series of bids Pk (t) over time 
from k bidding firms (k=1... n). Assume two-sided information asymmetry, i. e. 
the bidders and the target each has private information about their respective 
values. The management of both firms maximizes shareholder wealth. In 
addition, both bidder and target are assumed to be risk neutral. 
In an intertemporal decision model it is usual to consider two criteria that have 
to be met for a purchase to occur - the profitability criterion and the arbitrage 
criterion. The former says that the sale must be profitable to the seller and the 
second says that it would not be more profitable for the seller to wait for a higher 
future bid. In this context however it is argued that, via the market mechanism, 
the valuation of the target firm in time t, V; (t), will reflect potential future selling 
possibilities and prices and as such if the profitability criterion is met then so will 
be the arbitrage criterion. 
Define Max(Pk(t)/V, (t)) as the highest bid to market value offered at time t and 
assume that if a merger is to proceed the target will sell to that bidder offering 
this highest bid. To make this approach operational it is necessary to consider the 
determinants of Max(Pk(t)/V; (t)). The argument proceeds upon the basis that a 
main determinant of Max(Pk(t)) will be the value of the merged entity that results 
and thus the discussion considers this issue. It should however be stated that, as it 
is the ratio of this to the stand alone value of firm i, i. e. the ratio of 
Max(Pk(t)/VI(t) that matters, factors that equally affect market values of merged 
and stand alone entities will tend to cancel out. It is for this reason that we have 
not pursued the more common macroeconomic based approach, arguing in fact 
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that macro factors will most likely affect bidders and targets equally and thus 
will provide little insight into merger timing and determination. Similarly, as we 
are only interested in the maximum of Pk(t)/V, (t) the characteristics (and thus 
identity) of the actual buyer are of little interest to us, for such characteristics in a 
bidding war will primarily determine only who is the bidder rather than the bid 
being made. 
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5.3. Determinants of bidding by potential acquirers 
Four different mechanisms have been suggested in the literature (see Chapter 
4) that should affect Max(Pk(t)/V; (t), here labeled as stock, order, rank and herd 
effects 
5.3.1 Stock Effects 
Stock effects result from the assumption that the benefit to the marginal 
merger increases as the number of previous mergers increase. This assumption is 
derived from the industrial organization literature on mergers (see, Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.1, for example, Salant et al. (1983), Horn & Persson (2001 a). Based 
on this stream of literature, the incentive to merge depends upon a complex 
resolution of two forces. First, a merger results in a price increase. However, 
second, the output of the merged firm declines relative to that of its partners prior 
to the merger. Although the price increase benefits all firms, the question is 
whether that price increase can be sufficient to compensate for the output 
reduction of the merged firm and, thus, increase merged firm profits. It has been 
suggested (Perry and Porter, 1985) that when the number of merged firms is 
small, the number of remaining firms in an industry is large, so that the residual 
demand facing remaining firms considering merger is relatively flat. Thus, any 
output contraction has a small price effect, so the profitability of a merger is 
reduced. However, when the number of merged firms is large, the residual 
demand is relatively steep, so that an additional merger can more readily increase 
the price. Consequently, there is an incentive to merge when there is a large 
number of merged firms but not when the number is small. A merger is related to 
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previous mergers because of the strategic interaction between firms in an 
industry through the product market. 
The model is made operational by arguing that Max(Pk(t)/V; (t)) will be large 
when there is a large number of merged firms but not when the number is small. 
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5.3.2. Order Effects 
Order effects result from the assumption that firms engaging early in merger 
activity can reap first mover advantages (see relevant literature in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.2). The theory of pre-emptive mergers claims that when several 
potential acquiring firms achieve cost savings or market power, they will 
compete for the opportunity to merge if the available targets are limited. Targets 
may be limited by antitrust authorities or by geographic markets, or simply by 
firm-specific characteristics which make certain firms attractive targets (see 
Section 5.2.4). 
The winning firm that acquires the target could become a lower cost producer 
and increase its product market share if the cost savings are large enough. If the 
merged firm increases its market share, rivals are worse off. Intuitively, if a firm 
expects that one of its rivals will gain large cost savings or efficiencies from 
taking over another firm, then it can be rational for the first firm to pre-empt this 
merger with a takeover attempt of its own. By pre-empting the rival firm's 
merger, the first firm avoids the larger loss of profits it would have suffered had 
its rival been successful. Its post-merger profit could still decrease relative to its 
pre-merger profit. However, the market value of the pre-emptive firm increases. 
The model is made operational by arguing that, via an order effect, 
(Max(Pk(t)/V; (t)) may increase as the expectation of merger bids by other firms 
increase. For simplicity it is here assumed in the empirical work that expectations 
of mergers can be measured by realized mergers one period ahead 
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5.3.3 Herd Effects 
Herd effects result from the assumption that merger decisions are 
interdependent over time. Literature (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3) suggests that a 
merger may trigger a sequence of mergers. The rationale behind this is that if a 
merger provides important efficiency gains or cost savings, then it will be 
followed by a merger of the rivals. In other words, merging gives a signal that 
efficiency gains can be reaped from a merger, so rivals will respond by merging 
as well. This `defensive' merger will allow outsiders to match the efficiency 
gains, if any, of the first merged firms. On the other hand, if cost savings are 
small, firms are less likely to carry through their own merger because they 
anticipate that rivals will free ride (as it is more profitable to remain independent) 
and no merger will occur. This suggests that the very act of trying to use the 
information contained in the merger decisions made by others may create a 
bandwagon phenomenon, which once rolling, prompts firms to merge because 
others are merging. 
However, merger sequence in an industry may not lead to a monopoly 
because of antitrust authorities. Furthermore, when the number of merged firms 
is very large and the industry has been concentrated with only a few firms, a 
merger may be privately unprofitable. A firm, when considering the possibility 
of selling out, takes into account the fact that the merged entity that can be 
formed without its participation will increase the merged entity's profits by 
reducing further competition. This increases the reservation price of a target and 
thus, the cost of buying out firms. Therefore, the benefits of firms participating in 
a merger may be less than those of remaining outside. This creates a free rider 
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problem that limits the development of a monopoly and dissipates merger 
activity. 
The model is made operational by assuming that if a merger occurs that will 
encourage a rival's merger, then that, in turn, will lead to a sequence of mergers. 
Mergers stop occurring when industry has been concentrated and merger activity 
is no longer profitable. 
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5.3.4 Rank Effects 
These effects result from the assumption that potential targets have different 
inherent characteristics, and as a result, the fit with a certain bidder will be 
different; thus, different gains are obtained by the merged firm. As these different 
inherent characteristics may change through time as firms develop, gains from a 
merger change, too, generating different preferred merger dates. The model is 
operationalized by ranking potential targets in terms of their attractiveness, from 
highest to lowest. Attractive targets will attract more/larger bids while those that 
are less attractive will attract less/lower bids. 
There are numerous firm-specific factors influencing the merger decision, 
some of which may not be even observable or quantifiable. The factors that will 
be considered in this model are those which, in the finance literature, are 
believed to exert a systematic influence on the merger decision (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3). As the market for corporate control theory suggests, managers of 
efficient firms believe that they can run inefficient firms better than incumbent 
management, and seek some way of realizing the gains potentially available by 
taking over the inefficient firm. These inefficient firms are regarded as attractive 
targets. 
Literature suggests different mechanisms through which the market for 
corporate control can operate, the main channel being the profitability of the 
firm. However, corporate finance theory indicates lower profitability could lead 
to an increased probability of takeover not only for disciplinary reasons, but 
because lower profitability could financially constrain a firm (both internal funds 
are lower and access to external funds may be more difficult). In this case, firms 
with many profitable investment opportunities could be expected to become the 
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targets of firms without financial constraints. By conditioning on investment, 
leverage and liquidity, we can take into account financial constraints as far as 
possible (see, for example, Meador, et al., 1996; Dickerson et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, an application of the Tobin's q-theory to takeovers would imply 
that a takeover bid of a low q-firm is an attempt to acquire valuable resources at a 
cost below that of de novo investment. Since q ratio measures returns on a fine's 
existing assets, 2 as long as there are firms with q less than one, any firm desiring 
to enter the market will prefer acquisition to de novo investment, and ceteris 
paribus one would expect to find more acquisitions of such firms (see, for 
example, Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). 
The `free cash flow' theory (Jensen, 1988) suggests that if a larger share of 
profits is distributed in the form of dividend payments to shareholders (which 
implies that the free cash flow is not used to invest in unprofitable projects, but 
instead, is allocated to shareholders), this acts as a signal to the market that the 
firm's managers are acting prudently. It is this fact, according to the free cash 
flow interpretation, which explains why high dividends are related to low 
takeover likelihood. An alternative view suggests managers use dividends in an 
attempt to minimize probability of takeover. In this case, high dividends are 
aimed at inducing shareholders' loyalty, even though they might be a source of 
short-termist behaviour. 
Finally, low leveraged or more liquid firms are more likely to be acquired. It 
has also been observed that target firms tend to be smaller than bidders, 
suggesting a negative relationship between takeover likelihood and size. Firms 
seeking to expand their market share choose to merge with firms that exhibit 
2q ratio equals the ratio of market to replacement value of a firm. 
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high growth. Finally, undervalued firms are considered cheap buys and are more 
likely to be acquired (for a discussion, see Chapter 4, Section 4.3). 
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5.4. A Stochastic Model of Merger Timing 
Any modeling process necessarily abstracts from various real-life factors which, 
although possibly known with certainty by the individual players, cannot be 
incorporated into the model. These factors are introduced into the model through 
a stochastic error term e. Assume that the distribution, F(]+() is independent of 
payoffs and remains invariant across firms and time. The criterion for firm i to be 
sold (merged in time t) is then given by Max(Pk(t)/V(t)) _> 
(1 +E) i. e. when the 
maximum bid (over k) received in the time period is greater than the value of the 
firm by an amount reflecting firm specific stochastic factors. The probability of a 
target i being acquired in the small interval It, t+ dt} , conditional on not 
having 
being acquired by time t, the hazard rate, hi(t), is then given by: 
hi(t) = Pr[Max(Pk(t)/VI(t)) ?1+ EJ = F(Max(Pk(t)/Vj(t)) (1) 
Section 5.3 indicates that Max(Pk(t)/V, (t) is a function of rand (R(t)), stock 
(S(t)) , and order (O(t)) effects. Thus, Equation 1 can be written as: 
h, (t) = J[a, R(t), a2S(t), a30ýt)] (2) 
Hypotheses regarding the existence of rank, stock, and order effects can then 
be tested by considering the significance of coefficients a, , a2 , and a3 
in 
Equation 2 (see Chapter 6). 
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5.5 The Empirical Approach 
The empirical approach taken in this study is a survival or duration analysis3. 
Survival analysis is concerned with analyzing the time to the occurrence of an 
event. For survival analysis, we need methods that directly account for the 
sequential nature of the data, and are able to handle censoring and incorporate 
time-varying covariates. The solution is to model survival time (duration time of 
firm before being acquired) or time to acquisition indirectly, via the so - called 
`hazard rate', which is a concept related to chances of a firm being acquired at 
each instant (or time period) conditional on survival up to that point. 
Specifically, let the dependent variable of interest be the, survival time or the 
time to acquisition. Let this continuous random variable be denoted T. The basic 
building block in duration modeling is the acquisition rate or hazard function at 
some time t, commonly denoted h, (t), which represents the instantaneous 
acquisition rate at time t. In continuous terms, the probability that a firm, i, who 
is independent until time t, is acquired in a short interval of length dt after t is: 
h, (tý-limPr(t<_T<t+dt/T>-t)_ 
f(t) 
(3) 
ds->O dt s (t) 
Where f(t) is probability density function f (t) = Pr (T = t) and S(t) is the 
survivor function which is nothing more than the reverse cumulative distribution 
function of T: 
3 For a discussion, see Appendix B. Furthermore, classic texts on survival analysis is that of Cox 
and Oakes (1984), Lancaster (1990), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). An introductory discussion 
is given by Cleves et. al. (2004) while a more mathematical one by Lawless (2003). 
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S(t)=1-F(t)= Pr(T >-t) (4) 
The survivor function reports the probability of surviving beyond time t. Said 
differently, it is the probability that there is no acquisition prior to t. 
The probability density function f (t) summarizes the concentration of 
duration lengths (acquisition times) at each instant of time along the time axis. 
The hazard function summarizes the same concentration at each point of time, 
but conditions the expression on survival (no acquired) up to that instant, and so 
can be thought of as summarizing the instantaneous transition intensity. 
The hazard rate (or function) can vary from zero (meaning no risk at all) to 
infinity (meaning the certainty of acquisition at that instant). Over time, the 
hazard rate can increase, decrease, remain constant, or even take on more 
serpentine shapes. There is a one-to-one relationship between the probability of 
survival past a certain time and the amount of risk that has been accumulated up 
to that time. The hazard rate measures the rate at which risk is accumulated. 
In this study we make use of models belonging to the accelerated failure time 
(AFT) family of survival time models. Specifically, we estimate three different 
models from AFT family: log-logistic, log-normal, and generalized gamma: 
1) Log-logistic model 
The log-logistic model is specified as : 
ýrtlr 
Il 
h(1 x)- 
y[1+(wt)7 
1 
Where yr = exp(-ßX) and y is a shape parameter, y>0. 
(s) 
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In specific, ßX = /. 30 + Q, X, +, 62 X2 +... + ßk Xk which means that we define a 
combination of k explanatory variables for each firm while 83s are parameters, 
later to be estimated. The hazard rate is monotonically decreasing with survival 
time for y >_ I. If y<1, then the hazard rate first rises with time and then falls 
monotonically. 
2) Log-normal model 
This model has hazard rate: 
I 
[_{1(t)_'}2] 
ra t" i (6) 
Where 0 () is the standard Normal cumulative distribution function and 
characteristics are incorporated with the parameterization p =, 8X. The hazard 
rate is similar to that of log-logistic model for the case y<1; that is first rising 
and then declining . 
3) Generalized Gamma model 
This model has a rather complicated specification involving two shape 
parameters: they are the shape , k, and scale, a, parameters. The hazard 
function is quite flexible in shape, even including the possibility of aU shaped. 
The Generalized Gamma model incorporates several of the other models as 
special cases. If k=1, we have the Weibull model; if k =1,6=1, we have the 
Exponential model. With k=0, the Lognormal model results. And if k=a, 
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then we have the standard Gamma distribution. These relationships mean that the 
generalized Gamma is useful for testing model specification. By estimating this 
general model, we can use a likelihood ratio test to investigate whether one of the 
nested models provides a satisfactory fit to the data. 
There are at least two advantages in using survival analysis over alternative 
static models for investigating the timing of a takeover. Firstly, there is the issue 
of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Suppose that a firm characteristic, 
unobservable to us, is positively related to the probability of takeover (call it 
"attractiveness'). Then, those firms which have more of it will be taken over first 
(at a younger age), leaving the firms with less attractiveness still in the sample, 
getting older. The consequence for the estimates is that the probability of 
takeover will be seen to fall with age, but this is spurious because it is simply the 
fact that these firms are less attractive that prevents them from being taken over, 
not the fact that they are older per se. The biases induced affect the age (duration) 
variable as well as all other coefficients, as long as other covariates are correlated 
with age. Survival analysis can be used either to mitigate the effect of 
unobserved firm heterogeneity or to incorporate explicitly the unobserved 
heterogeneity directly into the functional specification. 
The second advantage of our approach is that observations are assumed to be 
time-dependent. We allow firms to develop, to be dynamic entities, not just 
random clusters of characteristics at any point in time. Survival analysis 
recognizes that certain observations come from the same firm and places these 
observations in the correct chronological order. Our framework explicitly allows 
for dependency over time, in that the hazard methodology estimates the 
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conditional probability of takeover. It is ideally suited to our main question, since 
it allows us to investigate whether, given that a firm has survived up to a certain 
point in time, changes in stock, order, and rank effects will lead to a change in 
the timing of takeover. 
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5.6. Herd Effect 
Thus far, herd effects have been ignored in the modelling. In this section, we 
discuss the empirical model, in order to analyze herd effects. As discussed, we 
adopt models from AFT family of models. The hazard function of these models 
in a general form is : 
h(t/X, )=ho(tyi, )yr,, w, =exp(ßX, ) (7) 
Where X is a vector of explanatory variables incorporating all the variables 
discussed above (rank, stock, order effects), ß is a vector of parameters, and 
ho (") gives the relationship between the hazard rate for a firm with 
characteristics X and the hazard rate for the case when X=0, i. e. the `baseline' 
hazard ho () . 
The effect of the explanatory variables is to change the time scale by a factor 
equal to V,. If explanatory variables equal zero, we get the baseline hazard rate; 
the hazard rate that depends only on time t (see, for example, Jenkins, 2005). 
The baseline hazard summarizes the pattern of `duration dependence', i. e. 
whether hazard rate increases or decreases with time, assumed to be common to 
all firms. 
Herd effects, as discussed, are based on imitation, due to informational 
asymmetries. Such an endogenous process can be introduced by specifying the 
hazard function4 as 
h(t1 X, )=ho(tW1)Wr0(t) (8) 
Where 4 incorporates the imitation process. We assume a nonparametric form 
for 4), as theory suggests no unique parametric specification of the herd effects. 
4 For a similar application in technological diffusion process, see Karshenas and Stoneman 
(1993). 
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Equation 8 gives a general model that incorporates rank, stock, order, and 
herd effects. However, it is apparent that it is not possible to separately identify 
the baseline hazard from the herd effect in this equation. Thus, the herd effects 
are absorbed into the baseline hazard, and in the empirical analysis, we estimate 
Equation 8 with no explanatory variables and examine the pattern of duration 
dependence (see Chapter 6). 
142 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 5/A Theoretical Model of Mereer Timing 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
Studies in M&A follow a pre-selected point of view, which is either an 
industrial organization or finance perspective, and tend not to combine 
approaches. In this study, we have set up a general model of M&A timing that 
simultaneously incorporates rank, stock, order, and herd effects. These four 
effects represent the main streams in the existing literature. This model differs 
from previous analyses, as it provides an effective way to analyze merger timing 
without a pre-selected perspective, and also enables comparison of relative 
model performance. 
In this model, merger decisions are analyzed within a dynamic framework 
from the target perspective, which provides an alternative point of view in 
describing the merger process. The target firm plays an important role in merger 
activity, as it determines the gains of the bidder by setting its selling price. 
Finally, the econometric model adopted in this study provides some additional 
advantages in analyzing merger timing; it deals mainly with issues of unobserved 
firm heterogeneity and allows for time dependency over time. 
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CHAPTER 6: DATA AND ESTIMATION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the sample selection and data used in this study. It also 
presents the results arising from the duration analysis used to empirically 
examine the impact of time-varying variables (described in Chapter 5) on timing 
of acquisition in the UK economy. 
An important issue in acquisition studies is sampling methodology. The 
typical procedure used in the acquisition literature is to draw a sample with an 
approximately equal number of acquired and non-acquired firms; a `matched' 
sample. Unlike random sampling, in `matched' sampling, a firm's probability of 
being selected into the sample is a function of its acquisition status, i. e. whether 
or not the firm is a target. This may lead to biased and incorrect inferences 
(Palepou, 1986). 
However, there is a valid econometric justification for preferring a `matched' 
sample over a random sample in the estimation of an acquisition model because 
the number of acquired firms is very small compared to the number of non- 
acquired in the population. If a random sample were to be drawn from such a 
population, the sample would be likely to consist of an overwhelming majority 
of non-acquired and very few acquired firms. The information content of such a 
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sample for model estimation would be quite small, leading to relatively 
imprecise parameter estimates. The sample can be enriched informationally by 
making the sample proportions of acquired and non-acquired more evenly 
balanced. Manski and McFadden (1981) show that in a population like the one 
described above, an appropriately `matched' sample provides more efficient 
estimates compared to a random sample of the same size. 
We select a sample in which the proportion of acquired firms is the same as 
the population proportion of acquired firms in the UK during the period 1990- 
2004. We use maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate the model 
parameters. Note that the maximum likelihood procedure consists of maximizing 
the sample likelihood. Since the maximization of the sample likelihood yields an 
unbiased estimate of the probability of a firm being acquired and sample 
proportion of acquired firms is the same with that of the population, this 
procedure yields an unbiased estimate of the population acquisition probability. 
Before estimating any parametric models, we investigate duration data using 
non-parametric techniques, in order to provide summaries of the survival times 
of all the firms in the sample. Having done that, we proceed by estimating 
appropriate parametric models as suggested by non-parametric analysis. That is a 
common practice in the literature and helps in identifying the most appropriate 
empirical model for our research questions. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 describes sampling 
methodology and Section 6.3 discusses survival data structure. Section 6.4 
defines dependent and explanatory variables and their measurements. Section 6.5 
presents non-parametric analysis of duration data. Section 6.6 discusses the 
estimation of parametric models. It first discusses estimation issues, such as 
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endogeneity bias, and then proceeds by estimating different parametric models. 
The most appropriate model is chosen based on different diagnostics tests. In 
Section 6.7, a generalization of the preferred model is conducted, in order to test 
for a heterogeneous population. In Section 6.8, the effects of the explanatory 
variables are calculated and discussed. Section 6.9 discusses the herd 
phenomenon in takeover activity. Section 6.10 discusses the results, while 
Section 6.11 summarizes the main conclusions. 
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6.2. Sample Selection 
We use a large sample of UK quoted companies from all sectors over the 
period 1990-2004, in order to investigate our research hypotheses. In order to be 
considered, an acquisition has to meet the following criteria: ' 
1. A UK domestic acquisition (acquirer and acquired companies operate 
mainly in the UK) 
2. Listing of both firms on the UK stock exchange 
3. Acquisition of an independent firm 
4.50% or higher change of ownership2 
We initially identified 616 acquisitions under the above criteria during the 
sampling period, by using the Thompson ONE Banker database (for a 
description, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). The next step was to collect financial 
statements for these firms for at least three years before the acquisition. This 
ensured that there was a reasonable span of data on each firm and allowed us to 
observe acquired firms for some time before acquisition. That requirement 
reduced the acquired firms available to 234 firms. 3 We used DataStream (for a 
We excluded from our study leverage buyouts, buyins / management buyouts, bankruptcy 
acquisitions, privatizations, minority stake purchases. 
2 The 50% threshold signifies legal ownership of a company. This is a common criterion for 
defining takeovers and assigning timing to them. (See, for example, Appendix I in Hannah, 1983, 
for the existing historic series in the UK, and for criteria for including acquisitions in these 
series. ) 
3 It is extremely difficult to collect financial data for firms that have been acquired, as most of 
them change names or are fully merged with the acquirer and are not listed in the UK stock 
exchange after the acquisition. However, a t-test on means indicates the elimination of firms is 
random and it is not associated with specific sectors, firm age or size, type or value of 
transaction. 
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description, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3) to obtain information on firms' annual 
accounts. The information was derived from published annual reports and, along 
with accounting data, included various descriptive pieces of information on the 
firms. 
We also used the DataStream dataset in order to select randomly firms that 
were not engaged in any acquisition (being neither acquirers nor acquired firms) 
during the sampling period. These firms had to be listed in the UK stock 
exchange, and to operate in the UK market. After screening for data 
requirements, the population meeting the above criteria numbered 2,054 firms, 
which were then classified into 12 sectors (obtained from Thomson One banker 
dataset classification), with firms in each sector being arranged in alphabetical 
order. Every sixth firm was selected from these lists (12 lists, one per sector) to 
generate a random group of 546 firms. Table 6.1 presents the decomposition of 
the sample into 12 sectors. 
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Table 6.1: Sector Representation in the Sample used in Survival Analysis 
Sector 
Index Sectors 
Number of 
acquired 
firms 
Number of firms 
not involved in 
any acquisition 
Total number of 
firms per sector 
Sector 
contribution to the 
sample 
I Consumer Products and Services 35 81 116 14.8% 
2 Energy and Power 11 25 36 4.6% 
3 Financials 36 85 121 15.5% 
4 Healthcare 10 24 34 4.4% 
5 High technology 25 59 84 10.8% 
6 Industrials 28 66 94 12.1% 
7 Materials 11 26 37 4.7% 
8 Media & Entertainment 29 67 95 12.2% 
9 Real Estate 17 40 57 7.3% 
10 Retail 13 31 44 5.6% 
11 Cosnumer Staples 10 24 34 4.4% 
12 Telecomunnications 7 17 25 3.2% 
Total 234 546 780 100% 
Note: when selecting the number of firms not involved in any acquisition for 
each sector, we followed the proportion of each sector to the total number 
of acquired firms. 
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In total, our sample consists of 780 firms. The proportion of companies 
acquired in our sample (30%) is representative of the population proportion of 
acquisitions in the UK over the period. The sample is summarized in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Composition of the Sample used in Survival Analysis 
Year acquired 
Number of firms 
acquired 
1990 16 
1991 18 
1992 6 
1993 7 
1994 13 
1995 22 
1996 30 
1997 28 
1998 32 
1999 33 
2000 13 
2001 7 
2002 4 
2003 4 
2004 1 
Total acquired firms 234 
Firms not involved in 
acquisition during 1990.546 
2004 
Total number of firms 780 
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Our sampling methodology contrasts with that usually employed in the 
literature on acquisitions. 4 An advantage of our sampling methodology is that we 
do not artificially choose a sample of firms for which we suspect that the 
probability of takeover is likely to be particularly influenced by variables 
investigated in this study. This is in contrast to a number of papers in the 
literature which either focus on one particular industry where, say, extraneous 
investment is thought to have occurred, and then test the over-investment 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986); or where the market for corporate control hypothesis 
is investigated by examining only hostile takeovers (Bhagat et. al., 1990). Such 
approaches have an element of subjectivity. 
6.3. Survival Time Data 
1990 is selected as the starting point (onset of risk of a firm being acquired) in 
our study because we seek to incorporate a complete takeover wave in our 
empirical analysis (recall that early 1990s is the start of the fifth takeover wave; 
see Chapter 2, Section 2.3 and Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1 for a discussion). We 
observe firms over time from 1990 until 2004. For much of the time, the 
beginning of `under observation' period coincides with the onset of risk. 
However, there is a period of ignorance, 5 for some firms, extending from on or 
4A notable exception is Dickerson et al. (2002), who also follow the population proportion of 
acquisitions when constructing their sample. 
5 Mainly because there is no available data during a period 
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before the onset of risk to some time after the onset of risk. For a while, the firm 
is not observed, but then the firm comes under observation. We include such 
firms in our study but we must account for the fact that, had the firm been 
acquired earlier, we never would have encountered this firm. Although the firm's 
subsequent survival can be analyzed, we do not want to make too much of the 
fact that the firm survived up until the point we encountered it (for more details, 
see Appendix B). 
This means that the time origin is not 1990 for each firm, with some firms 
entering the study later (left truncated survival time data). The survival time 
(time of acquisition) is measured from each firm's own date of entry in the 
study. In addition, some firms exit the study before 2004 for reasons other than 
being acquired (right censored observations). Once an acquisition occurs, the 
acquired firm can no longer be observed, while the acquirer is considered as a 
censored observation and exits the study at that time, before reentering it at the 
next period as a new entity (it must stay in the sample for at least three years 
before being acquired again). At the end of the observation period (2004), firms 
that have not been acquired are considered as censored observations. In 
summary, our sample is characterized as a sample with right censoring and left 
truncation (delayed entry). 
Figure 6.1 depicts all possible life histories of companies over the observation 
period, 1990-2004. The horizontal axis measures analysis time or time at risk 
(not calendar time). In other words, this is the time of acquisition or time of 
censoring for non-acquired companies, t, and is measured from the time origin of 
each firm (the base year 1990 (t = 0) or the entry date (t = to) for delayed 
entries). 
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Figure 6.1 shows six types of company, X, to X6, classified according to their 
acquisition activity and entry and exit times during the 1990-2004 period. 
Company Xl exists before the beginning of our study (1990) and survives 
beyond 2004 without being acquired (right censored). X2 has the same life 
history as X1, but differs in that it is acquired at timet = 8. Company X3 enters 
the study late, at time t=4, acquires X4 at time t=9, and exits the study as 
censored. It re-enters the study as a different firm, X'3, at time t =10 , and 
is 
acquired at time t= 14. Company X4 also enters the study late, at time t=2, and 
is acquired at time t=9 (by X3). Company X5 also enters late at time t=2 and 
exits the study at time t=7 for a reason other than acquisition. Finally, company 
X6, enters the study at the onset of risk, time t=0, and is acquired at time 
t=11. 
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Figure 6.1: Companies' Life Histories over the Sampling Period 1990-2004 
time at risk 
Note: (A), (C) refer to acquisition behaviour that is `acquired' and 
`censored', respectively. X where i=1,2,... 6 refer to different types 
of companies, with respect to acquisition behaviour, entry and exit 
times, in the sample. The horizontal axis measures survival time or 
time at risk of being acquired (the figures in parentheses refer to 
corresponding calendar time). 
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It is obvious that the systematic exclusion of companies with incomplete 
observations (truncated or censored), such as X1, X4, or X5, may introduce a 
selection bias in the sampling distribution of the model. To account for this, we 
include such companies in our sample and employ special techniques for 
estimating the models (see Appendix B). Table 6.3 gives a summary of our 
sample. 
Table 6.3: Summary of the Sample used in Survival Analysis 
Description Number 
Acquired firms 234 
Firms not involved in any 
acquisition 546 
Total number of firms 780 
Total number of observations 4842 
Acquisition rate in the sample 0.05 
Note: acquisition rate equals number of acquired 
firms to total number of observations 
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6.4. Definition and Measurements of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
The dependent variable used in the empirical analysis is the duration time of 
companies before being acquired (survival time; T). It is measured by the 
number of years elapsed since the onset of risk (beginning of study), taken to be 
1990. For companies who enter the study later (delayed entries), the survival 
time is counted from the year they enter the study to the year they are acquired. 
For those companies who are not being acquired by the end of the study or exit 
the study earlier for reasons other than being acquired, the survival time is right 
censored. 
The explanatory variables used in the duration analysis are time-varying 
variables hypothesized to affect time of acquisition, and whose relevance is 
discussed in Chapter 5. The list of explanatory variables included in the model is 
presented in Table 6.4. The first column presents the theoretical hypotheses that 
need to be investigated; factors that influence time of acquisition (discussed in 
Chapter 5). The second column presents the denotation of explanatory variables 
used in empirical models. The third column describes the measurement of the 
explanatory variables. 
We also include a vector of 11 sector dummies6 to control for fixed sector 
difference in takeover propensities. These sector differences may stem, among 
6 Although there are 12 sectors, we include only 11 sector dummies, in order to control for 
multicollinearity problems. 
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other things, from different sector structure, or different sector-specific 
regulations. ' 
7 In sectors such as media & entertainment, energy and power, telecommunications and 
financials, mergers are governed by different approval mechanisms or sector specific rules either 
instead of, or in addition to, the general jurisdiction of the OFT under Enterprise Act. 
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Table 6.4: Definition and Measurement of Explanatory Variables used in Survival 
Analysis 
Hypotheses Variable Description / Measurement 
Stock effect Si(t) Cumulative number of acquisitions in sector j up to and including time 
Order effect Op(t) : Expected change in the cumulative number of acquisitions in sector j 
in the interval [t, t+1], measured by {S(t+l)-S(t)} 
Rank effects 
1. Inefficient management Profitability 
hypothesis ROE(t) : Net income divided by total shareholders equity 
NIA(t) Net income divided by total assets 
EAR(t) : Earnings before interest and taxes 
2. Growth-resources Li uidi 
mismatch hypothesis CR(t) Current assets divided by current liabilities 
WCTA(t) Net working capital divided by total assets 
WCS(t) Net working capital divided by sales 
Lever 
TLTA(t) Total liabilities divided by total assets 
LDMV(t) Long term debt divided by market value of equity 
Growth 
SGR(t) :3 years growth is net sales 
AGR(t) 3 years growth in total assets 
EPSGR(t) :3 years growth in earnings per share 
Dummy variable 
GR(t) : lt is assigned a value one for the combinations 
low growth-high liquidity-low leverage or 
high growth-low liquidity-high leverage 
and zero for all other combinations 
3. Firm size hypothesis NS(t) : Net sales 
TA(t) Total assets 
4. Dividend Policy DIV(t) Cash dividends common divided by earnings available to 
common shareholders 
5. Investment opportunities q(t) :q ratio which is defined as the market value of a firm divided 
by the book value of total assets 
6. Market undervaluation PE(t) : Price-earnings ratio defined as market price per share divided by 
earnings per common share 
MTBV(t) : Market to book value defined as market value of a firm divided by its 
book value 
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Regarding rank effects, 8 the variables included in the empirical models are 
specified on the basis of six hypotheses that summarize the relevant literature 
(discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). Measurements of the variables used in this study 
are chosen from those in the previous studies of Palepou (1986), Meador et al. 
(1996) and Dickerson et al (1998,2002). Specifically, definition and 
computation of the variables representing the rank effects are as follows 
(appendix C presents summary statistics of the data used in this study). 
1. Inefficient management hypothesis 
The inefficient management hypothesis is investigated by including different 
measurements of profitability in the empirical model. This is done in order to test 
the sensitivity of the results to different measurements. Table 4 describes these 
measurements, which are return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and 
earnings before interest and taxes (EAR). They are computed and averaged over 
a period of three years prior to the year from which an observation is drawn. The 
unit of measurement for ROE and ROA is percentage, while the unit of 
measurement for EAR is thousands of pounds. A positive relation is expected 
between profitability and the survival time of a firm. 
2. Growth - resources mismatch hypothesis 
The growth-resources mismatch hypothesis indicates that growth and 
resource availability are important variables in determining a firm's acquisition 
8 Monetary values have been converted to constant values of 2000, by using the GDP deflator 
(taken by the Office of National Statistic National Account Data). 
159 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 6/ Data and Estimation 
likelihood. Specifically, this hypothesis implies that two types of firm are likely 
targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms In 
this study, growth, liquidity, and leverage are measured by using different 
measurements for each in order to test the sensitivity of the results to different 
measurements. 
Specifically, growth of a firm is defined as the annual rate of change in the 
firm's net sales, total assets, or earnings per share. The annual net sale growth is 
computed for the three fiscal years prior to the observation year, and the average 
is used as the net sales growth variable (SGR). (For example, consider a firm 
from the year 1995 with a December 31 fiscal year. The net sales data from the 
period January 1,1992 to December 31,1994 are used to compute the net sales 
growth during the three fiscal years 1992,1993, and 1994, and the average 
growth rate for these three years is used as the net sales growth variable. ) Total 
assets growth (AGR) and earnings per share growth (EPSGR) are calculated in 
the same way. The unit of measurement for all these variables is percent per 
year. 
Liquidity is measured by three different ratios: current assets divided by 
current liabilities (CR), net working capital divided by total assets (WCTA), and 
net working capital divided by sales (WCS). Leverage is measured by using two 
ratios: total liabilities divided by total assets (TLTA), and long term debt divided 
by market value of equity (LDMV). We generate the market value of common 
shares by multiplying the average share price over each firm's financial year by 
the average of the opening and closing number of common shares. All these 
ratios are computed for the three fiscal years prior to observation year, and the 
average is used as the liquidity and leverage variable, respectively. Liquidity is 
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expressed as a ratio. The unit of measurement of the leverage variable is 
percentage. No specific sign is hypothesized for the three variables since a priori 
it is not known a priori which imbalance is predominant. 
In another version of the empirical model, instead of the above three 
variables9 (growth, liquidity, and leverage), the growth-resource dummy variable 
is included in order to test the mismatch hypothesis. The growth-resources 
dummy is a 0/1 variable defined on the basis of the three variables, growth, 
liquidity, and leverage (as defined above). The dummy variable is assigned a 
value one if the firm has a combination of either low growth-high liquidity-low 
leverage, or high growth-low liquidity-high leverage. The dummy is set to zero 
for all the other combinations. Each of the three variables, growth, liquidity, and 
leverage is defined as `high' if its value for a firm is larger than the average for 
all the firms in its sector existing in the DataStream database; otherwise, it is 
defined as `low'. A negative relation between the growth-resources dummy and 
survival time of a firm is expected. 
3. Firm size hypothesis 
The variable size is defined as the book value of a firm's total assets (TA) or 
net sales (NS). Two different measurements of firm size are tried in order to 
investigate the sensitivity of results to these measurements. These variables are 
measured as of the fiscal year end immediately prior to the observation year. The 
9 Growth-resources dummy variables are not included in the empirical model together with 
growth, liquidity, and leverage variables, due to multicollinearity problems. 
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units in millions. A positive relation between firm size and survival time is 
expected. 
4. Dividend policy hypothesis 
Dividend policy hypothesis is investigated, by including the dividend payout 
ratio in the empirical model. The dividend payout ratio is defined as the book 
value of cash dividends to common shareholders divided by the book value of 
earnings available to common shareholders. Both cash dividends and earnings 
available to common shareholders are measured at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the observation year. The variable is expressed as a ratio. A positive 
relation between dividends payout and survival time of a firm is expected. 
5. Investment opportunities 
Tobin's q ratio is defined as the firm's market value divided by the 
replacement cost of a firm's assets. Calculating the market value of the firms 
raises a number of issues. Share information is available on an end-month basis. 
We generate the market value of ordinary and preference shares by multiplying 
the average share price over each firm's financial year by the average of the 
opening and closing number of ordinary shares. The definition of market value 
of a firm includes the market value of the firm's debt. However, lack of 
information on the maturity of debt and on current market prices for debt 
precludes any straightforward valuation. Instead, we are forced to use the book 
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value of debt. In addition, calculation of the replacement cost of total assets is 
complicated because of the lack of information on replacement costs. Instead, we 
use the book value of total assets as a proxy for replacement cost. 10 q ratio is 
measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the observation year. The 
variable is expressed as a ratio. A positive relation between the q ratio and 
survival time of firm is expected. 
6. Market valuation hypothesis 
Two different measurements are used for investigating the market 
undervaluation hypothesis. The first is the price-earnings ratio (PE), defined as 
the ratio of a firm's market price per share to its book value of earnings per 
share. The market price per share is the average share price over each firm's 
financial year. The price-earnings ratio is computed as of the fiscal year end 
preceding the observation year. The variable is expressed as a ratio. The second 
is the market to book value ratio (MTBV), defined as the ratio of the market to 
book value of the common equity of a firm. Both the market value and the book 
value are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the observation year. 
The variable is expressed as a ratio. A positive relation between market valuation 
and survival of a firm is expected. 
1° For a similar approach, see Hasbrouck (1984). 
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6.5. Nonparametric Analysis of Survival Data 
Before estimating any parametric model, it is common practice to investigate 
duration data using a non-parametric technique, which provides graphic 
summaries of the survival times of all firms in the sample without making any 
assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of survival times and how 
covariates serve to change the survival experience. Because the nonparametric 
analysis is informative about the pattern of duration dependence, it may suggest 
appropriate functional forms for parametric analysis and for specification 
analysis of more complicated models (Kiefer, 1988). 
Figure 6.2 presents Kaplan and Meier's estimator, a nonparametric estimate 
of the empirical survivor function; the probability of survival past time t or 
equivalently, the probability of failing aftert. The horizontal axis in Figure 6.2 
denotes the number of years elapsed from the beginning of the study (1990) to 
the year of acquisition or the year the study ended (2004) for censored 
observations. In addition, early exit (a firm disappearing before the end of the 
study) and delayed entry (a firm entering the study after 1990) were taken into 
consideration when the empirical survivor function was estimated. " As Figure 
6.2 shows, at the end of the sampling period (t = 15), the probability of being 
independent is approximately 60%, or equivalently, the probability of being 
acquired after t=15, is 40%. It is obvious that our dataset has not reached the 
median, as the median survival time is calculated as the smallest survival time 
for which the survivor function is less than, or equal to, 50%. 
At time t=0 the survival function takes the value 1, since no firm has been 
acquired. With the passage of time, survivor estimates decrease because firms 
" For a theoretical discussion, see Appendix B. 
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are being acquired. The speed of acquisition is slow and persistent until time = 8, 
i. e. in each time interval, a few firms are acquired but the number of acquisition 
in each interval is fairly stable. Then between time 8-10, the speed of acquisition 
becomes more rapid, i. e. the number of acquisitions in each interval increases 
during period 8-10. Towards the end of the study (time 10-15), the speed of 
acquisition becomes sluggish, i. e the number of acquisitions does not change 
significantly. 
We reach the same conclusions if we, instead, estimate the empirical 
cumulative hazard function by using the Nelson-Aalen estimator, depicted in 
Figure 6.3. The horizontal axis in Figure 6.3 denotes the number of years elapsed 
from the beginning of the study (1990) to the year of acquisition or the year the 
study ended (2004) for censored observations. In addition, early exit (a firm 
disappearing before the end of the study) and delayed entry (a firm entering the 
study after 1990) are taken into consideration when the empirical cumulative 
hazard is estimated. 
The cumulative hazard at the end of the sampling period (t = 15) equals 0.50. 
This means that the probability with which we observe no acquisitions over the 
interval is exp (-0.50 = 0.60, and thus, the probability of observing an 
acquisition is 1-0.60=0.40. 
In contrast to the survival function, at time=O, the cumulative hazard function 
takes the value 0, as no firm had been acquired. As time goes by, a firm's 
cumulative risk of being acquired increases slowly but persistently. During time 
8-10, the cumulative hazard increases more rapidly, meaning that during this 
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period, more risk is accumulated per year. Finally, after time=10, the cumulative 
hazard remains constant (there is no increase). 
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Figure 6.2: Kaplan -Meier Survival Estimate 
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We can use Figure 6.3 to plot an estimate of the hazard function, h (t). We 
can estimate the hazard by taking the steps of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative 
hazard and smoothing them with a kernel smoother. More precisely, for each 
observed failure time, t, , if we define the estimated hazard contribution to be 
dH (t, ) =H (t, )-H (t; _, 
), we can estimate h (t) as follows: 
D 
h(t)=b-'>K t-t' dH(tý) (1) 
, _, 
b 
Where K () is some symmetric density function, (the kernel) and b is 
bandwidth. The summation is over the D times at which failures occurs (Klein 
and Moeschberger, 2003, p. 167). 
The above procedure produces Figure 6.4 of a smoothed hazard estimate. The 
graph agrees with our informal analysis of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazards 
or Kaplan - Meier survivor estimate. The hazard rate of acquisitions increases 
steadily in the early stages of the study period; during time 8-10 there is a more 
rapid increase of the hazard rate, and after that it falls. This pattern of the hazard 
rate is consistent with the theoretical analysis of the acquisition process. 
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Figure 6.4: Smoothed Hazard Estimate 
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vertical axis measures the hazard rate of being acquired at time t 
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6.6. Parametric Analysis of Survival Time Data 
In this section, we proceed by estimating parametric models, after dealing 
with endogeneity issues. 
6.6.1 Endogeneity Issues 
The inclusion of S, (t) (cumulative number of acquisitions in Sector j up to 
and including time t) and O, (t) (expected change in the cumulative number of 
acquisitions in the interval [t, t+1] in Sector j) as explanatory variables raises the 
question of possible endogeneity bias. S, (t) and 0, (t) are endogenously 
determined, which means that they are related to the error terms of the model. 
This contrasts with the basic assumptions of the general linear regression model 
and may lead to inconsistent estimations. 
Consistent estimates of the parameters of the model can, nevertheless, be 
obtained by using a two stages estimation procedure (see, for example, Murphy 
and Topel, 1985, Greene, 2003, Ch. 15), which replaces the endogenous variables 
with their estimated or predicted values from an auxiliary statistical model. 
These values are then treated as if they are exogenous for the purposes of 
estimation and inference in the second-stage model, which is the model of 
interest. 
Regarding stock effects, in the first stage, we estimate an auxiliary statistical 
model with the endogenous variable as the dependent and the lagged values of 
the dependent as the exogenous variables: 
S, 
f(t)=ao+a, 
S; 
ý(t-1)+u, 
(t) (2) 
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Where i is a firm belonging to Sector j. It is customary to treat past values of 
endogenous variables as exogenous (see, for example, Maddala, 2003, p: 345). 
Since past values of endogenous variables are predetermined, they can be 
regarded as exogenous and independent of the error terms in the model. 
Since sector acquisition activity is interrelated (for a discussion, see Chapter 
3, Section 3.6.2), we construct a panel dataset in order to estimate an auxiliary 
model given by Equation 2. The best-developed and most frequently used 
estimator for a dynamic panel model is the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), originally developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991). The basic idea is to take first-differences of Equation 
2 to remove unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effects, and then instrument 
the right-hand-side variable in the first-differenced equation using levels of the 
series lagged two periods. This avoids the problem raised by the omission of 
initial stock level and yields a consistent estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), 
the results of which are presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Auxiliary Statistical Model for Correcting for Endogenous Stock Variable 
Coefficient Variable Value 
a1 Sj(t-1) 0.96 (60.02***) 
R-squared 0.15 
Number of 
observations 180 
Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used in the 
estimation 
The t-statistic (figures in parenthesis) , computed to test the 
null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to zero 
*** indicate significance at I% level 
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We substitute the predicted values of S,, (t) from the estimated auxiliary 
statistical model as presented in Table 6.5, in the main model of interest (given 
by Equation 3). The expectation term O, (t) at the second stage is calculated as 
the first difference of the predicted S, (t) values. 12 
6.6.2 Estimation of Parametric Models 
Given that we have several possible hazard models to choose from, the 
question is how we can select between them. Theory, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
gives an indication of the underlying process that generates acquisition times and 
specifically of the possible shape of the hazard function. That is, the hazard rate 
first rises with time until a certain level and then falls. In this way, an acquisition 
wave is generated. 
On the other hand, from a purely statistical view, nonparametric analysis 
(discussed in Section 6.5) provides some information about the pattern of 
duration dependence which assists with the choice of parametric model. The 
shape of hazard function presented in Figure 6.4 suggests three different models 
from the accelerated failure time family of hazard models as being appropriate 
12 However, the standard errors obtained from the second-stage estimation are downward biased 
(Politis and Romano, 1994). In order to resolve that, we adopt the approach suggested by Politis 
and Romano, and obtain consistent standard errors by using block resampling techniques, which 
involve grouping the data randomly in a number of blocks of ten or fewer firms and then re- 
estimating the model, leaving out each time one of the blocks of observations and then 
computing the corresponding standard errors as the mean values of these estimates. 
172 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 6/ Data and Estimation 
for describing our data. These are the generalized gamma model (Model 1), the 
lognormal model (Model 2), and the loglogistic model (Model 3). 13 All the 
above models share a common feature; a hazard function with a flexible shape. 
They all allow for a hazard rate which first rises with time and then falls 
monotonically 
We start by estimating the above three model specifications. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the theoretical model is: 
h(tý=J [ R(t), S(t), O(t)] (3) 
However, it is not sufficient to say that the timing of acquisition is a function 
of the above variables and parameterize ßX (t) just as a summation of the time 
varying explanatory variables listed in Table 6.4. For instance, the effect of stock 
may be constant, or it may increase or diminish with the level of stock (as 
already discussed in Chapter 5). We allow for that in our empirical 
parameterization, by approximating the effect by including (stock)2 in the 
model. In similar fashion, we include (order)t and (size)2 in our model. In 
addition, the effect of stock and order may increase or diminish with the level of 
the rank effects, and in such cases, it is common to approximate that by inclusion 
of cross product terms (for instance, stock x total assets, the interaction of stock 
and total assets). We also control for fixed sectoral differences in takeover 
propensity by including 11 dummy variables. The maximum-likelihood 
estimates of the parameters of the gamma, lognormal, and loglogistic models are 
shown in Table 6.6. 
13 For a discussion of these models, see Jenkins (2005) 
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Table 6.6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Gamma, Lognormal, and 
Loglogistic Models 
Dependent Gamma model Lognormal model Loglogistic model Variable (model 1) (model 2) (model 3) 
Survival time 
Coefficient 
Independent 
Variables 
ßo constant -2.4234 (11.87***) -2.4370 (12.33***) -2.3878 (14.89***) 
K Kappa -0.2157 (0.39) 
a Sigma 0.6266 0.5941 
'Y gamma 0.3183 
ßi S -0.0609 (4.03***) -0.0611 (6.13***) -0.0612 (6.46***) ß2 0 -0.0292 (3.03***) -0.0281 (2.97***) -0.0261 
(2.91***) 
Rank effects 
ßs ROE -0.0172 (0.01) -0.0100 (0.02) -0.0037 (0.14) 
ß4 DIV 0.3828 (3.6***) 0.3608 (3.79***) 0.3878 (4.24***) 
ß5 TA -0.0113 (3.27***) -0.0117 (3.35***) -0.0139 (3.07***) 
06 q 0.2305 (1.72**) 0.2345 (1.73**) 0.2188 (2.03**) 
37 PE -0.1553 (0.99) -0.1319 (1.03) -0.0770 (0.71) ßa GR -0.4781 (4.42***) -0.4939 (4.50***) -0.5004 (4.37***) 
Quadratic terms 
ß9 (S)Z 0.0006 (2.95***) 0.0006 (2.95***) 0.0005 (3.06***) 
ßlo (0)2 0.0036 (3.43***) 0.0035 (3.86***) 0.0031 (3.90*") 
ßi l (TA)2 0.000131 (2.23**) 0.000132 (2.25**) 0.000152 (2.10**) 
Sector dummies 
ßi2 D, 0.3386 (1.16) 0.3392 (1.21) 0.3618 (1.55*) 
ßi3 D2 0.2930 (1.00) 0.2907 (1.03) 0.3097 (1.32*) 
ßi4 D3 0.7021 (2.20) 0.6834 (2.24) 0.6415 (2.48***) 
ßi5 D4 0.3805 (1.28*) 0.3655 (1.28*) 0.3385 (1.38*) 
ßi6 DS 0.5500 (1.72**) 0.5648 (1.85**) 0.5715 (2.24**) 
ß17 D6 0.2107 (0.72) 0.2143 (0.72) 0.2395 -1.06 
ßis D7 0.8806 (2.56***) 0.8407 (2.60***) 0.7872 (2.79***) 
ßi9 D8 0.5181 (1.66**) 0.5202 (1.71**) 0.5467 (2.06**) 
ß20 D9 0.5873 (1.94**) 0.5827 (1.99**) 0.5959 (2.4***) 
ß2i Dio -0.0327 (0.10) -0.0305 (0.10) -0.0055 -0.02 ß22 Dil 0.5497 (1.20) 0.4890 (1.16) 0.6262 (1.59*) 
(continued on next page 
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Table 6.6 (continued) : Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Gamma, Lognormal, 
and Loglogistic Models 
Dependent Gamma model Lognormal model Loglogistic model 
Variable (model 1) (model 2) (model3) 
Survival time 
Independent 
Coefficient Variables 
Cross-product terms 
023 Sx ROE -0.0009 (0.16) -0.0007 (0.13) -0.0005 (0.11) 
924 Sx DIV 0.0048 (0.05) 0.0162 (0.18) 0.0169 (0.22) 
$25 Sx TA 0.0001 (0.15) 0.0001 (0.19) 0.0001 (0.23) 
$26 Sxq 0.0435 (1.79**) 0.0429 (1.80**) 0.0373 (1.76**) 
ßz7 Sx PE 0.0172 (0.35) 0.0175 (0.36) 0.0197 (0.47) 
028 Sx GR -0.0105 (1.21) -0.0108 (1.22) -0.0119 (1.33) 
ßz9 Ox ROE 0.0018 (0.10) 0.0018 (0.10) 0.0019 (0.13) 
930 Ox DIV -0.0859 (0.39) -0.0945 (0.45) -0.1385 (0.70) 
#31 Ox TA -0.0006 (0.96) -0.0006 (1.01) -0.0006 (0.99) 
032 Oxq 0.0476 (0.77) 0.0475 (0.79) 0.0309 (0.59) 
033 Ox PE 0.0341 (0.24) 0.0290 (0.21) 0.0414 (0.35) 
034 Ox GR -0.0080 (0.42) -0.0070 (0.37) -0.0082 (0.45) 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.23 0.22 0.23 
Log - Likelihood -264.11 -265.86 -264.25 
Number of observations 4842 4842 4842 
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0 X2(, )=0.01 XZý=0.03 X2 =0.01 
The t-statistic, computed to test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to zero, 
is shown in parantheses for each coefficient estimate 
* ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively 
The above findings are statistically satisfactory as indicated by the diagnostic 
test. The parameter vector remains remarkably stable in moving from one model 
to the other, indicating that the results are robust to changes in model 
specification. 
175 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 6/ Data and Estimation 
The above results are not sensitive to different definitions of variables 
representing rank effects. '4 We estimated all three models by including liquidity, 
leverage, and growth as separate variables, in an attempt to investigate the 
influence of these firm financial characteristics in takeover timing. As their 
coefficients were not statistically significant in any of the models, we report 
results with the growth-resources indicator instead of these three variables. 
The likelihood ratio statistic is computed to test the following hypotheses: 
1. Existence of cross product terms 
Ho ß23-ß24=ß5-1326-1327=ß28=ß29-1330=ß =A2=A3 `1334-0 
2. Existence of fixed sectoral differences 
Ho: ßi-A3-ßia=ßýs-ßý6-ßi7 =ßýs=ßý9=ßzo-ßzi-ßzz=0 
3. Existence of quadratic terms 
Ho: Q9=ßßo=ß11=0 
4. Existence of assets 
Ho: ß5=ß11=O 
5. Existence of stock effects 
Ho: A =ß9 =0 
6. Existence of order effects 
Ho: 82 = Ao =0 
14 Numerous combinations of measurements of rank effects were used, a subset of which is 
reported in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.7 presents the results of the likelihood ratio test for the above 
hypotheses. 
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Table 6.7: Summary of Likelihood Ratio Statistic 
Hypotheses Models Log-likelihood Calculated X2 
Number of 
restrictions' 
Critical 
values 
(a=0.05) Null Hypothesis (Ho) 
gamma -272 (-264) 16.14 
Ho. 1 Lognormal -272 (-266) 13.25 14 23.68 not rejected 
Loglogistic -273 (-264) 16.97 
gamma -276 (-264) 23.51 
Ho: 2 Lognormal -276 (-266) 20.16 11 19.68 rejected 
Loglogistic -275 (-264) 21.19 
gamma -283 (-276) 15.08 
Ho: 3 Lognormal -284 (-276) 15.31 3 781 rejected 
Loglogistic -283 (-275) 15.53 
gamma -293(-283) 20.35 2 5.99 rejected 
Ho: 4 Lognormal -293(-283) 20.63 
Loglogistic -293(-282) 22.79 
gamma -294 (-283) 23.04 2 5 99 rejected 
Ho: 5 Lognormal -295 (-283) 24.39 
Loglogistic -297 (-282) 29.88 
gamma -293(-283) 21.03 2 5.99 rejected 
Ho: 6 Lognormal -293(-283) 21.56 
Loglogistic -294(-282) 23.25 
(a) The number of restrictions equals the number ofexplanatory variables omitted 
Figures in parentheses indicate the log-likelihood for the models with all variables present (unrestricted models) 
The test statistic is defined as -2(L,, -L,,,,, ), where L and Lm are the values of the log-likelihood functions for the restricted and unrestricted models, 
respectively. If the calculated X2 is less than the critical value of X2 the null hypothesis is not rejected 
The likelihood ratio test fails to reject hypothesis 1, while it rejects the rest of 
the hypotheses; 2-6. Thus, cross-product terms are statistically insignificant. The 
results suggest that there is a positive relation between survival time and 
dividends, and the q ratio. On the other hand, a negative relation exists between 
survival time and the growth-resources indicator. Size of a firm, stock and order 
effects have a negative effect on survival time. However, that effect is not 
constant but increases with the level of size, stock, and order, respectively (see 
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also Section 6.8). Profitability and market valuation hypotheses do not seem to 
be supported by the results. ' 5 
15 We considered that there could be a correlation between the q ratio and MTBV ratio, which 
may cause the latter to be statistically insignificant. However, when we attempted to estimate the 
models without the q ratio, the results (regarding the MTBV ratio) did not alter. 
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6.6.3 Choosing Among Parametric Models 
In order to choose one model among the three presented in table 6.6, we first 
check whether these are nested or non-nested. When models are nested, the 
likelihood ratio tests can be used to discriminate between them. This can be done 
in the case of gamma versus lognormal; the gamma model may be collapsed to 
Weibull (if k=1) or to lognormal (if k=0) or to exponential (if k=1, u=1). When 
models are not nested, the likelihood ratio test is unsuitable, and we can use the 
Akaike (1974) information criterion. This is done in the case of gamma (or its 
nested models) versus loglogistic. 
We start with the nested models; gamma and lognormal. Specifically, we test 
the following hypotheses: 
1. Ho: is=0, in which case, if Ho is true, then the model is log-normal. 
2. Ho: K=1, in which case, if Ho is true, then the model is Weibull. 
3. Ho: K=1, Q=1, in which case, if Ho is true then the model is exponential. 
Table 6.8 presents the results of the likelihood ratio tests of the above 
hypotheses 
Table 6.8: Likelihood Ratio Test for Testing Nested Models 
Critical values 
Hypotheses (Ho) Likelihood ratio test (cr--0.05) Null Hypothesis (Ho) 
Ho 1: K=O 0.01 X2(, j 3.84 not rejected 
Ho 2: K=1 14.82 X2(, )=3.84 rejected 
Ho 3: K=1 & 9=1 6.04 X2(2) 5.99 rejected 
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The results presented in Table 6.8 preclude the use of Weibull and 
exponential models for our data. The test results strongly reinforce what we 
already know about the nature of the hazard for acquisition, namely, that the 
hazard shape cannot be constant or monotone; rather it is variable. 
Having decided between gamma and lognormal, the next step is to compare 
the lognormal with the loglogistic model. As these two models are non-nested, 
we use the Akaike information criterion (AIC), which suggests penalizing each 
model's log likelihood to reflect the number of parameters being estimated and 
then comparing them. Although the best-fitting model is the one with the largest 
log likelihood, the preferred model is the one with the lowest value of the AIC. 
For parametric survival models, the AIC is defined as: 
AIC=-2lnL+2(x+c) (4) 
Where K is the number of model covariates and c the number of model- 
specific distribution parameters. Table 6.9 gives the log likelihood and Akaike 
information criterion values from lognormal and loglogistic models. 
Table 6.9: Comparison of AIC Values for Lognormal and Loglogistic Models 
Distribution Log Likelihood Kc AIC 
Lognormal -282.63 12 2 593.26 
Loglogistic -281.97 12 2 591.94 
Per the AIC criterion, the loglogistic model is selected. 
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6.6.4 Diagnostics of the Estimated Models 
In this section, we present an approach that uses graphical analysis of 
residuals in order to evaluate the overall fit of our final model. 
Since in duration models, residuals are not directly identified, we can estimate 
residuals by using the accumulated hazard function. Thus, 
H(t)= jh(u)du =-log s(t) (5) 
If the model fits the data well, i. e. if the specification is correct and important 
explanatory variables are not omitted, the residuals will behave like observations 
drawn from a unit exponential distribution. Thus, if a model exhibits a good 
overall fit, the estimated minus log of the survival function for the integrated 
hazard evaluated at H (t, , 
(3X) should equal H (t, ßX). This implies that for a 
model that fits the data well, the minus log of survival function for the integrated 
hazard plotted against the integrated hazard for uncensored observations should 
lie approximately on a 45° line. A plot that displays a systematic departure from 
the 45° line indicates that the model needs to be modified either by changing 
functional form or by including other explanatory variables. 
We apply the above test to our final model (Model 3) in order to evaluate its 
overall fit. Figure 6.5 shows a plot of minus log of the survival function for the 
integrated hazard against the integrated hazard for firm acquisitions. The plot of 
the minus log of survival function appears to lie along the 45° line, indicating 
that there the overall fit of our final model is quite good. Note that some 
variability around the 45° line is still expected, particularly in the right-hand tail. 
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This is due to the reduced effective sample caused by prior failures and 
censoring (see Cleves et al, Chs. l 1 and 14,2004). 
Figure 6.5: Graphical Analysis of Final model Overall Fit 
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6.7. Generalizing the Parametric Regression Model 
In obtaining results, as presented in Section 6.6, it has been assumed that the 
correct functional forms have been specified and that the individual firms in the 
sample, after controlling for observable differences through the inclusion of 
explanatory variables, are homogenous. However, heterogeneity may arise 
through functional form misspecification or the presence of unobserved 
difference, and may then lead to misleading inferences regarding duration 
dependence and the effects of explanatory variables. 
In this section, we consider generalizations of the earlier model to allow for 
unobserved individual firm effects (unshared frailty models). In unshared frailty 
models, there is a distinction between the hazard firm's face and the population 
hazard that arises by averaging over all the survivors. In a heterogeneous 
population, it turns out that population hazard can fall, while the firm hazards all 
rise because, over time, the population becomes populated by increasing 
numbers of robust firms as the more frail members fail. This is known as the 
frailty effect, and it virtually assures that population hazards decline over time, 
regardless of the shape of the hazards faced by firms. 
The implication of this is that, under the assumption of a heterogeneous 
population, it could actually be the case that each firm's risk rises with time, 
even though for the population as a whole, the hazard rate falls. 
Under the unshared frailty model, the firm individual hazard function is 
written as h (t, / X, , v, 
) = v, h (t, / X, ) , and the resulting population 
hazard is 
written as he (t, / X, ) . 
It is shown that as 0 tends to zero, the population and 
individual hazard functions coincide, and that lime-. o he 
(") =h (") 
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In order to test whether our model is a frailty one, we re-estimate Model 3 and 
make an assumption about the hazard function each firm faces. The population 
hazard function is just whatever it turns out to be, given the estimate of 0 and 
the assumed distribution of v,. Thus, we fit a model with loglogistic individual 
hazard and gamma and inverse Gaussian distribution frailties. In order to check 
for unshared frailty, we test the following hypothesis: 
Ho: theta=O, in which case, if Ho is true, then the model is without frailty. 
The above hypothesis is examined by assuming gamma as well as inverse 
Gaussian distribution for frailties. Regardless of the choice of frailty distribution, 
however, from examining the likelihood ratio test for Ho at Table 6.10 we 
realize that there is not much evidence pointing towards a population that is 
heterogeneous. 
Table 6.10: Likelihood-Ratio Test for Frailty Model 
Critical values 
Hypotheses(Ho) Frailties distribution Likelihood-ratio test (a--0.05) Null Hypothesis (Ho) 
Ho: theta=0 gamma 0.01 X2(i 3.84 not rejected 
Ho: thetas inverse - gaussian 0.01 )2(1) 3.84 not rejected 
Clearly, firms are heterogeneous. There is no suggestion that the discussed 
explanatory variables fully describe the differences. What is really being asked 
here is whether heterogeneity is so great that it dominates the production of 
population hazards from individual hazards, or if, instead, for our research 
questions, that heterogeneity can be ignored. The likelihood ratio test suggests 
that the population and individual hazard functions coincide. 
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Indeed, Figures 6.6 and 6.7 present graphs of the individual and population 
hazards obtained by fitting Model 3. This particular model reproduces the shape 
of the population hazard which first rises with time and then falls. Individual 
hazards exhibit the same shape, and so it is not surprising to see that in the 
reported results above, the likelihood-ratio test for Ho: theta=0 will not be 
rejected at the 95% level of significance. 
Concluding that there are no significant individual specific differences that 
were not controlled because of unobserved variables is additional evidence that 
our model fits the data well. 
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6.8. Effects of Explanatory Variables on Survival Time of a Firm 
Having decided on Model 3 as our preferred model, it is possible now to 
interpret its parameterization by considering each of its component derivatives, 
which will give the marginal effect of each variable, ceteris paribus, on survival 
time. Table 6.11 presents the marginal effect of each explanatory variable. 
Table 6.11: Effects of explanatory variables on survival time of a firm 
Variables Marginal effects 
S -0.042 
0 -0.011 
ROE -0.004 
DIV 0.390 
TA -0.012 
q 0.219 
MTBV -0.077 
GR -0.500 
The effect of profitability, as measured by ROE, and the MTBV ratio on 
survival time is negative, which contrasts with existing literature. However, 
coefficients of these variables are always insignificantly different from zero (see 
Table 6.6), indicating that any effect is not well-defined on survival time. 
The dividend payout ratio (DIV) and q ratio have a positive effect on survival 
time. That means that if the dividend payout ratio increases by 1 unit, (log) 
survival time (time to acquisition) will lengthen by 0.39 years (or 142 days). If 
the q ratio increases by 1 unit, (log) survival time will also increase by 0.22 years 
(or 80 days). If a firm moves to the low growth-high liquidity-low leverage 
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group or high growth-low liquidity-high leverage group, time of acquisition will 
shorten by 0.50 years (or 183 days). In other words, dividends and q ratio 
lengthen the time to acquisition and thus, firm acquisition is `decelerated'. On 
the other hand, moving to a low growth-high liquidity-low leverage group or 
high growth-low liquidity-high leverage group shortens the time to acquisition, 
and thus, in this case, acquisition is `accelerated'. 
Finally, the effect of stock (S), order (0), and total assets (TA) on survival 
time changes with the level of stock, order, and total assets, respectively. Table 
6.11 presents the effect of stock, order, and total assets valued at the average 
level of these variables. The effect of stock on time to acquisition is negative, 
meaning that an increase in stock will shorten timing to an acquisition (survival 
time) in UK economy, ceteris paribus, and thus acquisitions are `accelerated'. 
Specifically, if stock increases by one acquisition, the survival time of firms will 
shorten by 0.04 years (or 15 days). In addition, the marginal effect of order on 
time to acquisition is negative, indicating that an increase in order will shorten 
timing to an acquisition in the UK economy, ceteris paribus, and thus 
acquisitions are `accelerated'. If expected acquisitions increase by one, the 
survival time of firms will shorten by 0.01 (or 4 days). Finally, total assets have a 
negative effect on survival time; an increase in total assets by £1m will shorten 
survival time by 0.01 (or 4 days). Figures 6.8,6.9, and 6.10 present the effect of 
stock, order, and total assets along different levels of these variables. 16 
16 The level of stock and order refer to aggregate stock and order in our sample. 
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Figure 6.8: Effect of Stock on Survival Time of a Firm 
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As Figure 6.8 shows, the stock effect is not constant over years. In the early 
years, when the level of stock is very low, its effect on acquisition timing 
remains at 0.055 years (or 22 days). During the period 1998-2000, when the 
level of stock sharply increases, its effect on time to acquisition begins to 
diminish gradually (in absolute values). For example, in 1998 an additional 
acquisition shortens time to acquisition by 0.050 years (or 18 days), while in 
2000, it shortens acquisition timing by 0.030 (or 11 days). That means that as 
stock reaches a certain high level, then the effect of an additional acquisition on 
acquisition timing starts diminishing (in absolute values) which, in turn, means 
that the rate of acquisitions' `acceleration' slows down. A possible explanation 
of the above results is that there is an incentive to acquire firms as the number of 
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acquisitions increases, but as the economy becomes too concentrated, 
acquisitions may become privately unprofitable and thus, the acceleration rate 
decreases. 
Figure 6.9 depicts the effect of order on time to acquisition. As Figure 6.9 
shows, when order is low (say 7) a marginal expected acquisition results in 
shortening the time of acquisition by 0.02 years (or 7 days). As the level of order 
increases, its effect diminishes (in absolute value). Thus, when the number of 
expected acquisitions is high, say 32, a marginal expected acquisition results in 
shortening the time of acquisition by 0.005 years (2 days). 
The above results suggest that when only a few acquisitions are expected, the 
survival time of firms is shorter than when the number of expected acquisitions 
is high. A possible explanation for this is that in the beginning of a potential 
wave, acquisitions are `accelerated' in order for firms to reap early mover 
advantages. If a firm is not acquired early (followers), then it may take longer for 
an acquisition to occur. 
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Figure 6.9: Effect of Order on Survival Time of a Firm 
0 000 
-0 005 
0 
ö 
-0.010 
c c.. 
-0.015 
bi) 
g -0.020 
-0.025 
-0.030 
Note: The horizontal axis measures the level of order (number of expected 
acquisitions) and calendar time (in years), while the vertical measures the 
marginal effect of order on the survival time of a firm 
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Furthermore, Table 6.12 shows the effect of stock and order over different 
sectors. 17 
Table 6.12: Effects of stock and order per sector 
Sectors 123456789 10 11 12 
Marginal effect of stock -0.045 -0.048 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.047 -0.033 -0.031 -0.036 -0.049 -0.058 -0.056 
Marginal effect of order -0.016 -0.021 -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.020 -0.029 -0.026 
Table 6.12 shows that a marginal acquisition in any sector results in 
shortening firm survival time. Sstock effect is quite similar among sectors, 
except for Sectors 7,8, and 9, where it is higher. On the other hand, there is 
higher diversity on the effect of order among sectors, its value ranging from - 
0.006 (sectors land 8) to -0.026 (sector 12). That may be due to the fact that 
acquisition intensity is not the same among sectors. (As Figure 6.9 shows, the 
order effect changes considerably as the level of expected acquisitions 
increases). Sectors 7,8, and 9 have the highest value of stock and order effects. 
This is an indication that in these sectors, the intensity of acquisition activity is 
very high (see also Appendix D for the effect of stock and order by sector and 
over time). 
" The marginal effect of stock and order of a sector are calculated at the average level of these 
variables. 
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Figure 6.10, measures the effect of firm size on survival time in the vertical 
axis, and the firm's size in the horizontal one. As the graph shows, at a lower 
level of total assets, say £30 m, an increase of total assets by £1m results in the 
shortening of survival time by 0.13 years (or 48 days). At £90m of total assets, 
the effect becomes positive. After that point, an increase in total assets lengthens 
firms' survival times. Thus, when total assets are, say, £ 120m ,a 
Elm increase 
results in lengthening survival time by 0.005 years (or 2 days). This implies that 
small firms (but not too small) are more `attractive' targets than large ones. 
Figure 6.10: Effect of Size on Survival Time of a Firm 
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6.9. Herd Effect of Merger Activity 
Herd effects are evaluated by estimating Model 3 without any covariates. 
Table 6.13 gives the maximum likelihood estimates of Model 3 with no 
covanates. 
Table 6.13: Maximum Likelihood Estimate of Loglogistic Model with no Covariates 
Loglogistic model 
Coefficient Variable (model 3) 
ßo constant 2.9166 (35.51 **") 
ly gamma 0.7167 
Log - Likelihood -341.19 
Number of observations 4842 
Figure in parenthesis refers to t-ratios 
*** 
, 
indicates significance at 1% level 
From Table 6.13, we can see that ßo is statistically significant, which 
confirms the existence of herd effects at the aggregate level. Furthermore, the 
estimated value of the shape parameter, y, is 0.72 which, being smaller than 
unity, suggests a positive and then negative duration dependence of acquisition 
probabilities. Figure 6.11 depicts the shape of hazard function with no 
covariates. This figure suggests that the probability of a firm being acquired at 
time t (conditional on not being acquired at time t- 1) first increases with time and 
then decreases, the herd effect being a possible explanation for this. 
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Figure 6.11: Hazard Function with no Covariates 
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Herd behaviour of a firm may be based on informational asymmetries. A firm 
that decides to get involved in an acquisition gives a signal to other firms that 
acquisition is a profitable strategy. Rivals will observe the choice made by the 
acquirer. Assuming that it has information that they lack, the rivals will decide to 
acquire, too. Such behaviour prompts every firm to do what other firms are 
doing, in an attempt to reap the same advantages. These "defensive" acquisitions 
will occur until high concentration is reached and mergers either are not allowed 
by antitrust authorities, or are no longer profitable (firms gain more by being 
outsiders due to the high selling price of targets in a concentrated industry, or 
due to reduced competition). Thus, we can conclude that herd behaviour may 
generate an acquisition wave. 
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6.10. Discussion of the Results 
Table 6.6 presents results for all models estimated. Appropriate tests for 
nested models and the Akaike information criterion suggest Model 3 as the 
preferred model. This model fits the data quite well and allows for robust 
inferences about acquisition timing. 
From Table 6.6, it can be seen that the estimated value of the shape 
parameter, y, for the loglogistic model is 0.32 which, being smaller than unity, 
suggests that the hazard rate increases and then decreases with time. Thus, the 
probability of a firm being acquired at time t conditional on the explanatory 
variables (and also conditional on not being acquired at time t-1) first increases 
with the passing of time and then decreases. Figure 6.7 presents the shape of a 
hazard function for acquisitions, and supports the non-parametric results reported 
in Section 6.5. 
Section 6.9 analyses herd effects as depicted in a hazard function for our final 
model with no covariates. That is, the shape of hazard function depicted in 
Figure 6.11 is due to acquisition activity per se, rather than to any exogenous 
factors. It is obvious from the graph that there is interdependence of merger 
activity over time and the endogenous character of the merger phenomenon. 
Explanatory variables act like a time scaling factor. The effect of the explanatory 
variables is to change the time scale by a constant (survival time-invariant) scale 
factor, and as a result, to `accelerate' or `decelerate' acquisition activity. Thus, 
including explanatory variables in our model broadens or shrinks the curve that 
depicts the hazard function with no covariates. In comparing Figures 6.7 and 
6.11, we can see that hazard functions have similar shapes - shapes that give rise 
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to the acquisition waves hypothesis where the hazard rate of an acquisition first 
rises and then falls with time. However, the hazard with no covariates is much 
lower than that with covariates. In addition, explanatory variables make hazard 
rates fall more sharply, showing that the herd effect is an important driving force 
in acquisition waves, while other explanatory variables may amplify these 
waves. Although herd effects may influence the probability of a firm being 
acquired, consideration of covariates gives a more complete picture of the 
acquisition phenomenon. Since our final model is an accelerated failure time 
model, it is more insightful to discuss the effects of explanatory variables in 
terms of survival time (time until a firm is being acquired). 
Results suggest that stock and order effect influence non-linearly time to 
acquisition. In particular, the stock effect is negatively related to time to 
acquisition. A possible explanation for this is that as stock increases, incentives 
to acquisition increase, which means that the survival time of firms shortens. 
This result is consistent with theoretical models of acquisitions (see, for 
example, Perry and Porter, 1985) which state that an acquisition is related to 
acquisitions occurring in the past because of the strategic interaction between 
firms in a sector through the product market. Specifically, the new merged firm 
has an incentive to supply less than did its component firms prior to acquisition 
and as a result price increase. The profit of the merged firm can exceed those of 
its constituent firms only if the acquisition results in a price rise sufficient to 
offset the lower output level. When stock is small, there is a large number of 
outsiders, so the residual demand facing outsiders considering merger is 
relatively flat. This means that an output contraction has a small price effect, and 
the profitability of an acquisition is reduced. As stock increases, the residual 
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demand is relatively steep, which, in turn, means that a marginal acquisition can 
more readily increase the price as well as profitability. The implication here is 
that as stock increases, a merger may take place and as it does so, further 
acquisitions may occur with an amplified acquisition wave. However, in a very 
concentrated sector, the gains enjoyed by a firm from an acquisition may be less 
than those enjoyed by outsiders (see, for example, Kamien and Zang, 1990; 
1991). This creates a free rider problem that may dissipate acquisition activity. 
Furthermore, order effect is also negatively related to time to acquisition, a 
finding consistent with theoretical models of pre-emptive acquisitions (see, for 
example, Fauli-Olier, 2000, Molnar, 2005). A possible explanation for this result 
is that when a firm anticipates that one of its rivals may be engaged in an 
acquisition and becomes a low cost producer, or obtains market power, then the 
first firm may pre-empt this acquisition with a takeover of its own. By pre- 
empting the rival firm's acquisition, the first firm avoids the loss of profits it 
would have suffered had its rival been successful. Moreover, when no or only a 
few acquisitions have occurred, the selling price of a target is low (in relation to 
periods of intense acquisition activity). This means that a fine acquiring early 
may have larger gains because it pays less for the target. These early mover 
advantages may shorten the survival time of firms. Such behaviour, if adopted by 
many firms, may trigger an acquisition wave. As the occurrence of acquisitions 
increases, an even higher number of expected acquisitions may lead firms to wait 
longer before acquiring, as early advantages no longer exist. Firms, at this stage, 
attempt to delay acquisitions because with intense acquisition activity in the 
sector, firms may gain more by being outsiders. This is due either to reduced 
competition or the increased selling price of targets (see, for example, Stigler, 
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1950; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Fauli-Olier, 2000). The Order effect 
implies that in the beginning of a potential acquisition wave, firms may gain 
more than those acquisitions occurring at the peak of waves. 
Survival time is also influenced non-linearly by fine size. The coefficient on 
total assets and its square indicate that when the target size is small, an increase 
in size results in shortened survival time (acquisitions are accelerated). When 
targets are large, an increase in size results in extension of survival time 
(acquisitions are decelerated). The turning point is close to £90,000. Thus, small 
firms (but not too small) are more likely to be acquired than very large firms. 
This finding contrasts with existing literature which finds a monotonically 
decreasing relationship between takeover probability and firm size (see 
Dickerson et al, 1998 for the UK and Palepou, 1986 for the US). On the other 
hand, Dickerson et al. (2002), using data from the UK during the 1980s, produce 
findings similar to the present study. Our results may reflect the fact that, during 
the end of the 1980s, financing constraints were loosened, allowing larger firms 
(although not the largest) to be taken over (Chatterjee, 1995). 
Another variable that is statistically significant with a negative sign is the 
growth-resources indicator. Growth and resource availability are important 
variables in determining the timing of an acquisition. These factors do not 
influence survival time, as their coefficients are not statistically significant. They 
are combined to construct a single variable which is statistically significant and 
supports the growth-resources mismatch hypothesis. When a firm belongs to the 
low growth-high liquidity-low leverage or high growth-low liquidity-high 
leverage group, its survival time is shortened. This means that two types of firm 
may be attractive targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms and high-growth, 
200 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 6/ Data and Estimation 
resource-poor firms, a result that is consistent with the findings of Palepou 
(1986) for the US. 
On the other hand, the impact of dividends on the time until acquisition is 
positive and significant, indicating that firms giving high dividends have longer 
survival times; i. e. acquisition is expected to occur later. Such a relationship 
between dividends and acquisition activity is consistent with existing literature 
(see, for example, Dickerson et al. 1998) and is open to various interpretations. 
One line of argument - the `free cash flow' theory (Jensen, 1988) - suggests that 
managers of a firm who have their own agenda, do not spend retained profits 
optimally from the shareholders' perspective (by investing only in projects 
which have a positive net present value). Thus, if a larger share of the profits is 
distributed in the form of dividend payments to shareholders (implying that the 
free cash flow is not used to invest in negative net present value projects), this 
acts as a signal to the market that the firm's managers are acting prudently. It is 
this fact, according to the free cash flow interpretation, that explains why high 
dividends decelerate acquisition activity. An alternative view suggests that 
dividends are used in an attempt to reduce the probability of takeover. In this 
case, high dividends are aimed at inducing shareholders' loyalty, even though 
they might be a source of short-termist behaviour. Thus, managers, fearful of 
takeover, pay out high dividends in order to avoid being taken over. ' 8 
18 Managers might be averse to takeovers because they are frequently dismissed following 
takeover. Franks and Mayer (1996) find that, in the case of hostile takeovers, 90% of top 
management is replaced within two years of the takeover. Partington (1985), in a survey of 
firms' dividend policy, finds that shareholder loyalty is frequently given as an important reason 
for the paying of dividends by firms. 
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The q ratio has a positive and significant impact on survival time. Low q ratio 
results in short survival time for a firm, a result consistent with the existing 
literature (see, for example, Gugler et al. 2005). Several explanations for this 
relationship of q ratio to acquisition timing may be advanced. The most familiar 
of these is that firms with low q ratio are more likely to be acquired, thus having 
short survival time, as these firms provide valuable resources at a cost below that 
of purchasing assets in new or used capital markets. On the other hand, the q 
ratio can be regarded as an indicator of investment opportunities of a firm; those 
with low investment opportunities have shorter survival times, being regarded as 
inefficient firms and more likely to be acquired. 
Empirical evidence suggests that investment depend on retentions (see, for 
example, Bond and Meghir, 1994). Firms may choose between two possible 
courses of action. The first involves the payment of low dividends, which, given 
the trade-off between dividends and investment, allows greater retentions and 
hence higher investment. The second possibility is for the firm to pay high 
dividends and consequently, to have lower investment. The coefficients in Table 
9 indicate that higher dividends and higher investment both significantly 
`decelerate' acquisition activity. In the case of dividends, the marginal effect is 
0.39; a unit increase of dividends payout ratio will increase survival time by 0.39 
years. This suggests that increasing dividend payments may be an effective 
strategy to ward off takeover. In contrast, the marginal effect of investment is 
0.22; a unit increase of investment opportunities will increase survival time by 
0.22 years. Thus, survival time increases more with increasing dividend than 
with increasing investment. Thus, managers faced with the decision of how to 
202 
Part 3: Microeconomic Analysis Chapter 6/ Data and Estimation 
allocate the marginal 1 pound of earnings, and who wish to avoid takeover, 
would be better advised to increase dividends rather than investment. 19 
The joint significance of the sector dummies reveals that there do appear to be 
residual significant sectoral differences in the timing of takeovers, although two 
sectors, Industrials and Retail, experience no significantly different timing from 
Telecommunications. Coefficients of dummy variables are positive and range 
from 0.30 to 0.79. Thus, in Financials, for example, timing of acquisitions is 
longer by 0.64 years, ceteris paribus, which means that in that sector, acquisition 
activity may start almost half a year later in relation to the other sectors. As most 
of the dummy coefficients are not very high, we can conclude that these results 
are consistent with a synchronization of sectoral acquisition waves (for a 
discussion, see Chapter 3). 
Finally, profitability and market to book value ratio have statistically 
insignificant coefficients, indicating that they are not important influences in 
acquisition timing. Such results contrast with existing literature (see Section 4.3). 
However, as most existing studies use data from the 1980s or earlier, it would 
appear that these variables do not play an important role in acquisitions in the 
1990s. 
19 These results on dividends and investment give rise to the need for further research. 
Specifically, an interesting question would be the effect of these variables on survival timing 
separately for firms that are characterized by having relatively low investment opportunities (low 
value of q) and those that are not. 
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6.11. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have empirically examined factors that influence 
acquisition timing in the UK at the micro-level. The analysis is of particular 
interest in that our period includes the takeover boom of the late 1990s. 
Our sample consists of the same proportion of acquired firms as in the 
population in the UK during the sampling period. In addition, the sample is 
objective in the sense that it does not include only firms for which the probability 
of takeover is likely to be particularly influenced by variables investigated in this 
study. Thus, our sampling methodology avoids several methodological flaws 
present in previous acquisition literature, and leads to unbiased and correct 
inferences. 
We use secondary data collected from two main datasets. Thomson ONE 
Banker is used to gather information about acquisitions in the UK during 1990- 
2004, and DataStream is used to obtain firms' accounting data. We use 
accounting data in order to investigate factors that influence the timing of 
acquisitions. We are aware that this itself has problems. In particular, it is well- 
known that firms can use creative accounting techniques, which may imply that 
their published accounts may not be a true and fair reflection of the firms' 
financial position (Griffiths, 1986). However, the use of accounting data does 
have the advantage of allowing us to test directly the hypothesis in which we are 
interested. 
The results indicate that there is evidence that firm-specific characteristics are 
an important influence of takeover timing. The payment of high dividends is 
used by managers to induce shareholders' loyalty and thus, to delay any potential 
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takeover. On the other hand, high investment opportunities may also delay a 
takeover, as this is a signal to the market that the firm's managers are acting 
prudently. However, given the trade-off between dividends and investment, 
empirical evidence in this study suggests that managers who wish to avoid 
takeover would be better advised to increase dividends, rather than investment. 
The size of a firm has a negative relation to survival time. However, in 
contrast to the existing literature, this relation is non-linear, indicating that when 
firms are small, increased size is associated with shortened survival time, while 
at larger firms, an increase in size results in lengthened survival time. This 
means that small (but not too small) firms are regarded as attractive targets. 
Furthermore, low growth, resource-rich firms or high-growth, resource-poor 
firms are considered attractive targets. 
On the other hand, takeover activity per se plays an important role in the 
survival time of a firm. Specifically, stock, order, and herd effects have all been 
found to exert significant influence on takeover timing. These results support 
empirical evidence on theoretical models that analyze takeover in a static 
industrial organization framework, pre-emptive takeovers, and sequence of 
takeovers (see Chapter 4). On the other hand, by incorporating all these effects 
into a dynamic framework, evidence that takeover waves may be shaped by 
takeover activity per se is provided. Stock, order, and herd effects (together with 
the rank effects) fuel the dynamics within a wave. This is consistent with results 
provided in the empirical analysis in Chapter 3, which shows that merger activity 
is an endogenous process. It is influenced by takeover activity occurring in 
previous (stock effect), current (herd effect) and also expected (order) takeovers. 
However, empirical analysis implies that these effects are not equally important 
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over different stages of a takeover wave. In the early stages of a potential wave, 
the order effect is vital, while towards the peak, the stock effect seems to prevail. 
Herd effects describe the endogenous character of a takeover wave. Finally, rank 
effects are significant determinants of a takeover during the duration of an entire 
wave. 
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter suggests that although macro 
factors may create a hospital environment for merger activity (see Chapter 3), 
the micro forces may reinforce it and generate dynamics which shape a merger 
wave. 
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PART 4: THE OVERVIEW 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
7.1 Summary of the Findings 
Existing research into the determinants of merger timing has lacked an 
encompassing analytical framework within which the numerous proposed 
hypotheses of merger determination put forward can be assessed. The plethora of 
studies at the micro-level have largely concerned themselves with single motive 
models of merger, rarely considering the interdependence of merger determinants 
and decisions over time. A common aspect of studies at this level of analysis is 
their apparent inability to explain in themselves the recorded episodic nature of 
merger activity and thus, a lack of strong statistical results from their empirical 
evaluation. At the macro-level, the apparently stronger results of some studies 
have been insufficient to form the basis of a widely accepted theory of merger 
waves. Although the predications are closer to the observed procyclical and 
episodic behaviour of the process, the findings of the macro-literature have been 
limited, in most cases, to confirmation of what is evident by casual observation. 
We argue that a better understanding of the nature of merger and its timing 
can be provided by an analytical framework that combines the micro- and macro- 
levels of analysis. In this study, we presented such a framework and used it in 
analyzing merger waves in the UK. At the macro-level, we first employed 
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univariate spectral techniques to investigate the dynamic behaviour of merger at 
the aggregate and sector levels. Results suggest that aggregate merger in the UK 
exhibits a regular cycle of 6 years, most of the variation in merger series being 
due to that cycle. However, a smaller cycle of 2.5 years also exists, but is 
considered less regular. At the sectoral level, most sectors have a cycle of 5 
years. Only Consumer Staples and Telecommunications do not exhibit a regular 
cycle. There is, also, a synchronization of merger cycles for most of the sectors. 
These results suggest that there may be a bandwagon effect to merger activity 
that influences most sectors in the UK economy. Having identified merger cycles 
at the aggregate level, we employed multivariate spectral techniques to 
empirically investigate the synchronization of these cycles with business or 
capital market cycles. Results from multivariate spectral analysis suggest that the 
relation of aggregate merger cycles to business cycles or to fluctuations of 
interest rate and stock prices differs over cycles with different duration. There is 
clear evidence of a strong coherence between an aggregate merger cycle of 6 
years and the business cycle. These two cycles synchronize, although the 
amplitude of the former is much higher than that of the latter. A less strong 
coherence exists along the same cycle between aggregate mergers and interest 
rates, with the former leading the latter by approximately 2 years. 
The above results indicate that as the economy expands, it would seem that 
business becomes more optimistic and confident about the future, and when 
excess capacity is exhausted, mergers may be undertaken with borrowed finance, 
triggering the interest rate cycle. On the other hand, there is no strong coherence 
between the aggregate merger cycle of 6 years and that of stock prices. A 
stronger relation between these two exists in smaller cycles of about 2.5 years. 
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However, along this cycle, the coherence of aggregate mergers with interest rates 
and the business cycle is very small. This indicates that the observed relation 
between high stock market valuations and merger activity may have been 
misattributed to expectations about future economic conditions. The relation is 
actually driven by behavioural misevaluation factors in the short-run. This 
relation becomes weaker in the long-run, when stock prices return to efficiency. 
Finally, results suggest that a large portion of fluctuations in aggregate mergers 
cannot be explained by the business cycle, interest rates, or stock prices alone. 
Thus, we may conclude that these factors are necessary, but not sufficient to 
trigger a merger wave. 
Complementary to the macro-analysis is the analysis at the firm level. At this 
level of analysis, we constructed a decision-theoretic model of merger timing. 
This model encompasses different merger motives, as suggested by existing 
literature, simultaneously within a dynamic framework which endogenizes the 
merger process. Our model exploits the dynamics of merger process by assuming 
that a target accepts an offer at time t (and thus, merger occurs) if it does not 
expect to gain more by waiting one more period before merging. Potential targets 
should have different preferred takeover dates; in other words, at any given date, 
only some of the potential targets will wish to actually be acquired. We argue 
that four micro-forces may influence the timing of mergers. Firstly, the 
propensity of firms to merge increases as the number of merged firms increases 
(stock effect of mergers). Secondly, if a firm expects that one of its rivals will 
gain from merging, then it is rational for the first firm to pre-empt this merger 
with a takeover of its own (order effect of mergers). Thirdly, a merger may 
trigger another merger as firms attempt to mitigate the action of rivals and match 
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the gains, if any, of the first merger partners (herd effects of mergers). Finally, 
firm-specific characteristics play an important role in a merger decision and its 
timing (rank effects of mergers). 
We test the above model by using merger data from the UK during the period 
from 1990 to 2004. The empirical approach taken is survival analysis. Results 
indicate that firm-specific characteristics play an important role in merger timing. 
Specifically, low growth, resource-rich or high growth, resource-poor firms or 
firms that pay low dividends, have low investment opportunities, or are small 
(but not too small) are considered "attractive" targets and are more likely to be 
acquired. On the other hand, the results also suggest that merger activity per se, 
such as stock, order, and herd effects, may influence the timing of mergers. 
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7.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study provides an alternative framework for investigating merger waves. 
We argue that both micro- and macro-levels of analysis are necessary for a better 
understanding of merger nature and timing. The contributions of this study can 
be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, the study has examined the existence of UK merger waves by using 
frequency domain techniques. The UK experience has received little attention in 
the empirical literature on merger waves. Hypotheses about mergers and 
structural change have tended to be derived from the US experience and then 
applied to UK data. We are filling this gap by using spectral analysis and 
filtering techniques to empirically examine for merger waves. Spectral analysis is 
an alternative approach better suited to describing and analyzing quasi-cyclical 
fluctuations at different frequencies. In this way, in contrast to existing studies, 
we uncover waves of different duration, regularities, and explanatory power. In 
the multivariate case, we examine the synchronization between mergers cycles of 
different duration and regularities with business cycles and capital market 
fluctuations. Furthermore, filtering techniques overcome the important but 
controversial issue of detrending. This minimizes the risk of introducing a 
spurious cyclical structure of the merger series, which is something that many 
studies suffer from (see Chapter 3). 
Secondly, the thesis constructs a decision-theoretic model of merger timing. 
The merger decision is analyzed from the target perspective, which provides an 
alternative (and innovative) approach to analyzing the merger process. Past 
studies in mergers have tended to follow a pre-selected point of view - either an 
industrial organization or finance perspective - in isolation and have not 
211 
Part 4: The Overview Chapter 7/Discussion and ConcludinL Remarks 
combined approaches. This model encompasses both perspectives within a 
dynamic framework and uses their findings to explain merger waves. It provides 
an effective way of analyzing merger timing without a pre-selected perspective. 
In this way, existing research has been extended to provide explanations on 
merger timing (see Chapter 5). 
Thirdly, the theoretical model is estimated by means of merger data from the 
UK from 1990 to 2004. The empirical approach taken in this study is survival 
analysis. There are at least two advantages in using survival analysis over the 
alternative static models found in most existing studies. First, there is the issue 
of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Survival analysis can be used to either 
mitigate the effect of unobserved firm heterogeneity or to incorporate explicitly 
the unobserved heterogeneity directly into the functional specification. The 
second advantage is that survival analysis allows for time varying explanatory 
variables. Firms are allowed to develop, to be dynamic entities, not just random 
characteristics at any point in time. This framework explicitly allows for 
dependency over time, in that it estimates the conditional probability of merger; 
that is, the probability of merger by t, given that is has not occurred by time t-1. 
It is ideally suited to empirically examine merger timing, since it allows us to 
investigate whether, given that a firm has survived up to a certain point in time, 
changes in firm-specific characteristics or changes in merger activity per se will 
lead to a change in the timing of merger. Such analysis, to the best of our 
knowledge, provides the first supporting empirical evidence of theoretical 
models of pre-emptive and sequential mergers. It also provides strong statistical 
evidence that micro-theories of mergers can be used effectively in explaining the 
dynamics within merger waves (see Chapter 6). 
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7.3 Concluding Remarks and Further Research 
This study proposed a two-staged framework to illuminate the dynamics of 
merger wave activity and to help explain the persistence of this phenomenon. 
The first stage refers to the macroeconomic environment that sets the context for 
the development of a merger wave. In building the dynamics of the first stage of 
merger activity, we explored the key macro- and financial factors and forces 
stimulating a wave and leading to initial merger activity. These factors are 
indicative of the influence that the macro-environment exerts on merger activity. 
Macro-environmental forces not only create receptive conditions for the 
development of an initial merger activity, but they also interact with competitive 
factors within industrial sectors in essence that may influence competitive 
motives for mergers. 
Thus, in addition to key macro-factors, a range of micro-forces is necessary 
for merger activity to intensify at an increasing rate to shape a wave. These 
micro-dynamics feed into and fuel merger diffusion, and further reinforce merger 
activity. In building the dynamics within a merger wave, we explored key micro- 
forces such as firm financial characteristics, and merger activity per se. 
Based on the empirical results of this study (at both micro- and macro-levels 
of analysis), we offer the following account of merger waves. Although merger 
waves repeat themselves, they are far from being periodic. A fairly regular long 
cycle, as well as a less regular, less powerful cycle of mergers exist. Even though 
no two merger waves are identical, they usually have some important features in 
common. Their coherence with macro- and financial factors varies in strength 
over cycles of different duration and regularity. Long waves coincide with the 
business cycle of an economy. Periods of expansion of economic activity may 
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pave the way for initial merger activity and remove barriers for merger diffusion. 
A loosening of financial conditions may also help the development of the initial 
merger activity. However, such cycles do not seem to cohere with stock price 
fluctuations. 
The existence of merger cycles of different duration, regularity and power 
may explain why empirical studies give mixed results regarding the relation 
between aggregate mergers and economic fundamentals. Previous studies have 
applied time domain techniques, which do not distinguish between cyclical 
fluctuations of different duration and regularity, a fact which may be 
enlightening when such relations are examined. Further research may investigate 
the driving forces of these different merger cycles in an attempt to provide a 
complete picture of the merger phenomenon. In addition, studies investigating 
and comparing merger activity among different countries or industries may 
further distinguish between cycles of different duration and regularity. That is 
because fluctuations of significant importance in the merger series may not make 
an important contribution to the contemporaneous covariance between merger 
series of different countries or industries simply because they are in a different 
phase of the implied cycle. 
On the other hand, firms decide whether to engage in merger activity based on 
the gains of merger. When several potential acquirers may achieve these gains, 
they compete for the opportunity to acquire a target. An acquirer that moves fast 
and buys a target first may gain more than followers because it pays less for its 
target by exploiting the competition among target firms. Moreover, the 
reservation price of a target may be low when no mergers have taken place. On 
the other hand, the winning firm who acquires the target could become a lower 
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cost producer and increase its product market share if the costs saving are large 
enough. If the merged firm increases its market share, rivals are worse off. Early 
mover advantages, as described above, may be a strong motive for merger and 
may reinforce the initial merger activity. 
Furthermore, the propensity of firms to merge increases as the number of 
merged firms already formed increases. A merger is related to mergers that have 
occurred in the past because of the strategic interaction between firms in a sector 
through the product market. That motive for merger may amplify a merger wave. 
In addition, mergers may trigger more mergers as firms attempt to mimic the 
action of rivals and match the gains of the first merger partners. Once the 
bandwagon is rolling, firms choose to merge not because it is likely that it will be 
profitable and efficient, but because a number of other firms are already doing it. 
Such behaviour may shape a merger wave. 
Finally, firms' financial characteristics, the rank effect, are important 
determinants of merger activity. Since these characteristics may change over 
time as firms develop, they generate different merger timing. 
The findings at the micro-level provide strong empirical evidence of the 
endogenous character of mergers. The fact that mergers may be influenced by the 
past, present and future merger activity is related to theoretic models of 
endogenous mergers (see, for example, Gorton et al., 2005; Toxvaerd, 2004; 
Fridolfsson et at., 2005), and adds to the new, so called, endogenous merger 
theory framework. The endogenous character of merger activity may, for 
example, explain the merger paradox of why mergers that reduce profits may be 
rational. If the target will otherwise be taken over by competitors, profits may be 
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reduced even more. The stock market realizes the dilemma and rewards the 
merging firms. 
A combination of the above micro-level events is the driving force within a 
wave and keeps the bandwagon rolling at full speed. The importance of these 
micro-forces may differ at different stages of a merger wave. Thus, order effects 
are more important at the early stage of a wave. As the merger diffusion 
accelerates, stock effect outweighs order effect. Rank effects maintain the same 
amount of significance along a wave. Finally, herd effects describe the 
endogenous character of a merger wave. The above implies that merger motives 
may be different along different stages of a wave. As a result, the performance of 
merger may change as the wave develops. This is related to recent studies (see, 
for example, Bhagat et al. 2004; Harford, 2003; Moeller et al.; 2003) on merger 
performance which demonstrate that the total gains of mergers occurring in 
periods outside the merger waves are always significantly lower than the gains 
earned during merger waves. Furthermore, they reveal that the highest combined 
merger gains are realized at the beginning of merger waves. As a consequence, 
the dynamics within a wave provide new evidence that may be utilized in 
explaining the gains to acquirer and acquired firms, and the way in which these 
may change along different stages of a wave. 
Overall, the above analysis that utilizes macro- and micro-driving forces 
provides a satisfactory explanation of merger waves. Macro-factors may pave the 
way for the development of initial merger activity, while micro-forces fuel 
merger diffusion and build the dynamics within a wave. The presented 
framework stresses the importance of both levels of analysis and provides 
motivation for further research to fully integrate macro- and micro-factors within 
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a single model. In addition to the macro-factors examined in this study, further 
research could investigate the influence of technological change, regulation 
change, and globalization, among others, on merger activity. Doing so may lead 
to a more complete theory of merger activity and its timing. 
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APPENDIX A 
UNIVARIATE SPECTRUM OF SECTOR MERGERS 
In this section the univariate estimated spectrum of sector mergers using HP 
and BK filtered data are presented. 
The horizontal axis measures the cycle length in quarters while the vertical 
one the power of spectrum of mergers series (variance of merger series). The 
dashed line gives the 95% confidence interval. The area in the plot is divided into 
three segments: the long run periodicity band (LR) which corresponds to cycles 
of 32 quarters or longer, the merger cycles band (MC) which corresponds to 
cycles of 6-32 quarters, and the short run (SR) periodicity band which 
corresponds to cycles of 2-6 
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APPENDIX B 
THE SCOPE OF SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
Bl. Introduction 
The empirical approach taken in this study is based upon survival analysis. 
Survival analysis is concerned with analyzing the time to the occurrence of an 
event. 
In survival analysis we make some simplifying assumptions. Firstly, the 
chances of making a transition from the current state do not depend on transition 
history prior to entry to the current state (there is no state dependence). Secondly, 
entry into the state being modeled is exogenous- there are no `initial conditions' 
problems. Otherwise the models of survival times in the current state would also 
have to take account of the differential chances of being found in the current state 
in the first place. Finally, the model parameters describing the transition process 
are fixed, or can be parameterized using explanatory variables-the process is 
stationary. 
B2 Survival time data 
This section describes features of survival time data. It provides a definition of 
failure times and describes two important aspects of survival time data: censoring 
and truncation. 
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B2.1 The definition of failure times 
We are following firms over time, and that data collection effort is typically 
called a study (it is the period during which the firm is under observation). 
During the study period, firms are enrolled and data are collected. Data collection 
stops on a firm because the firm is acquired (fails), the study ends, or the firm. 
leaves the study for other reason (for example no available data). The event can 
only occur once, and once it does occur, the firm can no longer be observed. 
To determine failure time precisely, there are three requirements: a time origin 
must be unambiguously defined, a scale for measuring the passage of time must 
be agreed and finally the meaning of failure must be entirely clear. 
The time origin should be precisely defined for each firm. It is also desirable 
that, firms to any known differences on explanatory variables, all firms should be 
as comparable as possible at their time origin. The time origin need not be and 
usually is not at the same calendar time for each firm. Each firm's failure time is 
usually measured from its own date of entry in the study. The time origin need 
not always be at the point at which a firm enters the study, but if it is not, special 
methods for analysis are needed (see, truncation in Section B2.3). 
The `scale' for measuring time is clock time (real time), although other 
possibilities may arise. One reason for the choice of a timescale is that two firms 
treated identically should, other thing being equal, be in a similar state after the 
lapse of equal `times'. 
Finally, the meaning of the point event of failure must be defined precisely. In 
this study, failure means the first instance at which a firm is being acquired. The 
1 Indeed, in many industrial reliability applications, time is most appropriately measured by 
cumulative usage, in some sense. Or failures may consist of flaws in textile yarn, when failure 
`time' would be the length measured up to the first flaw. 
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analysis is concentrated on time until a firm is being acquired (failure time). In 
this study, the unit of time is a year. 
B2.2 Censoring of survival time data 
A special source of difficulty in the analysis of survival data is the possibility 
that some firms may not be observed for the full time until they are acquired. For 
example, as figure 1 depicts, a firm that is observed, failure free (no acquisition), 
for 14 years and then withdrawn from study has a failure time which must exceed 
14 years. Such incomplete observation of the failure time is called right 
censonng. 
X firm 
t=o 
Figure B 1: Right censoring of survival time data 
study ends 
under observation -º 
I +- not observed 0 
-X firm is acquired subsequently 
t=14 
time 
Thus, in this type of censoring, the firm participates in the study for a time 
and, thereafter, is no longer observed (see e. g. Klein and Moeschberger, 1997). 
In this study, this can occur because we run a study for a pre-specified length of 
time, and by the end of that time acquisition has not yet occurred for some fines 
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or because a firm disappears for unknown reasons. Like failure, censoring is a 
point event and the period of observation for censored firms must be recorded. 
We suppose that, in the absence of censoring, the i'h firm in a sample of n 
firms has failure time T,, a random variable. We suppose also that there is a 
period of observation c, such that observation on that firm ceases at c, if failure 
has not occurred by then. Then the observations consist of N, = min (T, , c, 
) 
, 
together with the indicator variable V, =1 if T. 5 c; (uncensored), V, =0 if 
T,. > c. (censored). 
On the other hand, left censoring means that the event (acquisition) occurred 
at some time before the firm enters the study but it is not known when (see e. g. 
Klein and Moeschberger, 1997). As figure B2 presents a firm may had been 
acquired well before we have started observing it. 
Figure B2: Left censoring of survival time data 
firm 
Stud begins 
the firm is never under observation 
X It is only known that the firm was acquired 
between 0 and 5 
onset of risk censoring ends 
t=O t=5 
When most researchers say censoring, they mean right censoring. The analytic 
tools we use assume that, if censoring occurs, it occurs randomly and is unrelated 
to the reason for failure. 
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B2.3 Truncation of survival time data 
Truncation is often confused with censoring because it also gives rise to 
incomplete observations over time. Truncation, in most statistical applications, 
refers to complete ignorance about the event of interest and about the covariates 
over a portion of the distribution. In survival-data applications, truncation is 
defined as a period over which the firm is not observed but is, a posteriori, 
known not to have failed. The statistical difficulty that truncation causes is that, 
had the firm failed (acquired), it would never have been observed. We may 
distinguish two types of truncation: left (delayed entry) and right truncation. 
In left truncation, as figure B3 shows, there is a period of ignorance extending 
from on or before the onset of risk to some time after the onset of risk. For a 
while, the firm is not observed, but then the firm comes under observation. Left 
truncation usually arises because we encounter a fine that came at risk some time 
ago. 
Can we include this firm in our study? The answer is yes, but we must 
account for the fact that, had the firm been acquired earlier, we never would have 
encountered this firm. The firm's subsequent survival can be analyzed, but we do 
not want to make too much out of the fact that firm survived up until the point 
we encountered it. 
Figure B3: Left truncation of survival time data 
firm . not observed 
under observation -º 
onset of risk enrolled acquisition 
t=0 t=3 t=10 
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Right truncation is indistinguishable from right censoring, which is previously 
discussed (see e. g Cleves et al, 2004). There is a point beyond which the firm is 
not observed, and since time may extend all the way to infinity, failure is certain 
to occur eventually. 
B3. The hazard rate and survivor function 
For survival analysis, we need methods that directly account for the sequential 
nature of the data, and are able to handle censoring and incorporate time-varying 
covariates. The solution is to model survival times indirectly, via the so - called 
`hazard rate', which is a concept related to chances of making a transition out of 
the current state at each instant (or time period) conditional on survival up to that 
point. 
Specifically, let the dependent variable of interest be the duration of a process, 
or the time to exit from a state (firm staying independent, in our case). Let this 
continuous random variable be denoted T with an associated probability density 
function f (t) = Pr (T = t) . It is implicit in this formulation that firms enter the 
state at time T=0. It need not be the case that T represents calendar time. Given 
that we are going to look at durations across sample of firms each of whom may 
start their existence in the state in question at different dates, T is effectively set 
to zero for each firm at the time they enter the state. The duration distribution 
function F (t) represents the probability of exit from the state by time t, where 
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Pr (T <t)= f_o f (s)ds (1) 
Which implies that 
f ýtý -d aft) 
(2ý 
We are commonly interested in T's survivor function S(t) or its hazard 
function h (t). The survivor function in nothing more than the reverse 
cumulative distribution function of T: 
Sýtý=1-F(t)=Pr(T>_t) (3) 
The survivor function reports the probability of surviving beyond time t. Said 
differently, it is the probability that there is no failure event (no acquisition) prior 
to t. The function is equal to one at t=0 (at the start of the spell) and decreases 
towards zero as t goes to infinity. The survivor function is a monotone, 
nonincreasing function of time. Thus: 
0<_s I, s(o)=1, 
as < 0, 
zats 
<0 
limS(t)=O (4) 
(5) 
The basic building block in duration modeling is the exit rate or hazard 
function at some time t, commonly denotedh(t), which represents the 
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instantaneous exit rate from the state at time t. In discrete terms, the probability 
that an individual who has occupied the state (a firm is independent) until time t 
leaves the state (firm is acquired) in a short interval of length dt after t is 
Pr(t<T <t+dt/T>_t) (6) 
An average probability of exit per unit of time within the short interval dt is 
Pr(t<_T<_t+dt/T>_t) 
dt 
(7) 
As we shorten the length of the interval over which this average probability is 
defined, we converge to the hazard rate h (t). That is, 
ht -limPr(t<_T<_t+dt/T>_t)- 
f(t) 
(8) ýý 
di-*O dt S(t) 
The probability density function f (t) summarizes the concentration of spell 
lengths (exit times) at each instant of time along the time axis. The hazard 
function summarizes the same concentration at each point of time, but conditions 
the expression on survival in the state up to that instant, and so can be thought of 
as summarizing the instantaneous transition intensity. 
The hazard rate (or function) can vary from zero (meaning no risk at all) to 
infinity (meaning the certainty of failure at that instant). Over time, the hazard 
rate can increase, decrease, remain constant, or even take on more serpentine 
shapes. There is a one-to-one relationship between the probability of survival 
past a certain time and the amount of risk that has been accumulated up to that 
time. The hazard rate measures the rate at which risk is accumulated. 
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Given one of the four functions2 that describe the probability distribution of 
failure times, the other three are completely determined. In particular, one may 
derive from a hazard function the probability density function, the cumulative 
distribution function, and the survivor function. In order to show these 
relationships, it is first convenient to define another function, the cumulative 
hazard function: 
H (t) =Ih (u)du (9) 
And thus 
H(t)= £f(U)d u=-f 
1d 
S(u) du=-In{S(t)} (10) 
S (u) S (u) du 
The cumulative hazard function measures the total amount of risk that has 
been accumulated up to time t. From equation 10, we can see the relationship 
between accumulated risk and the probability of survival. We can write: 
S(tý=exp{-H(t)} (11) 
F(tý =1-exp{-H(t)} (12) 
f (t) = h(t)exp{-H(t)} (13) 
When data are left truncated we do not observe firms from the onset of risk. 
That is, rather than observing firms from t=0 until failure, we observe them 
from t= to until failure with to > 0. When the failure is an absorbing event (e. g. 
Z All forms, S (t), h (t), F (t), f (t), describe exactly the same probability distribution for T 
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a firm being acquired), after which observation is pointless, we will instead want 
to deal with the conditional variants of S("), h("), F("), f ("), H("). The 
important features here is that those who failed (being acquired) during period 0 
to to will never be observed in our datasets. The conditional forms of the above 
functions are: 
h(t/T>to)=h(t) (14) 
H(t/T>to)=H(t)-H(to) (15) 
F(tIT>to)=F(t) 
F(t°) 
(16) 
(to) 
(17) f (t/T > to) =f 
(t) 
S(to) 
s(t IT > lo) =s 
(t) 
(18) 
(o) 
Note that h (t) is unaffected by the conditioning; it is an instantaneous rate 
and so is not a function of the past. 
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B4. Accelerated failure time (AFT) models 
In this study we make use of models belonging to the accelerated failure time 
(AFT) family of survival time models. The AFT models assume a linear 
relationship between the log of (latent) survival time t and characteristics X: 
ln(t)=ßx+z (19) 
Where ß is a vector of parameters, and z is an error term. 
This expression can be re-written as 
Y=, u+6u or 
Y-P 
=u 
6 
(20) 
Where Y =1n (t), p= 8X, and u=Z is an error term with density function 
6 
f (u), and 6 is a scale factor which is related to the shape parameters for the 
hazard function. Distributional assumptions about u determine which sort of 
regression model describes the random variable t. Table 1 presents different AFT 
models as implied by different error term distributions. 
Table B 1: Different error term distributions imply different AFT models 
Distribution of error term Distribution of t 
Extreme Value (1 parameter) Exponential 
Extreme Value (2 parameter) Weibull 
Logistic Log-logistic 
Normal Lognormal 
Log Gamma (3 parameter 
Gamma) 
Generalized Gamma 
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From equation 19 and letting yr = exp (-ßX) = exp (-, u), it follows that: 
In(tti)=z (21) 
The term V/, which is constant by assumption, acts like a time scaling factor. 
Thus, 
0 If yi >I: it is as if the clock ticks faster. The time scale for a firm with 
characteristics X is tw , whereas the time scale for a 
firm with 
characteristics X=0 is t. Failure is `accelerated' or survival time 
shortened. 
0 If yp <I: it is as if the clock ticks slower. Failure is `decelerated' or 
survival time lengthened 
This time scaling property is also present in the survivor function. The 
survivor function of AFT models is given by: 
S(t, X) = So [texp(-, u)] = So [t i] (22) 
Where y' =exp(-p). 
It follows that iv >1 is equivalent to having ,u<0 and yr <I 
is equivalent to 
having p>0. In sum, the effect of the covariates is to change the time scale by a 
constant (survival time-invariant) scale factor cv = exp(-p) . The AFT regression 
coefficient relates proportionate changes in survival time to a unit change in a 
given regressor, with all other characteristics held fixed. 
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Also, the relationship between the hazard rate for a firm with characteristics 
X and the hazard rate for the case when X=0, i. e. the `baseline' hazard ho () , 
is given for AFT models by: 
h(t, Xý=yrho(tyr) (23) 
A relatively straightforward generalization of the AFT hazard to allow for 
time-varying covariates is to suppose that: 
h(t, X: w, ho(tyl, ) (24) 
235 
Appendix B The Scope of Survival Analysis 
B5. Estimation of the survivor and hazard functions 
In this section we consider estimators of the survivor and hazard functions- 
the empirical counterparts of the concepts that we considered in the previous 
sections. These estimators are distinguished into two3 forms nonparametric and 
parametric all depending on what we are willing to assume about the form of the 
survivor function and about how the survival experience is affected by 
covariates. 
B5.1 Nonparametric analysis 
Nonparametric estimators, make no assumptions about neither the distribution 
of the failure (acquisition) times nor how covariates serve to change or shift the 
survival experience. With survival data, the key insight into removing the 
distributional assumption is that, because events (acquisitions) occur at given 
times, these events may be ordered and the analysis may be performed using 
ordering of the survival times exclusively. Because the nonparametric analysis is 
informative about the pattern of duration dependence, it may assist with the 
choice of parametric model. Nonparametric analysis follows the philosophy of 
letting the data speak for itself. 
We can use nonparametric methods such as Kaplan and Meier (1958) or the 
method of Nelson (1972) and Aalen (1978) to estimate the probability of survival 
3 There is also semiparametric estimators but are not considered in this study (see section B5.2 
for a justification) 
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past a certain point in time. These methods take into account censoring and other 
characteristics of survival data4. 
The estimator of Kaplan and Meier is a nonparametric estimate of the survivor 
function S (t) , the probability of survival past time t (or equivalently, the 
probability of failing after t). For a dataset with observed failure times, t1...., tk , 
where k is the number of distinct failure times observed in the data, the Kaplan- 
Meier estimate at any time t is given by 
l ný -d (25) 
Where n; is the number of firms at risk at time t, and d; is the number of 
failures at time t,. The product is over all observed failure times less than or 
equal to t. 
The Kaplan-Meier estimate operates only on observed failure times and not at 
censoring times. When censoring occurs at some time other than an observed 
failure time, the effect is simply that the censored firms are dropped from the `the 
number at risk' total without processing the firm as having failed. However, 
when some firms are censored at the same time that others fail we assume that 
failure occurred before censoring (see Cleves at el, 2004). On the other hand, left 
truncation causes no problems with the Kaplan-Meier calculation. In n, is the 
number of firms at risk (eligible o fail), and this number simply needs to take into 
account that firms are not at risk of failing until they come under observation. 
When they enter, we increase n, to reflect this fact. 
4 There exists a vast literature on performing nonparametric regression using methods such as 
lowess or local polynomial regression; however, such methods do not adequately deal with 
censoring and other issues unique to survival data. 
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On the other hand, Nelson-Aalan estimator provides a nonparametric method 
for obtaining the empirical cumulative hazard function. That estimator is given 
by 
H(t)= 
i/I; sr n, 
(26) 
Where n; is the number at time t, 5 d, is the number of failures at time t; , and 
the sum is over all distinct failure times less than or equal to t. 
Theoretically, the survival and cumulative hazard functions are related by 
equation 10. We can by using this relation to convert one estimate to the other. It 
has been shown that, in small samples, the Kaplan-Meier estimator is superior 
when estimating the survivor function, and the Nelson-Aalen estimator is 
superior when estimating the cumulative hazard function. For the survivor 
function and the cumulative hazard function, both the Kaplan-Meier estimator 
and the Nelson-Aalan estimator are consistent estimates of each, and the statistics 
are asymptotically equivalent (see Klein and Moeschberger, 2003). That is, in 
very large samples, it does not matter how one estimates the survivor function, 
whether by Kaplan-Meier or by transforming the Nelson-Aalen. 
B5.2 Parametric analysis 
Nonparametric and semiparametric methods compare firms at the times when 
acquisitions happen to occur. Parametric methods, on the other hand, do not base 
their results on such comparisons. Rather, for each record in the data spanning 
(t01, t, J, parametric estimation schemes use probabilities that depict what occurs 
over the whole interval, given what is known about the firm during this time. For 
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example, consider a survivor model where failure depends on a covariate xi . 
Hypothesize that one of the firms in the dataset has the following x, profile: 
Figure B4: Example of a firm's survival profile 
x, for firm B 
x, (firm is acquired at t3) 
0 t11 t21 t3 
analysis time t 
In semiparametric analysis (for example, cox regression), if no other firm is 
acquired between t, and t2 , 
it simply does not matter that x, blipped up for this 
firm because no comparisons will be made in that interval using the temporarily 
higher value of x,. In other words, in this case, we would obtain the same results 
in semi-parametric models if the blip in the time profile for this subject did not 
exist; i. e., if x, remained at its initial value throughout. The blip in xl , however, 
would be of importance in a parametric model, regardless of whether other 
failures occurred in the interval because the parametric model would exploit all 
the information. 
Semi-parametric models are not making an error by ignoring the blip- it is 
merely being inefficient. Suppose that higher values of x, increase failure rates. 
Conditional on having survived beyond time t2 , the 
fact that the blip occurred 
becomes irrelevant in terms of subsequent survival. The information in the blip is 
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that it indeed occurred and the firm managed to survive it, which means that this 
firm provides evidence that higher values of x, really do not lead a firm to fail. 
Semi-parametric models would ignore that unless other failures occurred in the 
interval, in which case some amount of the information contained in the interval 
would be exploited in improving the estimate of the effect of x1. Parametric 
methods would not ignore that information. 
The likelihood functions of the parametric models-regardless of the particular 
one under consideration- all follow the same general form: 
ci -ci 
L(ßx. o)= Fl f('i/xoo, e) S(r/xifo) (27) 
i=1 . 
S'(ro, /X, ß "©) 
S(to1/x, ß.:. e) 
Where f () is the density function of the assumed distribution, S(") is the 
corresponding survivor function, and (to, , t,, c,, X, 
) is the information on the i`h 
firm. The parameters ßx and 0 are estimated from the data: ß are the 
coefficients on X, and 0 are ancillary parameters, if any, required by the 
assumed distribution. 
The triple summarizes the survival experience for the firm: the firm 
is observed and known not to fail during the period t0 <t<t, , and then at t=t, , 
the firm either fails (c, = 1) or is censored (c, = 0). Thus, the powers (1- c, ) and 
c, in 27 serve to select either S(") or f () as the numerator of the ratio. If 
censored, S(. ) is chosen, and that is the probability that the firm survives from 0 
to t, without failure. If c, =1, if the firm fails, f () is chosen, and that is the 
`probability' of failure at time t; . Either way, the numerator is divided by 
S (to, / X; ßx, 0), which is the probability of surviving up to time to; , and thus 
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whichever is the numerator is converted to a conditional probability or 
probability density for the time span under consideration. 
Equation 27 may be equivalently written as 
n 
ý'iß 
» 
e) 
L(ßx, 19) -fI[h`ti / Xißx/9I] 
ci 's 
(ii / 
(28) 
l-I s(t0i /Xißx, 0) 
C 
The first part h 
(ti / Xi, ßx, 0) l, becomes h (ti / Xißx, O) if the span ends 
in failure (which is the corresponding risk of that event at time t, ), or 1 if the 
span ends in censoring. The second part is the probability of survival from to, 
until t; . 
Furthermore, equation 28 can be written as: 
L(ß 
, 
6) = Fl 
[h(ti 
/ Xlßx, O)]' 
[wiS(ti 
/ Xi, ßx, 0)] (29) 
Or 
logt(Qx, e)-y_ ýoilogh(ti/Xißx, O)+log[wis(ti/Xißx, 0)] (30) 
i=I 
Where w, =1 /S (to, / X, Jix, 0) . Think of the w, as 
being like weighting 
variable: one weights the delayed entry observations by a type of inverse- 
probability weight to account for the left truncation. The later in time that t01 is 
(the closer to t, ), the larger the weight. If there is no left truncation (to, = 0), then 
s(to, /x, ßT, e) =1=w, 
All parametric likelihoods are of the above form, and the only difference 
among the models is how S (} (and therefore f (") and h ()) is chosen. 
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Note that the terms of the likelihood function are stated in terms of firms. In 
simple survival data, there is one-to-one correspondence between observations 
and firms. But in more complex cases, a firm may have multiple observations. In 
that case, parametric models are generalized to allow time-varying covariates. 
In specific estimation of continuous time parametric regression models 
incorporating time-varying covariates requires episode splitting. We have to split 
the survival time (episode) for each firm into subperiods within which each time- 
varying covariate is constant; i. e. we have to create multiple records for each 
firm, with one record per subperiod. What is the logic behind this? 
Consider a firm i with two different values for a covariate: 
X, if t<u 
x2 ift>u 
The log likelihood contribution for a firm i in the data structure that we have 
is: 
log L, (ßx, 0)=c; logh(t, l Xßx, O)+log[wS(t, l X, ßX0)] (31) 
But 
log[w, S(t, /X, ßx. O)]=log S(u/x; ßx, 0)w'S(t, 
/X'ßx, e) 
S(u/X, ßX, 0) 
(32) 
=log[S(u/X, ß"O)w, ]+log 
S(t, /X, ß, 0) 
S(u /X, ßx, O) 
Thus the log of the probability of survival until t, equals the log of probability 
of survival to time u (weight w, incorporates left truncation as above) plus the 
log of probability of survival to t, , conditional on entry at u. 
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So what we do is to create one new record with c, = 0, t=u (a right censored 
episode), plus one new record summarizing an episode with `delayed entry' at 
time u and censoring indicator c, has the value as in the original data. In the first 
episode and record, the time-varying covariate takes on the value x, and in the 
second record the time-varying covariate takes on the value x2. Table B2 
presents a summary of the old and new data structures. 
Table B2: Example of episode splitting 
Surival Entry Time varying 
Record# Censoring indicator time time covariates value 
Single data record for i 
1c0 or 1 t; ta; - 
Multiple data records for i (after episode splitting) 
I c; =0 u to; x, 
2 c; =0 or 1 t; u x2 
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B6. Unobserved heterogeneity ('frailty') 
In the multivariate models considered so far, all differences between firms 
were assumed to be captured using observed explanatory variables (the X 
vector). In this section, we consider generalizations of the earlier models to allow 
for unobserved individual effects. Variables captured these unobserved 
individual effects might be relevant because of omitted variables (unobserved in 
the available data, or intrinsically unobservable) and of measurement errors in 
observed survival times or regressors (see Lancaster, 1990, chapter 4). 
If these effects are important but `ignored' in modeling the literature suggests 
several findings: 
" The `no-frailty' model will over-estimate the degree of negative duration 
dependence in the hazard (i. e. under-estimate the degree of positive duration 
dependence). In other words, the hazard rate from `no-frailty' model increases 
less fast, or falls faster, that does the `true' hazard. Controlling for observable 
differences, firms with unobserved characteristics associated with higher exit 
rates leave the state more quickly than others. Hence `survivors' at longer t 
increasingly comprise those with low unobservable individual effects which, in 
turn, implies a lower hazard, and the estimate of hazard is an underestimate of 
`true' one (see, Gutierrez, 2002) 
0 The proportionate response of the hazard rate to a change in a regressor 
k declines with time 
0 One gets an under-estimate of the true proportionate response of the 
hazard to a change in a regressor k from the no-frailty-model 
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In order to present the unobserved heterogeneity concept in continuous time 
case we consider the model (assuming that there are no time-varying covariates): 
h(t, X/v)=vh(t, X) (33) 
Where h (t, X) is the hazard rate depending on observable characteristics X, 
and v is an unobservable individual effect that scales the no-frailty component. 
Random variable v is assumed to have the following properties: 
" v>0 
0 E(v)=1, unit mean 
0 Finite variance Q2 >0 
0 Distributed independently of t and X 
It is shown that the relationship between the frailty survivor function and the 
no-frailty survivor function is: 
s(t, x/v)=[s(t, x)]v (34) 
Thus the individual effect v scales no-frailty component survivor function. 
Firms with above-average values of v leave relatively fast (their hazard rate is 
higher, other things being equal, and their survival times are smaller), and the 
opposite occurs for firms with below-average values of v. 
How does one estimate frailty models, given that the individual effect is 
unobserved? Clearly we cannot estimate values of v themselves since, by 
construction, they are unobserved. In other words, there are as many individual 
effects as firms in the data set, and there are not enough degrees of freedom left 
to fit these parameters. However if we suppose the distribution of v has a shape 
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whose functional form is summarized in terms of only a few key parameters, 
then we can estimate those parameters with the data available. 
We first specify a distribution for the random variable v, where this 
distribution has a particular parametric functional form (e. g. summarizing the 
variance of V. Then we work with some survivor function 
S, (t, X)=S(t, X/ß, a') and not S(t, X/ß, v). 
Then 
S, (t, X)= ý[s(t, x)]'g(v)dv (35) 
Where g(v) is the probability density function for v ('mixing' distribution). 
The most commonly used specification for the mixing distribution is the Gamma 
distribution, with unit mean and variance a2 . An alternative mixing distribution 
to the Gamma is the Inverse Gaussian distribution. But this is less commonly 
used (see Lancaster, 1990) 
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APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DATA USED IN 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Duration 7.80 3.90 1 15 
Stock 18 15 0 58 
Order 3 6 -10 20 
Profitability 
ROE(t) 0.20 0.90 -33.04 18.81 
NIA(t) 0.04 0.18 -5.81 0.62 
EAR(t) 1185 6341 -50545 158826 
Liquidity 
CR 0.15 0.21 0.04 1.29 
WCTA 1.70 8.13 0.01 4.90 
WCS 1.59 12.12 0.08 4.62 
Leverage 
TLTA 0.19 0.16 0.08 4.18 
LDMV 0.12 0.15 0.04 3.89 
Growth 
SGR 0.48 8.35 -1 18.90 
AGR -0.27 11.57 -4 28.50 
EPSGR -0.84 29.48 -17 23 
Size 
NS 1987 2632 0.45 20089 
TA 11316 53087 3.38 631783 
DIV 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.91 
q ratio 0.19 0.16 0.01 4.18 
PE 0.29 1.23 0.06 60.07 
MT13V 2.51 7.06 0.22 13.80 
Appendix D Effects of Stock and Order By Sector and Over Time 
APPENDIX D 
EFFECTS OF STOCK AND ORDER BY SECTOR 
AND OVER TIME 
Figure D1 and D2 present effect of stock and order by sector and over 
time, respectively. 
Figure D 1: Effect of Stock by Sector over Time 
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Figure D2: Effect of Order by Sector over time 
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